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The thesis of this dissertation is that the essential unity both in 
the variety of literary v/orks and in the life of Hatthev/ Arnold is to be 
apprehended in his dedication as a humanist to the humanization of his 
countrymen by a ^/rogram of humanistic education, which he effected through 
his poems and his essays in criticism (literary, educationa.1, religious, 
social, and political)— wherein he created an imaginative vision of the 
human condition in a naturalistic universe and advocated the actualization 
of an ideal of the good man and of the good society— so that his country­
men would be enabled to assume the social responsibilities and to pursue 
the personal opportunities involved in the inevitable development of the 
modern world as an industrial and as a democratic civilization.
Chapter I, "Introduction," contends that Arnold's imaginative vision 
of naturalistic humanism was intended to supersede the religious mythology 
of supernaturalistic Christianity, the orig-inal basis of the traditional 
Victorian cultural ideology, which was adapted to an agricultural economy 
and to an aristocratic society. Inevitably, the consequence of his en­
deavor was to create an imaginative vision that, although grounded in 
na.turalistic assumptions and animated by humanistic principles, is essen­
tially relii:;io-mythic in its effect; providing an explanation for natural 
phenomena, suppljdi^anctions for the 'social institutions and for the cultural 
life-style, and resolving; the anxiety i 'plicit in the human condition (our 
conscious involvement in the ;::ortal situation of peculiar creatures in a 
strange universe) by suggesting answers to the _reat questions of human 
existence —  tiiose concerning the nature, purpose, and relations of God, of 
nature, of society, and of man. That .'.mold deliberately dedicated himself 
to transforming the cul.tural ideology in En ,^ls.nd is indicated by evidence 
from ve,rious sources.
Chapter II, "The Images of God and of nature," examines Arnold’s 
concepts of nature and of God, thejt^as projected in his poems and essays, 
concluding that (for lij.n) God is but an aspect of nature as experienced 
from the perspective of the moral viewpoint. Cnapter III, "The Image of 
Society," proceeds to -analyse the humanist ideal of the good society that 
t-r:'iold applied as a standard in his socio.l criticisii of Victorian insti­
tutions. .-mid Chapter IV, "The Image of man," traces the humanist ideal of 
the good man as reflected in Arnold’s v;orks.
Finally, Chapter V, "Conclusion," asserts that Arnold's naturalistic 
humanism iS in effect a religious vision, satisfying reli~io-mytliic needs, 
and (in order to substantiate this assertion) compares and relates it to the 
religious attitude in the contemporary movement of naturalistic humanism, 
especially as articulated in the writings of John Kerman Randall, Jr.
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THE NATURALISTIC HUMANISM OF MATTHEW ARNOLD:
A CRITICAL REINTERPRETATION OF 
HIS IMAGINATIVE VISION
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Purposer Approach, and Procedure
With the passage of time, Matthew Arnold's eminence 
in English literature becomes increasingly plain. Both 
as a transitional figure linking his era to our own and 
as the central man of letters in his own period he fully 
deserves the thorough, searching study he has been 
receiving in recent years.1
Matthew Arnold has always excited critical controversy and 
elicited sympathetic commentary. But the recent accelera­
tion of serious scholarly interest in his works received its 
initial impetus with the publication of H. F. Lowry's edition 
of The Letters of Matthew to Arthur Hugh Clough in 1932.
"No single work has contributed more to the Arnold revival
2
of the last several decades." Its presentation of new 
information and material, with a judicious "Introduction," 
stimulated a response in literary scholars. They returned
^Leon Gottfièld, Matthew Arnold and the Romantics 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 1.
n
Frederic E. Faverty, The Victorian Poets : A Guide to
Research (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 112.
2to the literary works of Arnold with renewed interest.
Along with the other eminent Victorians, he had suffered 
from the general scorn and neglect accorded all things 
Victorian in the natural reaction of the early twentieth 
century to the previous age--despite the enthusiasm of a 
minority, like the American Neo-Humanists, for his classical 
and ethical emphasis. Landmarks in Arnoldian scholarship 
were established in successive decades; Lionel Trilling's 
"intellectual biography," Matthew Arnold (1939); C. B. Tinker 
and H . F . Lowry's The Poetry of Matthew Arnold: A
Commentary (1940), which presented more unpublished primary 
source material, and their subsequent standard edition of 
the poetry itself. The Poetical Works of Matthew Arnold 
(1950); and an edition of his private notebooks, by 
H. F. Lowry, Karl Young, and W. H. Dunn, The Notebooks of 
Matthew Arnold (1952). And now, in the present decade of 
the sixties, this scholarly attention has reached its culmi­
nation in the projected ten-volume standard edition of 
Arnold's prose works edited by Professor R. H. Super, The 
Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold, of which five hand­
some volumes have already appeared. Finally, a new edition 
of his letters is projected, for many more have been found 
since G. W. E. Russel's early edition, "censored" by the 
Arnold family, was published in 1895.
3 :
Purpose
Needless to say, the literary criticism of Arnold has 
proceeded space with the literary scholarship. Yet the com­
pleteness and success of Arnoldian scholarship has perhaps 
not been fully matched in Arnoldian criticism. An adequate 
understanding and appreciation of Matthew Arnold's intention 
and achievement as a man of letters remains, I think, to be 
fully realized. The purpose of this dissertation, as a critical 
reinterpretation of Arnold's imaginative vision, is to make 
a contribution towards a fuller and more adequate criticism 
of his literary works as a whole.
Any reader of Arnold is soon impressed with the 
catholicity of his interests as reveaWl in the multiplicity 
of his literary works. He was a man of letters who inter­
preted broadly the province of literature. Collectively, 
his literary works constitute, as it were, a "criticism of 
life." Besides poetry, his canon includes essays in literary, 
educational, religious, social, and political criticism. The 
variety of his literary activity is impressive. And it is
also rather puzzling to the student of literature and to the
literary critic. How is this variety to be accounted for?
Why was Arnold moved to produce it? What does it all mean?
Yet, despite the impression of diversity, the reader
of Arnold is also impressed with the sense of a unity that 
seems to pervade the multiplicity of his literary works.
Somehow his works seem more or less related, beyond the mere
4fact of their having been composed by a single author.
Beneath the variety of appearance, surely there must be a 
reality of unity. But to discern and to define the subtle 
and elusive principle that unites them (if there be one) is 
a complex critical process. The critical studies of Arnold, 
as of any man of letters, have usually attempted to impose a 
principle of order upon his literary productions by tracing 
in them a number of consistently recurring themes. But a 
satisfying comprehensive interpretation remains, I think, to 
be achieved. The question of unity, like that of variety, 
has yet to be answered in a convincing manner. Unless 
Arnold's works are merely the miscellaneous productions of 
an entirely undisciplined curiosity, he must have been im­
pelled by a unifying purpose to undertake the variety of 
literary activities represented in his canon. Yet he was 
anything but undisciplined and undirected, either in his life 
or in his works.
Any hypothesis that proposes to resolve the problem of 
unity and of variety in the life and works of Arnold must 
certainly, among other matters, account for his movement from 
poetry to criticism and from literary criticism in particular 
to criticism in general— educational, religious, social, and 
political. Such a hypothesis must, it would seem, account 
for this variety of occupation in terms of a unity of voca­
tion— the call of a single purpose. The particular hypothesis 
of the present study is that the literary works of Arnold
5express and create the imaginative vision of naturalistic 
humanism, whose intended effect was to supersede the tradi­
tional Victorian cultural ideology (based originally on the 
mythology of a supernaturalistic Christianity and adapted to 
an argicultural economy and to an aristocratic society), an 
ideology which had become increasingly incredible both to 
Arnold and to his age; the unity of his works, then, stems 
from his consistent endeavor to reflect an adequate and 
acceptable vision of life for modern man, and the variety 
springs from his comprehensive endeavor to extend the impli­
cations of his vision to human life in general. The thesis 
of this dissertation, then, is that the essential unity both 
in the variety of literary works and in the life of Matthew 
Arnold is to be apprehended in his dedication as a humanist 
to the humanization of his countrymen by a program of human 
istic education, which he effected through his poems and his 
essays in criticism (literary, educational, religious, social, 
and political)— wherein he created an imaginative vision of 
the human condition in a naturalistic universe and advocated 
the actualization of an ideal of the good man and of the good 
society— so that his countrymen would be enabled to assume 
the social responsibilities and to pursue the personal oppor­
tunities involved in the inevitable development of the modern 
world as an industrial and as a democratic civilization.
Approach
In an article entitled "Victorian Study: An Interdis­
ciplinary Essay," Michael Wolff has suggested that, generally.
6anything is best understood in its organic context as a part 
of a whole and that, specifically, a Victorian figure is to 
be understood best in his relation to the change which Vic­
torian culture was undergoing. Wolff contends that the cul­
ture of Victorian England was shaped by a complex of 
revolutionary forces operating between 1750 and 1830, with 
the consequence that "the aristocratic mode in political life, 
the rural mode in social life, the Christian mode in personal
3
life . . . were put on the defensive . . . He asserts
that most Victorian public figures are to be understood, then, 
"as a pre-technologically educated elite in a newly technol­
ogical society."^
With Mr. Wolff's general suggestion one readily 
agrees. Surely a broad but clearly defined cultural approach 
offers the best perspective for understanding a man in rela­
tion to his age. Although one may disagree with Mr. Wolff's 
specific theory for understanding particular Victorian 
men, it is now clear that the culture of Victorian England 
was indeed undergoing a revolutionary change. In its broadest 
aspect, i think, the change involved the shift in the culture 
of western civilization from an essentially supernaturalistic 
ideology, aristocratic society, and agricultural economy to 
an essentially naturalistic ideology, democratic society, and
3
Michael Wolff, "Victorian Study: An Interdisciplinary
Essay,"'Victorian Studies, VIII (September, 1964), p. 60.
'^Ibid., p. 62.
7industrial economy. Against this cultural background, the 
significance of Matthew Arnold may be apprehended most clearly.
Arnold strove to replace the "religious mythology" of 
supernaturalistic Christianity with the "imaginative vision" 
of naturalistic humanism. Insofar as he intended for his 
naturalistic humanism to usurp, to assume, and to fulfill cer­
tain of the functions previously performed by a religious 
mythology, his own imaginative vision may be recognized as 
itself essentially mythic in function or religious in effect. 
Inevitably, the consequence of Arnold's endeavor to supersede 
a system of religious mythology was to create an imaginative 
vision that— although grounded in naturalistic assumptions 
and animated by humanistic principles— is nonetheless to a 
large extent religio-mythic in character.
Now the essential effect of a comprehensive system of 
religious mythology, serving as the primary source of the cul­
tural ideology in a society, is to provide an explanation for 
natural phenomena, to supply sanctions for the social institu­
tions and for the cultural life-style, and to resolve the 
anxiety implicit in the human condition— our conscious involve­
ment in the mortal situation of peculiar creatures in a 
strange universe. These mythic ÿand religious functions 
account for the unity and variety of Arnold's imaginative 
vision. His competitive endeavor to replace supernaturalistic 
Christianity inevitably involved him in the effort to fulfill 
the needs that the religious mythology had previously satis­
fied. And the effort to cope with these religio-mythic
8functions necessarily determined the depth and breadth of 
his own imaginative vision. In creating his naturalistic 
humanismy Arnold so shaped his imaginative vision that ulti­
mately it reflected a relatively consistent and fairly com­
prehensive view of reality with certain focal images or 
central concepts. Thus the unity and variety of Arnold's 
imaginative vision correspond to the consistency and compre­
hensiveness of a system of religious mythology.
The content of a religio-mythic vision— whether it 
be supernaturalistic or naturalistic, primitive or sophisti­
cated— centers in its imaginative conceptions of God, of 
nature, of society, and of man. Collectively, these consti­
tute a complex of basic concepts. For the images used to 
express these concepts reveal the fundamental assumptions 
and ultimate implications involved in the vision. And the 
effect of these images within the context of a religio- 
mythic system is to suggest satisfactory answers to the great 
questions of human existence— those concerning the nature, 
purpose, and relations of man, of society, of nature, and of 
God.
Insofar as an imaginative vision in modern literature 
strives to suggest answers to these great questions, it may 
be regarded as essentially mythic in its function or religious 
in its effect, even though its assumptions be naturalistic 
rather than supernaturalistic. Thus the view of the human 
condition that is expressed and created in the poems and
9essays of Arnold may be regarded as the religio-mythic vision 
of a Victorian man of letters.
Procedure
As a critical reinterpretation of Arnold's imaginative 
vision (rather than a specifically "scholarly" investigation), 
this study does not undertake to establish any new factual 
material. Instead, its object is to propose a new generaliza­
tion to account for the existing facts already available, to 
offer a new interpretation of them. Consequently, the pro­
cedure used to support the basic generalization in this 
study is that used to substantiate any hypothesis— an inductive 
analysis of the extant facts: in this case, the internal
evidence of primary sources and the external evidence of 
secondary sources.
Some explanation of the principle of organization in 
this study is required. The organization used in the body 
of this dissertation is not chronological and historical but 
topical and analytical. This approach departs from the usual 
practice of examining the canon of an author's works in the 
order of their composition or publication. In so doing, I 
have striven to explicate Arnold's imaginative vision through 
exploring selected ideas— specifically, his concepts of God, 
of nature, of society, and of man. The rationale for this 
organization is that the analysis of these selected topics 
should lead to a comprehensive understanding of his vision.
To abstract and to analyze this complex of basic concepts 
will clearly reveal the fundamental assumptions and ultimate
10
implications of his vision. Although the element of 
stylistic texture may be neglected in the process, the 
structural unity of his vision (with which this study is 
primarily concerned) is thus emphasized and clarified. This 
is deemed a distinct advantage.^
The disadvantage of topical and analytical organiza­
tion is intricately interrelated with its advantage. 
Abstracting simplifies and clarifies, but it may also dis­
tort or misrepresent the complexity that a subject assumes 
when viewed in a concrete setting with its contextual asso­
ciations. But the advantage to be gained in this instance—  
a clarifying of the essentially religio-mythic effect of 
Arnold's imaginative vision in the Victorian age— seems to 
warrant the taking of the risk. Moreover, the risk has 
been minimized by analyzing the development of the basic 
concepts as they emerge in the chronological sequence of 
the works. For example, the idea of God is treated by trac­
ing its development within Arnold's poems and essays, from
^After every chapter in this dissertation except the 
last had been composed, I discovered that G. Robert Stange 
in his Matthew Arnold; The Poet As Humanist (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967)— just
published— had adopted the same topical and analytical 
approach in a study of Arnold's poetry. His selected topics 
("The Idea of Poetry," "The Idea of Nature," "The Idea of 
the Self," and "The Idea of Love") are not the same as mine, 
and his analysis is restricted to the poems alone. Yet, in 
the few places where our topics do touch, I am pleased to 
say, our treatments largely agree. However, I was even more 
pleased to note that Stange's reason for adopting the 
topical and analytical approach is identical with mine: 
simply, it is a new and illurainating approach to apply to 
Arnold's works.
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the earliest to the latest, so that a sense of its complexity 
as an evolving concept has been preserved.
The present study is, of course, indebted to the host 
of previous studies on Arnold, which have contributed to illu­
minating his life, art, and vision. The significant early 
books on Arnold by George Saintsbury (1899), by Herbert W.
Paul (1902> by G. W. E. Russell (1904), and by Stuart P.
Sherman (1914), were surpassed by Lionel Trilling's monumental 
study, Matthew Arnold (1939), for which all students of Arnold 
must be grateful. It has since been supplemented by 
E. K. Chamber's factual biographical sketch (1947) and by the 
psychologically oriented studies of Louis Bonnerot (1947) and 
of E. K. Brown (1948). Other studies have explored particular 
aspects of Arnold's works with scholarly thoroughness and 
critical competence: Poetry and the Criticism of Life (1931),
which includes essays on Arnold's esthetic theory and practice, 
by H. W. Garrod; The Educational Thought and Influence of 
Matthew Arnold (1950), by W. F. Connell; Matthew Arnold the 
Ethnologist (1951), a study of his typically nineteenth-century 
racial notions, by Frederic E. Faverty; The Touchstones of 
Matthew Arnold (1955), a study of his standards of literary 
criticism, by John S. Eells, Jr.; The Ethical Idealism of 
Matthew Arnold (1959), a study of his religious and moral 
ideas, by William Robbins; Matthew Arnold and John Stuart 
Mill, (1965), a comparative study of his political thought, 
by Edward Alexander; Matthew Arnold and the Classical
12
Tradition (1965), by Warren D. Anderson; and two recent and 
excellent studies of Arnold's poetry— Imaginative Reason 
(1966), by A. Dwight Culler, and Matthew Arnold; The Poet as 
Humanist (1967), by G. Robert Stange. From among many such 
books (as well as numerous scholarly and critical articles in 
literary journals), these at least must be singled out and 
acknowledged as outstanding contributions to the criticism 
of Arnold's ideas and works.
However, none of these previous studies has suffi­
ciently grasped and analyzed in a concentrated treatment the 
continuity, consistency, and centrality of the naturalistic 
assumptions and humanistic principles that not merely inform 
but actually dominate the imaginative vision of Arnold.
That Arnold's views were influenced by naturalistic and by 
humanistic notions has, it is true, been acknowledged to a 
certain extent; but that his imaginative vision may be 
defined, interpreted, and apprehended most clearly as a unified 
and coherent naturalistic and humanistic ideology has not been 
generally recognized. Nor has any of the previous studies of 
Arnold sufficiently conceived that, because he created and 
expressed his naturalistic humanism in order to supersede a 
religious mythology, much of the character of his imaginative 
vision is determined and explained by the circumstantial 
requirement that inevitably it had to assume and to perform 
certain religio-mythic functions. The contribution of this 
dissertation towards a more adequate criticism of Arnold,
13
then, lies in its endeavor, first, to reinterpret his imagi­
native vision as a comprehensive and consistent naturalistic 
humanism and, second, to elucidate its religio-mythic effect. 
Hence, in its relation to previous studies, the present study 
may be regarded as partly a synthesis, assimilating what has 
been established as valid in the preceding interpretations 
of Arnold within the larger context of a critical 
reinterpretation.
In order to achieve the purpose of this study, the 
remainder of this "Introduction" will be devoted to back­
ground material, designed to make clear the extent of Arnold's 
awareness of the condition of his age and his conception of 
his own role in changing that condition. The three chapters 
in the body of the text will then be devoted to an analysis 
of the naturalistic assumptions and humanistic principles 
that consistute the foundation for Arnold's concepts of God, 
nature, society, and man. And, finally, the "Conclusion" 
will be devoted to the elucidation of the religio-mythic 
effect of Arnold's imaginative vision by a comparison of his 
position with the consciously religious perspective of the 
twentiety-century movement of naturalistic humanism, espe­
cially as apprehended and articulated in the writings of 
John Herman Randall, Jr.
14
Background Information; Historical and Biographical
The Function of Myth in Life and Art 
In the popular or common sense, of course, the word 
myth is used simply to denote an idea that is false, such as 
the "myth" of racial superiority. But in the more technical 
or scholarly sense, the term myth is used to denote a story 
that explains the origin and operation of a natural or social 
phenomenon not in scientific but in supernatural or imagina­
tive terms. The genesis of such a myth is explained by the 
processes of primitive psychology. For the primitive imagi­
nation operated in accordance with the psychological principal 
of analogical association: the unknown or unfamiliar was
apprehended in terms of its resemblance to the familiar and 
known. Myths are thus the result of anthropomorphic projec­
tions and imaginative personifications of natural phenomena 
by early man. The natural was interpreted in terms of the 
human. The activities of nature were explained as the work­
ings of spirits or gods, who were like men but supernaturally 
(or superhumanly) great. Hence the thundering clouds were 
conceived as being manned by an angry god— Yahweh or Zeus.
The ultimate consequence'^^of the myth-making imagina­
tion in primitive man was the creation of a system of 
mythology, a cycle of numerous and interrelated myths. After 
a specific version of the creation myth had established the 
centrality of certain images, themes, and figures, the ensuing
15
cycle of myths collectively explained for primitive man the 
origin and operation of all things in his universe, both in 
the heavens above and on the earth below, through supernatural 
agents of causation— the gods.  ^ Primitive theology, cosmol­
ogy, sociology, and psychology were all interpreted by 
reference t-> the cycle of myths, which provided fairly compre­
hensive and relatively consistent images of man, society, 
nature, and the gods.
Primitive man regarded his system of mythology as 
extremely significant, for it supplied the ideological basis 
of his culture. To the anthropologist, as a student of prim­
itive man, the term culture signifies the totality of human 
inventions and creations, both technological and ideological. 
The culture of early man included, therefore, not only his 
tools, weapons, utensils, shelters, ornaments, and clothing; 
it also included his weltanshauung— the ideology 6f imagina­
tive conceptions that he held concerning the nature, purpose, 
and relations of man, nature, and the gods and, consequently, 
concerning the structure and function of his social institu­
tions. This cultural ideology had its source in the mythos, 
or mythic world-view, embodied in his system of mythology.
As an imaginative vision of reality, the mythos provided an 
acceptable explanation of the entire universe in which
^On the central significance of a creation myth in 
determining the structure of mythic belief, see Mircea Eliade, 
"Cosmogonic Myth and 'Sacred History,'" Religious Studies, II 
(April, 1967), 171-183.
16
primitive man lived and moved and had his being; and it 
supplied the sanction for the modes and forms of his social 
life. The cultural ideology embodied in a mythos was thus 
the world-view to which early man strove to adapt his life 
and institutions as to reality itself, for to him it was 
reality. The cultural technology (the material inventions 
of the culture) was but the actualization of potentialities 
assumed, implied, or envisioned within the cultural ideology. 
Hence, from the viewpoint of anthropology, the mythology of 
primitive man performed an extremely significant role in his 
culture as the primary source and embodiment of his ideology.^
In recent decades, the concept of "myth" has been 
assuming increasing significance in literary criticism. In 
a sophisticated and literary sense of the term myth,
William Van O ’Connor, a modern critic, haë written of "the 
Shakespearean or Elizabethan myths : that of divine and
earthly governance, with the accompanying belief in man's 
dignity and potential nobility, and that of the transcendant 
importance and power of love, with the accompanying belief 
in plenitude and ripeness."® O'Connor's use of the alterna­
tive adjectives, "Shakespearean or Elizabethan," suggests
^See Ralph L. Beals and Harry Hoijer, "The Nature of 
Culture," An Introduction to Anthropology (second edition;
New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), pp.223-48.
^William Van O'Connor, "Modern Literary Criticism," 
Contemporary Literary Scholarship: A Critical Review, ed.
Lewis Leary (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1958), 
p. 229.
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his recognition that the "myth" of Shakespeare is indeed that 
of his age, or at least a private version of it. The Eliza­
bethan myth itself (as described by E. M. W. Tillyard in The 
Elizabethan World-Picture) was a Renaissance modification of 
the Medieval world-view. And the Médiéval view of reality, 
in turn, had been a synthesis of the ancient Greek idea of 
the chain of being (as described by Arthur 0. Lovejoy in The 
Great Chain of Being) and of the mythos of primitive Chris­
tianity. What all of this suggests is that the literary 
artists in the ancient, medieval, and renaissance epochs, no 
less than the myth-makers in primitive cultures, continued 
to reflect or to create a mythic imaginative vision of the 
human condition in their art.
Ancient classical culture was grounded in the mythos 
of pagan mythology, originally inherited from more primitive 
times, although considerably modified. The emergence and 
development of rationalism ampung the ancient sophists, 
sceptics, and philosophers then led ultimately to a generally 
incredulous attitude toward pagan mythology. Subsequently 
the mythos of primitive Christianity was gradually established 
and accepted as more valid in a large part of the ancient 
world. Classical culture was consequently accommodated to the 
Christian mythology. Since the advent and triumph of Chris­
tianity, the successive epochs in the history of western 
civilization— ancient, medieval, renaissance, and even the 
Enlightment— have been characterized by the accommodation of
18
secular cultural advances to a basically Christian mythos, 
which has served as the ideological foundation upon which 
the structure of western civilization has been reared. It 
is in this sense that the culture of western civilization 
has been continuously and fundamentally Christian. Of course, 
the secular advances also gradually modified the mythos of 
Christianity, but ultimately it was the latter which always 
assimilated the former.
The climax of Christian culture surely occurred in 
the high middle ages. The medieval religious mythology was 
essentially an accommodation of the greek concept of the 
chain of being to the primitive Christian mythos, resulting 
in the monolithic structure of Medieval Catholic Christianity. 
This religious mythology was crystallized in the Divine 
Comedy of Dante. But then the mythology of Christianity began 
to disintegrate. With the rediscovery of the classical cul­
ture of antiquity, the Renaissance emerged: the same ration­
alism that had dissolved the mythology of paganism was 
reintroduced into western civilization; and the seeds that 
would sprout, grow, blossom, and ripen as the modern world­
view were first planted. In his intellectual history of 
modern western civilization. The Shaping of the Modern Mind, 
Crane Brinton has discussed the successive ideologies or 
"cosmologies" that have attempted to provide answers to the 
"big questions" about God, nature, society, and man, as the 
cultural ideology that constituted the foundation for the
19
monolithic structure of Medieval Catholic Christianity grad­
ually disintegrated. This movement— beginning in the 
Renaissance, advancing in the Enlightenment, and accelerating 
in the scientific revolution of the nineteenth century— has 
caused the mythos of supernaturalistic Christianity to become 
increasingly incredible to the educated. As J. Hillis Miller 
notes in The Pisapperance of God; "Post-medieval literature 
records . . . the gradual withdrawal of Gdd from the world," 
and "an important group of nineteenth and twentieth-century 
[including Matthew Arnold] represent the culmination of a
9
long process."
In the nineteenth century the consequence of this 
development was that the man of letters was losing the mythos 
that, accommodated to the cosmologies of successive cultures, 
had afforded a relatively unified vision of reality for men 
in western civilization. The ultimate effect of this loss 
was to be the emergence of multiple visions of reality and 
the accompanying confusion that we recognize as characteristic 
of our own contemporary culture. Lacking a basis of generally 
accepted myth to reflect in his art, the man of letters must 
create his own "myth." One thinks immediately of W. B. Yeats, 
T. S. Eliot, and James Joyce, in whose works the imaginative 
use of myth, if not its actual creation, is certainly
9
J. Hillis Miller, The Disappearance Of God; Five 
Nineteenth-Century Writers (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1963) p. 1.
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pervasive. The modern literary artist, like the primitive 
myth-maker, must create an original "myth" or use the tradi­
tion of broken myths in a novel manner.
Like the man of letters, the modern man in the street,
who may suppose that he has shed all the illusions of ancient
myth, has nevertheless a modern mythos by which he lives. He 
has inherited or constructed an imaginative vision that pro­
vides his answers to the great questions of human existence.
In nearly every respect, his modern imaginative vision is the 
equivalent of an ancient mythos. Its function is essentially 
religio-mythic. However, in order to accommodate itself to 
contemporary conditions, the modern imaginative vision is 
"displaced," to a greater or lesser degree, from the unadul­
terated mode of the purely mythic, in the sense that Northrop 
Frye uses the term "displacement" in his Anatomy of Criticism. 
Modern man is still endowed with the same symbol-creating, 
myth-making, analogical imagination as primitive man. But it 
has been checked and corrected by the subsequent development 
of the analytical intellect, which breaks down the syntheses 
of the imagination. There is tension between the literal and 
metaphorical modes of apprehending the world in modern man—  
unlike primitive man, whose imagination was not so inhibited.
^^Northrop Frye, "Archetypal Criticism: Theory of
Myths," Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton, :
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, .1957), pp. 131-239.
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In order to be intellectually respectable, the 
structure of a modern religio-mythic vision must be reared 
upon a foundation of scientific knowledge. It must not be 
incompatible with the empirically, pragmatically, or mathe­
matically verified facts of science. But the interpretation 
of these facts, the elucidation of their significance in 
relation to human life, is essentially a religio-mythic 
exercise. Thus the moment when even a scientist speculates 
on the human significance of the knowledge that he has dis­
covered or established, he is forsaking his role as a scientist 
and acting as a man— conceiving religio-mythic images of God, 
nature, society, or man. The images that he conceives emerge 
from his creative imagination. And if he were to give effec­
tive expression to his image-concepts in an esthetic medium, 
such as poetry, he would be recognized as an artist. As 
'Joseph Campbell asks in The Masks of God; Primitive Mythology, 
"Can mythology have sprung from any minds but the minds of 
artists?"^^
The Cultural Crisis in Victorian England
Perhaps every age regards itself as a transitional 
age. And in a very real sense, of course, every age is indeed 
an age of transition: in any period, the present is always
involved in a process of change from the condition of the past
^^Joseph Campbell, The Masks of God: Primitive
Mythology (New York: The Viking Press, 1959), p. 472.
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to the condition of the future. So it was in Victorian 
England, except that the pace of change had accelerated. In 
the Victorian period, perhaps the most significant development 
in the history of human culture reached its climax— the shift 
in western civilization from a culture whose ideology was 
originally based on supernaturalistic mythology and adapted to 
an aristocratic society and an agricultural economy a cul­
ture whose ideology is essentially based on naturalistic 
assumptions and adapted to a democratic society and an indus­
trial economy.
The history of this shift in ideology from supernatural­
ism to naturalism is long. But the time when this movement 
reached its crisis and climax was in the Victorian period.
For religious scepticism then became general and pervasive, 
even among the working classes. The break-up of supernaturalism 
reached such proportions in the Victorian period that it con­
stituted a crisis, for it threatened to dissolve the ground of 
the cultural ideology that was ultimately derived from it. All 
of the institutions of a society— politics, economics, religion, 
the family, morality, recreation, education, and the arts--are 
ultimately grounded in the cultural ideology that the society 
accepts. This cultural ideology (with its basic concepts of 
God, nature, society, and man) provides the theoretical basis 
that determines the practical structure and function of the 
institutions in a society. The working, form of the various 
institutions is an implementation of the implications involved
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in the view of reality expressed in the ideology. It is true 
that the ideology is partly a rationalization for the struc­
ture and function of the social institutions; but it is also 
true that once it is established (however it was formulated), 
the cultural ideology operates as the primary determining 
force in shaping and perpetuating the forms of social institu­
tions and the patterns of individual lives. These traditional 
forms direct the members of a society in activity that is 
vital to their well-being, with the authority and sanction of 
their supposed ground in the very nature of reality.
The situation in Victorian England was approaching a 
critical juncture. The inherited cultural ideology was 
riddled with confusion, uncertainty, and inconsistency. The 
relatively stable cultural ideology of eighteenth-century 
Neo-Classicism (the accommodation of classical culture and 
Christian ideas to the Newtonian world-machine) had afforded 
a rational authority and sanction for the structure and func­
tion of its institutions and for the pattern of its social 
life. But as the cultural ideology of eighteenth-century 
Neo-Classicism disintegrated under the pressure of technologi­
cal and ideological innovations, it was not succeeded by a 
uniformly acceptable view of reality. The complex of basic 
concepts about God, nature, society, and man were not 
re-established in an adequate and unified cultural ideology. 
Insofar as the imaginative vision of Romanticism constituted 
the basis for a cultural ideology, its organic images of God,
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nature, society, and man were either too reactionary or too 
radical for most men to accept. The Romantic concepts were 
influential for only a short time in the lives of only a few 
men and in no uniform way, as the varied epithets of the time—  
the Lake School, the Satanic School, and the Cockney School—  
attested and as our continuing quest to define Romanticism, 
issuing in such varied definitions, continues to attest. If 
anything, the effect of the Romantic movement was to compound 
the confusion in the cultural ideology even more by offering 
other alternatives, much as the multiple sects of a religion 
must confuse the seeker of absolute truth.
The consequence of confusion in the cultural ideology 
of Victorian England was, of course, confusion in the theory 
and practive of its social institutions. As perhaps never 
before, the institutions of politics, religions, economics, 
education, and the arts were struggling to cope with new con­
ditions and problems with no sure definition of their structure 
and function in a generally accepted cultural ideology. In 
politics, the development of democracy created a crucial situa­
tion. In economics, the continuing spread of industrialism 
brought many problems in its wake. In religion, the source of 
Protestant authority, the Bible, was being widely discredited 
and, concurrently, the influence of the churches was declining. 
And the function of the arts was also in question, as the 
various schools of esthetic theory advanced their several
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claims. Institutional confusion is inevitably the accompani­
ment of a loss of faith in the cultural ideology.
Of course, when the theoretical basis of a social cul­
ture begins to be questioned by its own members or when the 
institutional and individual activity greatly diverge from 
the generally held theoretical basis, then the conservative 
and preservativelforces in the society begin to generate 
counter-active agents. Prophets, or social critics, appear. 
What may be called the "prophetic response" to a condition 
of social danger varies with the situation. If the threat 
to the well-being of the society seems to reside in a failure 
to practice a basically sound ideology, then the role of the 
prophet is simply to exhort reform. He may first urge the 
leaders to require more strict observance of traditional 
forms by the people. If the rulers will not listen, then he 
may turn to the people. If the danger is ideological in 
nature, then the prophet may pursue one of several courses, 
depending on his analysis and interpretation of the threat.
If a rival but "evil" ideology is establishing itself, the 
prophet may urge a reactionary return to the good old ideas 
of yesteryear. If the cultural ideology is outworn and 
inadequate, then he may urge the acceptance of a novel imagi­
native vision of the human condition— a vision that, if 
generally accepted, would become central in the newly emerg­
ing cultural ideology. For once a new cultural ideology is 
accepted, once a new view of reality is established, the forms
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of institutions and the patterns of human life will inevitably 
conform to it as the ground of their practical activity.
The prophetic response to the crisis of Victorian 
England— its loss of an established and accepted cultural 
ideology, with the consequent institutional confusion— was 
plentiful. It is represented by many voices in the discord- 
and choir of Victorian sages,including among others Thomas 
Carlyle, John Henry Newman, John Stuart Mill, John Ruskin, 
Thomas Henry Huxley, William Morris, Walter Pater, and 
Matthew Arnold. All of these men, each in his own way, 
responded to the cultural crisis in Victorian England, con­
cerning themselves with what they thought were the greatest 
problems of the time and proposing solutions that range from 
a reactionary conservatism to a radical liberalism. Emery 
Neff has described the conditions in Victorian England, 
referring to "the stress and strain of a society in often 
bewilderingly rapid change, trying desperately to preserve in 
a life increasingly industrial and urban the human values of 
the past. Into this effort every form of literature, even
12art criticism and superficially 'pure' poetry, was drawn."
^^Emery Neff, "Social Background and Social Thought," 
The Reinterpretation of Victorian Literature, ed. Joseph E. 
Baker (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1950), p. 9.
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The Personal Crisis of Matthew Arnold
One wonders if our literary criticism and biography 
do not often underestimate the force of what really takes 
place in a man who, like Arnold, once thought of himself, 
even in childhood, as a Christian— a Christian believing 
in personal immortality, in the full significance of 
Christ as the son of a loving God, dying for mankind and 
rising from the dead . . . .Will he . . . ever quite 
escape the memory of that first mind-filling and heart-
filling commitment?13
In Matthew Arnold's first volume of poetry. The 
Strayed Reveller and Other Poems, published in 1849, there is 
clear evidence of the young man's departure from the dogmatic 
orthodoxy of traditional Christianity, with its supernatural­
istic orientation. The assumptions, assertions, and implica­
tions of these published poems concerning nature and God will 
be examined in the next chapter. Our immediate concern is 
the private history of Arnold's conversion from orthodox 
Christianity to more heterodox, if not heretical, religious 
views.
The history begins, of course, when Matthew was a boy 
in the home of his father. During the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Dr. Thomas Arnold was perhaps the most 
prominent leader of the Broad Church movement in the Anglican 
church. He was notorious for his liberalism in religion. How­
ever , the question of the nature and degree of Dr. Arnold's
13professor H. F. Lowry, as quoted by William A. Madden 
in "A Review of Imaginative Reason, by A. Dwight Culler," 
Victorian Studies, X (March, 1967), 301.
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liberalism has been the subject of several recent studies. 
Discussing the influence of the father on the son in Matthew 
Arnold and the Three Classes, Patrick J. McCarty interprets 
the stance of Dr. Arnold as essentially conservative. Much 
the same conclusion is reached by Edward Alexander in his 
Matthew Arnold and John Stuart Mill. Dr. Arnold was not so 
liberal as his reputation may lead one to suppose. Although 
he was radical in urging the application of Christian prin­
ciples to contemporary social problems, his Christianity 
remained relatively conservative and orthodox. The doctrinal 
questions that disturbed him in his youth were concerned more 
with the accuracy of the historical transmission of Christian­
ity, not so much with its ultimate validity. As Lionel 
Trilling described him. Dr. Arnold was an historical relativist 
but a religious a b s o l u t i s t . 14 Although he believed that the 
discovery of God was historically determined, conditioned, 
and expressed in forms accommodated to the primitive culture 
and consciousness of the scriptural writers, he nevertheless 
accepted the Bible as indeed a divine document— the progressive 
revelation of the essential and eternal truths of human life.
As J. M. Robertson declared in A History of Freethought 
in the Nineteenth Century, "The intellectual process by which 
the son of the devout Dr. Arnold of Rugby became the debonair 
mocker of the creed of miracles. Trinity, Protestantism, and
l^Lionel Trilling, Matthew Arnold (second edition;
New York; Columbia University Press, 1949), p. 42.
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the anthropomorphic Diety, is matter for speculation."^^ It 
is unlikely that Matthew Arnold absorbed his heterodoxy from 
his father. It is much more likely that the orthodox beliefs 
of the son were dissolved during his years in Balliol College 
at Oxford. When Arnold entered the university in 1841, the 
Oxford Movement was still active, and involvement in religious 
controversies continued to constitute an important element in 
the academic experience of students. The classic pattern of 
the influence of higher education in unsettling traditional 
religious beliefs in young men, as in the case of Arthur Hugh 
Clough, is surely also applicable to the case of young 
Matt Arnold. There is no clear documentary evidence about the 
immediate effect of the course of study at Oxford on Arnold 
during these so-called "unknown years." But in the letters of 
Arnold to A. H. Clough after both had left Oxford, it is clear 
what the ultimate effect of his university career had been; a 
loss of faith in the orthodox supernaturalism of traditional 
Christianity.
The first two letters in Arnold's correspondence to 
Clough were actually written near the end of the Oxford period 
in their relationship. However, even in these two earliest 
letters, the new cast of his ideas and attitudes is already 
indicated. The first of the letters, dated by the editor 
H. F. Lowry as "shortly before, March 28, 1845," includes a
M. Robertson, A History of Freethought in the 
Nineteenth Century (London: Watts and Co., 1929), II, 400-01.
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delightfully irreverent parody of "true Xtian Simplicity" in 
Matthew's mock confession of his academic shortcomings to 
C l o u g h . T h e  second letter, written during the same period 
as the first, contains enthusiastic references to George Sand 
and includes an admired quotation from a letter in one of 
her novels. In an editorial note, Lowry identifies the novel 
as Indiana and describes the letter as "a passionate statement 
of a free, non-conforming religious idealism. Apparently it 
affected Arnold d e e p l y . A r n o l d ' s  second letter also des­
cribes certain of his more conventional friends and acquaint­
ances as "born-to-be-tight-laced"; refers to a "misguided 
Relation," whom again Lowry identifies as "most likely Tom 
Arnold Matthew's brother, who already at Oxford was revealing 
the tendencies that turned him to the Roman Church"; and 
speaks of Clough and of Matthew himself as being "fellow 
worshippers of Isis."^^
From the mood of light-hearted irreverence in these 
early letters (rather natural for a youth who assumes his 
superior enlightenment to the mass of men), the letters 
developed into a serious interchange of ideas and attitudes c l ­
over the ensuing years. It is interesting to note, near the 
end of the series of letters, the apparently settled attitude
^^The Letters of Matthew Arnold to Arthur Hugh Clough, 
ed. H. F. Lowry (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), p.55.
l^Ibid., p. 58.
l^ibid., p. 59.
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toward conventional religion that Arnold had formulated.
Some insight into his attitude is afforded by the following 
passage, in which he reports on his visit to a mutual friend, 
who had published an irreligious book entitled Nemesis of 
Faith:
I should like you to see Froude— quantum mutatus! He 
goes to church, has family prayers— says the Nemesis 
ought never to have been published, etc. etc.— his 
friends say that he is altogether changed and re-entered 
within the giron de l'Eglise— at any rate within the 
giron de la religion chrétienne; but I do not see the 
matter in this light and think that he conforms in the 
same sense in which Spinoza advised his mother to con­
form— and having purified his moral being, all that was 
mere fume and vanity and love of notoriety and opposi­
tion in his proceedings he has abandoned and regrets.
This is my view.19
One suspects that Arnold's own stance enabled him to
see or imagine a kindred attitude in another. And the next
letter to Clough more or less confirms this suspicion by an
explicit statement of his attitudes and actions with respect
to religious conformity. The statement is apparently in
answer to a question by Clough, who must have remarked on the
20
passage quoted above.
As to conformity I only recommend it in so far as it 
frees us from the unnatural and unhealthy attitude of 
contradiction and opposition— the Qual der Negation as 
Goethe calls it. Only positive convictions and feeling 
are worth anything— and the glow of these one can never 
feel so long as one is pugnacious and out of temper.
This is my firm belief.21
19Ibid., p. 140
^^The Letters of Matthew Arnold to Arthur Hugh Clough 
contains only the letters written by Arnold, which were pre- 
served by Clough. The letters written by Clough to Arnold 
were not kept or have since been lost or destroyed.
21lbid., p. 48.
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This attitude toward religion— public conformity with private 
reservations— Arnold formulated early in his adult life and 
practiced throughout the remainder of his life. It is said 
that his wife, Fanny Lucy, who had never read his religious 
writings, remarked after his death that her husband had always 
been a good Christian in his way.
Sometime in his youth, it is clear, Arnold endured an 
experience of conversion, as it were, from Christianity—  
either rather suddenly and painfully or perhaps gradually and 
easily. That to which he was eventually converted— the imagi­
native vision of naturalistic humanism— is the matter to be 
discussed in the body of this study. However, the next matter 
of immediate interest is Arnold's awareness of the extent to 
which the age in which he lived was undergoing the same criti­
cal experience as himself— a loss of faith in supernaturalistic 
Christianity, the original basis of the cultural ideology in 
Victorian England.
The Culture-Epoch Theory of History
Perhaps the best means of indicating Arnold's aware­
ness of the critical situation in which his age was involved 
is to examine his view of history. As Gaylord C. LeRoy has 
remarked, Arnold's speculations concerning the historical 
process "add up to a philosophy of history so impressive in 
its comprehensiveness and inner consistency that one wonders
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that students of Arnold have taken little notice of it."
The nature of his theory of history may be apprehended by 
examining a number of his works in which the theory is either 
expressed or implied— specifically, several of the essays pub­
lished in Essays in Criticism (1865); a poem published in the 
volume of 1867, "Obermann Once More”; Culture and Anarchy 
(1869); and Literature and Dogma (1873).
"Heinrich Heine," reprinted in Essays in Criticism,
was first published in the August issue of Cornhill magazine
in 1863, but it was originally composed and delivered as an
Oxford lecture by Arnold in his capacity as Professor of
Poetry in June, 1863. In the essay Arnold dwells on the
awakening of the modern spirit to the,inadequacy of the tradi-
23tional European order, its medieval heritage. And he 
asserts that the task of the modern spirit is to reduce the 
lack of correspondence between old institutions and new needs. 
He singles out Goethe as the great representative of the 
modern spirit who preceded Heine in Germany, admiring his
^^Gaylord C. Leroy, Perplexed Prophets: Six
Nineteenth Century British Authors (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press for Temple University Publications,
1953), p. 50.
^^References to the works of Arnold that have been 
published in The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold, 
still being edited by R. H. Super, will be indicated by the 
last name of the editor, the number of the volume, and the 
number of the page. Thus the source for the reference in 
the text above is Super, III, 109. The full titles of the 
five completed volumes in Super's new edition of Arnold's 
works are listed in the bibliography.
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"profound, imperturbable naturalism" and regarding it as 
"subversive of foundations" that must be removed so that a 
better structure, a new order, may be reared. Thus, even 
in this early essay, one senses Arnold's conception of his 
age as historically crucial, differing radically from pre­
vious ages, and as being especially in need of changes to 
dissolve the remnants of an outmoded Medievalism.
"Pagan and Medieval Religious Sentiment" was first 
composed and delivered as an Oxford lecture in March, 1864. 
After appearing in the April issue of Cornhill, it was 
reprinted in Essays in Criticism. The contribution that it 
makes to our understanding of Arnold's historical consciousness 
is in the distinctions that it draws between succeeding 
epochs in the history of western civilization. In the essay 
Arnold describes the latter stage of Greek paganism as an 
epoch in which the expression of "sentiment," particularly 
religious feelings, was characterized by an appeal to the 
senses and understanding. After the introduction of Chris­
tianity into the pagan world of antiquity and its development 
in the medieval period, the expression of religious sentiment 
was characterized by its appeal to the heart and imagination. 
Continuing his history of the modes of religious expression 
up to the nineteenth century, Arnold describes the Renaissance 
as an epoch in which the appeal to the senses and understand­
ing was revived in a reaction against the practice of the
Z^Ibid., p. 110
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Medieval period. The Reformation, in turn, is interpreted 
as another reaction, this time in favor of the heart and 
imagination. And, again, the eighteenth century reacted 
and insisted on reason— on the understanding and senses.
But in the present epoch of the nineteenth century, he asserts, 
"the main element of the modern spirit's life is neither the 
senses and understanding, nor the heart and imagination; it 
is the imaginative r e a s o n . ^5
Whatever the "imaginative reason" may mean, it is 
nonetheless clear that Arnold perceives a pattern in history, 
a rhythmic oscillation of periods. He is setting forth a 
version of what historians call the "culture-epoch theory of 
history," and he interprets his own epoch as distinctly 
different from previous epochs, as an epoch in which the 
movement of history (the swinging pendulum) may achieve a 
balance— the golden mean between extremes. The periods of 
past history are neither condemned nor commended. Each is 
regarded by Arnold as appropriate at the time. But in the 
present, the time has come for a new and vital synthesis of 
historical forces.
"The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," the 
introductory essay to the volume of Essays in Criticism, was 
first published in the November, 1864, issue of The National 
Review; but it was originally an Oxford lecture, delivered
25guper, III, 230.
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in the preceding October. In the course of the essay,
Arnold has occasion to distinguish between the "epoch of 
expression" that preceded the French Revolution and the 
"epoch of concentration” that succeeded it and continued on 
through the middle of the nineteenth c e n t u r y . H e  describes 
an "epoch of expansion" as one characterized by vital crea­
tive activity in all fields of human endeavor, whereas the 
"epoch of concentration" is characterized by the effort to 
consolidate and preserve the achievements of the past. The 
latter is, in other words, conservative or even reactionary 
in its activity. The condition for an epoch of creative 
expansion, Arnold asserts, is the existence of a Stimulating 
"order of ideas." And the exercise of the "critical power" 
is what discovers and disseminates these new and true ideas.
The critical power tends to establish an order of 
ideas, if not absolutely true, yet true by comparison 
with that which it displaces ; to make the best ideas 
prevail. Presently these new ideas reach society . . . 
and there is a stir and growth everywhere; out of this 
stir and growth come the creative epochs . . . . ^7
Apparently a period of critical activity functions as a nec­
essary prelude or transition to an epoch of creative activity; 
criticism precedes creation.
After this analysis of the previous century or more
of history, Arnold suggests in the essay that "an epoch of
2 8
expansion seems to be opening in this country."
Z^Super, III, 269.
^^Ibid., p. 261.
ZGlbid., p. 269.
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But, he insists, a period of critical activity is required to 
stimulate it with vital ideas. And again, in the "Preface" 
to Essays in Criticism, written in January of 1865, he refers 
to "an epoch of dissolution and transformation, such as that 
on which we are now e n t e r e d . H e r e  again, in "The Criticism 
at the Present Time," Arnold is articulating his awareness of 
the crucial situation in his age.
One of Arnold's poems, "Obermann Once More," contri­
butes to our understanding of his view of the progress of 
history. It appeared in the place of honor at the end of his 
New Poems, published in 1867, Within the poem, the monologue 
of Obermann expresses and implies a view of history that 
parallels rather closely that expressed in "Pagan and Medieval 
Religious Sentiment." In the poem, as in the essay, the 
latter stage of classical antiquity— "that hard Pagan world"—  
is described as lacking in an essential and vital quality; 
it was an age of spiritual sterility, without true joy. But 
the coming of Christianity, so Obermann says in his monologue, 
brought new hope and purpose and joy, like the breaking of a 
new day. The life of men in western civilization was spirit­
ually revitalized by belief in Christ. But then, at the end 
of the Medieval epoch and at the beginning of the Renaissance 
epoch, belief began to waver and faith to disintegrate.
But slow that tide of common thought,
Which bathed our life, retired.
Super, III, 288.
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Slow, slow the old world wore to naught.
And pulse by pulse expired.30
Although without inner life, the outer forms of the old world
remained, until "the storm" (the French Revolution) reduced
it to ruins. In describing the present condition of the world
to the narrator in the poem (Arnold), Obermann declares:
Your creeds are dead, your rites are dead.
Your social order too.
. . . the past is out of date, 
The future not yet born.
However, the poem concludes with a vision of the dawn of a new 
order of spiritual and social vitality, emerging from the pre­
sent. Thus the poem characterizes the present, like the end 
of the ancient Pagan world and the beginning of the Christian 
era, as an age of crucial historical significance— a time in 
which both death throes and birth pangs are intermingled.
The chapters of Culture and Anarchy were originally 
composed as, on the one hand, an Oxford lecture entitled 
"Culture and Its Enemies," delivered in June of 1865 and sub­
sequently published as an article in the July issue of Cornhill 
magazine, and as, on the other hand, a series of five articles 
collectively entitled "Anarchy and Authority," whose successive 
installments were published in the January, February, June, 
July, and August issues of Cornhill in 1868. The articles were
^^The quotations from Arnold's poems in this study are 
all taken from the standard edition of his poetry. The Poetical 
Works of Matthew Arnold, ed, C. B. Tinker and H. F. Lowry 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1949).
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then collected/ corrected, and published in book form with 
a "Preface" early in 1869. In the second edition of the 
volume/ certain phrases from the text that had become well 
known were used as the titles of the chapters. The chapter 
entitled "Hebraism and Hellenism" presents an interesting 
version of the pattern of history, based on the interaction 
and alternation of "strictness of conscience" and "sponta­
neity of consciousness" in the successive cultural epochs 
of western civilization. According to this version of 
history, the Hellenism of classical antiquity was succeeded 
by the dominance of Hebraism in the Medieval epoch. The 
Renaissance epoch is then interpreted as a resurgence of 
Hellenism. And the Puritanism of the seventeenth century, 
which cut short the Elizabethan Renaissance, is regarded 
as an Hebraic reaction to an imbalanced Hellenism. Accord­
ing to Arnold, this modern form of Hebraism— Puritanism—  
has continued as the dominant characteristic of English 
life up to the present. It is time now, he proposes, for 
a revival of Hellenism but not to the exclusion of Hebraism; 
we must achieve a dynamic balance of both qualities. In 
the past, mankind has always emphasized one or the other as 
essential to his vitality. But now is the time to achieve 
a balance of both— a vital synthesis.
Finally, in Literature and Dogma, published in 1873, 
Arnold traces the course of a rhythmic process through the 
history of religion in western civilization. The book
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consists of twelve chapters. In the first chapter, entitled 
"Religion Given," Arnold defines the religious vision of the 
early Hebrew patriarchs and prophets as essentially moral in 
its primary concern for righteousness, which was personified 
as "God." In Chapter II, "Aberglaube Invading," he describes 
the development in the Old Testament of a "poetic" accretion 
of supernaturalistic elements, which he calls Aberglaube—  
superstition, myth, extra-belief. Gradually the growth of 
this Aberglaube attached itself to the originally pure moral 
insight of the ancient Hebrews and eventually displaced it, 
relegating the matter of morality to a secondary position.
"Religion New-Given," the third chapter in Literature 
and Dogma, asserts that the essential significance of Jesus 
Christ resides in his correction of this confusion, which 
threatened to overwhelm the religious effectiveness of Judaism, 
but his restoration of primary emphasis on morality. In the 
next three chapters, then, Arnold repudiates the supernatural­
istic elements in the four gospels as Aberglaude, not 
essentially connected with Jesus' ethical teachings. Chap­
ter VII is devoted to an elucidation of these teachings about 
righteousness. And in Chapter VIII Arnold asserts that the 
remainder of the New Testament, after the four gospels, 
expresses a clear vision of the central teachings of Jesus, 
especially in the Pauline Epistles. But in Chapter IX, 
"Aberglaube Re-Invading," he traces in the succeeding history 
of Christianity the development of supernaturalistic elements.
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early Hebrew patriarchs and prophets as essentially moral in 
its primary concern for righteousness, which was personified 
as "God." In Chapter II, "Aberglaube Invading," he describes 
the development in the Old Testament of a "poetic" accretion 
of supernaturalistic elements, which he calls Aberglaube—  
superstition, myth, extra-belief. Gradually the growth of 
this Aberglaube attached itself to the originally pure moral 
insight of the ancient Hebrews and eventually displaced it, 
relegating the matter of morality to a secondary position.
"Religion New-Given," the third chapter in Literature 
and Dogma, asserts that the essential significance of Jesus 
Christ resides in his correction of this confusion, which 
threatened to overwhelm the religious effectiveness of Judaism, 
but his restoration of primary emphasis on morality. In the 
next three chapters, then, Arnold repudiates the supernatural­
istic elements in the four gospels as Aberglaude, not 
essentially connected with Jesus' ethical teachings. Chap­
ter VII is devoted to an elucidation of these teachings about 
righteousness. And in Chapter VIII Arnold asserts that the 
remainder of the New Testament, after the four gospels, 
expresses a clear vision of the central teachings of Jesus, 
especially in the Pauline Epistles. But in Chapter IX, 
"Aberglaube Re-Invading," he traces in the succeeding history 
of Christianity the development of supernaturalistic elements.
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which again displace the originally ethical emphasis, so 
that the true teaching of Jesus has been obscured, especially 
by the Puritans in England.
The next chapter describes the crisis to which this 
history of Christianity has led: the Christian religion has
been identified not with its experientially verifiable ethical 
content but with its Aberglaube, which the Zeit-Geist (the 
scientific orientation of modern man) is dissolving and, with 
it, the credibility of a Christianity based entirely on an 
unscientific supernatural foundation. Consequently, even the 
masses are losing faith in the religion of the Bible and, with 
it, the basis of their morality, so that even the social order 
itself may ultimately be endangered. The final two chapters 
reaffirm the value of the Bible, when interpreted aright, in 
promoting the moral life of modern man.
Now, the structure of Literature and Dogma as a whole 
seems to exhibit a rhythm of decadence and resurgence, of 
sterility and fertility. The two last chapters, summarizing 
Arnold's reinterpretation of the ethical significance of the 
Bible for modern man, perhaps implicitly suggest the grounds 
for another resurgence (which might be retitled "Religion 
Re-Given by Matthew Arnold"). Thus, in Literature and Dogma, 
the pattern of history is again perceived as a rhythmical 
oscillation of cultural epochs, leading up to an epoch-making 
crisis in the present.
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In The Victorian Temper,. Jerome Buckley states, "The
doctrine of organic development was so thoroughly diffused
throughout the nineteenth-century science and philosophy that
no serious thinker could escape its implications."^^ And in
Matthew Arnold and John Stuart Mill, Edward Alexander suggests
that the concept of history as a succession of cultural
epochs, a concept held by both Arnold and Mill in different
forms, is no doubt ultimately traceable to the ideas of 
32Saint-Simon. However, the particular interpretation of the 
pattern of history by Arnold is distinctively his own. What 
emerges from our examination of the several works that either 
express or imply Arnold's interpretation of history is a rough 
but relatively consistent culture-epoch theory of history.
The slight variations in the several versions are largely 
attributable to the differing contexts in which they are set 
forth and can be accounted for in terms of the various purposes 
that they are designed to achieve.
Very generally, the culture-epochs that Arnold 
emphasized as significant in the history of western civiliza­
tion may be distinguished. First, there was the epoch of 
original Hebraism, whose history is recounted in the Old 
Testament; second, the epoch of original Hellenism in classical
31Jerome H. Buckley, The Victorian Temper; A Study in 
Literary Culture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951),
p. 5.
^^Edward Alexander, "The Historical Method." Matthew 
Arnold and John Stuart Mill (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1965), p. 40.
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antiquity; third, the epoch of primitive and Medieval Chris­
tianity, an extremely long and strong epoch,slow in beginning 
and slow in ending; fourth, the epoch whose beginning was 
marked by the opening of the Renaissance and whose end was 
marked by the close of the Napoleonic era. It was an epoch 
in which the inner life of the old world was, at first, grad­
ually undermined and in which the outer forms of the old world 
were, at last, dramatically destroyed; yet it was also an 
epoch that, by clearing away the old, prepared the way for a 
new world. Fifth, there was the epoch of reaction that began 
after the French Revolution and continued into the second 
decade after the middle of the nineteenth century— the 1860's. 
And, sixth, there was a new epoch, so Arnold sensed, starting 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century— the present.
It was an epoch, he believed, that could be of crucial signifi­
cance in the history of western civilization. On the one hand, 
the reactionary activity of the fifth epoch could be continued 
into the present. If so, the consequence would be catastrophic; 
for the failure to respond to the challenging demands in the 
present epoch, occasioned by the conditions of modern existence, 
would almost certainly determine a bleak future for England.
On the other hand, the constructive preparation begun in the 
fourth epoch but interrupted by the fifth could be continued 
and completed. Indeed, England might enjoy an epoch in which 
the ideal of the good man and the good society could be 
achieved, in which the several elements of human nature and
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social culture would unite to create a vital synthesis— a 
perfect balance.
- Thus Arnold regarded the current condition of his 
country as crucial. Like every generation, he saw the present 
as the forward edge of history— a time of transition between 
the several epochs of the past and an epoch of great promise 
in the future. The actualization of its potentiality depended 
on a recognition by the age of its crucial condition and on 
its decision to construct the future world on a sound founda­
tion, based on a clear understanding of the nature of reality—  
of God, nature, society, and man. In other words, the opening 
epoch needed an adequate cultural ideology, and it needed to 
adapt its institutions and individual lives to it.
In a review of Raymond Williams' Culture and Society,
1780-1950, Seymour Betsky described the failure of the book.
What Mr. Williams fails to do is to suggest that an 
industrial civilization in our sense is unprecedented 
in the history of civilizations; that such a civilization 
brought either a radical or an unprecendented change, in 
every single human activity: literature and the arts,
religion, politics, 'social life and manners' (including 
sexual relations and family life), law, philosophy, 
science, pure and applied, national defense, economics, 
agriculture, education, even recreation. We are dealing, 
in fact, with the transition from one kind of civiliza­
tion, based on an agricultural order, balanced by trade, 
small industry, and commerce, and sanctioned by the 
Church, and exhibiting a certain stability over the 
centuries; to a different kind of civilization, sparked 
by industrialism, incorporating in time the goals of the 
French Revolution, and supported in its essential secular 
goals by science and the scientific m e t h o d . ^3
^^Seymour Betsky, "A Review of Culture and Society, 1780- 
1950, by Raymond Williams," Victorian Studies, III (March, 
1960), 298.
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This is perhaps a fair description of the cultural situation 
that Arnold seems to have sensed in his Victorian England, 
although he lacked the clarifying advantage of the century of 
hindsight that Betsky enjoys.
Betsky has interpreted the cultural revolution as being 
necessitated by the technological innovations that constituted 
the industrial revolution. However, the emphasis in this study 
is upon the primary significance of ideological innovations, 
for ultimately even the technological innovations must be 
regarded as the actualization of potentialities envisioned 
within the evolving cultural ideology. Thus the industrial 
revolution may be viewed as the implementation in the economy 
of implications involved in the shift (at first gradual but 
accelerated at last) from a supernaturalistic to a naturalistic 
ideology. Viewed in this light, the impetus for the industrial 
revolution— the acceleration in economic technology as 
developed by applied science— was the emergence of naturalistic 
assumptions in the cultural ideology, as developed by pure 
science; the discovery of new and basic knowledge. The 
pattern of cultural evolution is, first, the discovery of new 
insights into the nature of reality by original thinkers; 
second, the ensuing transformation of the cultural ideology as 
the new ideas win general acceptance; and, third, the conse­
quent adaptation of social institutions and cultural technology 
to the new vision of r e a l i t y . t e r m  "cultural lag" is
^^See the "Introduction" in Neal Cross and Leslie Dae 
Lindou's The Search for Personal Freedom (Dubuque, Iowa;
Wm. C. Brown Company, 1948), Vol. ÏT
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used to indicate the failure of institutions to conform their 
theory and practice, or their structure and function, to 
innovations in the cultural ideology. As Karl Marx demo- 
strated, the economic institution is indeed far-reaching in 
its effects on other social institutions; yet even the economic 
institution itself (as well as all of the other institutions 
in the culture of a society) is ultimately bound by the cul­
tural ideology, whose evolution must be determined by the 
insights of original thinkers, like Marx himself.
The essence of Matthew Arnold’s insight into the con­
dition of his age consisted in his awareness that the cultural 
ideology of the past was no longer adequate, that a new view 
of reality and novel social conditions had emerged in the 
modern age, and that the theory and practice of present insti­
tutions did not coincide with the new view of reality nor 
fulfill present needs; rather, they were unsoundly based on 
ideas and conditions either no longer valid or no longer 
existing. This incongruity he regarded as a critical situa­
tion. He saw his age as involved in a cultural crisis. In 
concluding a letter to Sir M. Grant Duff, he wrote:
I have said nothing about politics. Events and per­
sonages succeed one another, but the central fact 
of the situation always remains for me this: that
whereas the basis of things amidst all chance and 
change has even in Europe generally been for ever so 
long supernatural Christianity, and far more so in 
England than!in Europe generally, this basis is cer­
tainly going— going amidst the full consciousness of 
the continentals that it is going, and amidst the
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provincial unconsciousness of the English that it is
going.35
The Prophetic Response: The Role of Social Critic
Once Arnold himself was conscious of the crucial sit­
uation in his country, his historical awareness elicited a 
personal response from him. Essentially, it was a version of 
the prophetic response. With a strong sense of vocation, he 
felt that he had a mission to perform in his country.
Young Matt Arnold's own personal crisis of faith has 
been indicated. Sometime in his youth, most likely at Oxford, 
his inherited cultural ideology was rudely shaken and eventu­
ally shattered. Gradually he reconstructed an imaginative 
vision to replace his lost faith. But what was his public 
response after his private resolution of this crisis? The 
nature of Arnold's response to his perception that the age 
was involved in very much the same crisis that he himself had 
experienced is perhaps most clearly articulated in certain of 
his confidential letters. Among many passages in his letters 
that might be selected, the following may serve to indicate 
both his convinction that he had a role to perform and his 
specific conception of the nature of this role.
In a letter dated December 24, 1859, Arnold wrote to 
his married sister, Mrs. Forster; whom he called "K" and in 
whom he often confided:
^^Matthew Arnold, Letters of Matthew Arnold, 1848- 
1888, ed. W. E. Russell (second edition; New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1900), II, 234.
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I thought the other day that I would tell you of a 
Frenchman whom I saw in Paris, Ernest Renan, between 
— whose line of endeavor and my own I imagine there is 
considerable resemblance, that you might have a look 
at some of his books if you liked. The difference is, 
perhaps, that he tends to inculate rsi-sl morality, in 
a high sense of the word, upon the French nation as 
what they most want, while I tend to inculate intelli­
gence, also in a high sense of the word, upon the 
English nation as what they most want . . . .36
In another letter to "K," dated November 14, 1863,
Arnold wrote:
I think in this concluding half of the century the 
English spirit is destined to undergo a great trans­
formation; or rather, perhaps I should say, to perform 
a great evolution, and I know no one so well fitted 
as William jjlr. Forster, a Member of Parliament to 
be the parliamentary agent and organ for this movement.
I shall do what I can for this movement in litera­
ture . . . .37
Again, in another letter to his sister, Arnold wrote
on January 6, 1865:
Indeed, I am convinced that as Science, in the widest 
sense of the word, meaning a true knowledge of things 
as the basis of our operations, becomes, as it does 
become, more of a power in the world, the weight of 
the nations and men who have carried the intellectual 
life fartherest will be more and more felt . . . .
That England may run well in this race is my deepest 
desire; and to stimulate her and to make her feel how 
many clogs she wears, and how much she has to do in 
order to run in it as her genius gives her the power 
to run, is the object of all I do.38
On December 27, 1866, in answer to a letter from his 
mother upon his birthday, Arnold made an interesting 
declaration:
36ibid., I, 128-29.
37lbid., p. 240
38ibid., pp. 285-286.
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Forty-four is indeed an age at which one may say "The 
time past of our life may suffice us" to have trifled 
and idled, or worse, in. I more and more become con­
scious of having something to do, and of a resolution 
to do it; and if . . .  I double my present age, I shall,
I hope, do something of it . . . .3^
Throughout the collected letter of Matthew Arnold, 
such passages frequently recur, expressing not only a general 
sense of responsibility toward his age as a well-known man 
of letters but also the specific conception of a concrete pur­
pose to be achieved, a definite contribution to be made. 
Further, here and there through the letters, he rejoices in 
testimonies to the influence and effect of his writings, 
delighted that he is in some sense moving the age as he hoped 
to do.
After the loss of his inherited cultural ideology, 
Arnold gradually reconstructed an individual and original 
imaginative vision of the human condition, with its own 
distinctive images of God, of nature, of society, and of man, 
implying answers to the great questions of human existence.
And gradually he became convinced that he had a significant 
function to fulfill— a prophetic role to perform: essentially,
to transform gradually the cultural ideology of Victorian 
England until it coincided with his own imaginative vision, 
so that the social institutions would then be stimulated to 
minimize their cultural lag. As William Harbutt Dawson des­
cribed Arnold's purpose, "Direct influence he did not seek to
^^Ibid., p. 400.
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to exert. Transformation of thought rather than practical 
reform was his aim, for to such transformation of thought he 
looked for the impulse which alone could lead to any whole­
sale scheme of social r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . " ^ 0  He took advantage 
of every opportunity afforded him in his capacity as a man 
of letters to further this end and to achieve this effect. 
Although many of his literary essays were occasional in 
nature, stimulated by an immediate demand, he used them to 
express the specific application of his general imaginative 
vision in relation to a particular topic.
Without in the least over-rating himself he took him­
self with absolute seriousness, and his work from 
first to last is informed with the high sincerity of 
a consistent purpose— the high purpose of being nobly 
useful to his time and country by preaching to them 
precisely the gospel he conceived they most vitally 
needed.41
Now in order to explicate the naturalistic assumptions 
and humanistic principles that animate Arnold's imaginative 
vision, in contrast to the religious mythology of supernatura­
listic Christianity, the chapters in the body of this 
dissertation will be devoted to a topical analysis of his 
concepts of God, nature, society, and man as assumed, implied, 
or expressed in his poems and essays. The concluding chapter,
‘^ ^William Harbutt Dawson, Matthew Arnold and His 
Relation to the Thought of Our Time (New York: The Knicker­
bocker Press, 1904), p. 7.
^^W. C. Brownell, "Matthew Arnold," Victorian Prose 
Masters (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902), p. 156.
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then, will be devoted to an elucidation of the religio- 
mythic effect of Arnold's imaginative vision through a com­
parison of his position with the consciously religious 
perspective of the contemporary movement of naturalistic 
humanism, especially as articulated in selected writings by 
John Herman Randall, Jr.
In concluding his review of Raymond Williams' Culture
and Society, 1780-1950, Seymour Betsky insisted on the
significance of Arnold as a cultural critic.
The signal failure of the book . . . lies in Mr. Williams' 
radical underestimation of Arnold, who among nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century commentators on "culture" is some­
thing of a gaint. Arnold should have been seen as a 
figure who consolidates the better ideas of his prede­
cessors and adapts them to the changed times, who offers 
original insights, and who has been prophetic for us in 
ways we have not yet spelled out.42
To understand and appreciate Arnold's intention and achievement
in this sense— as the creator of an imaginative vision and as
the prophet of a cultural ideology— is precisely the purpose
of this present study.
‘^^Betsky, p. 300
CHAPTER II 
THE IMAGES OF NATURE AND OF GOD
In an article written several years ago, Kenneth 
Allot described certain lists that young Matthew Arnold had 
entered in his pocket diaries from 1845 through 1847. In 
these diaries Arnold had written the authors and titles that 
he wished to read during those years. Prominent in the lists 
of proposed reading were the names of many philosophers : 
Plato, Descartes, Kant, Coleridge, Cudworth, Schelling, 
Berkeley, Mill, Plotinus, Lucretius, and Aristotle.^
In another article, A. J. Lubell has discussed the
probably significance of the indication in these reading
lists of the young Arnold's great interest in philosophical
matters. Commenting on these lines in Arnold's poem "Stanzas
from the Grande Chartreuse"—
For rigorous teachers seized my youth,
And purged its faith, and trimm'd its fire,
Show'd me the high white star of Truth,
There bade me gaze, and there aspire—
^Kenneth Allot, "Matthew Arnold's Reading-Lists in 
Three Early Diaries," Victorian Studies, II (March, 1959), 
254-266. These unpublished diaries were presented to the 
Yale University Library for preservation. Mr. Allot was 
permitted to examine them and to describe their contents.
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Lubell suggests that at least some of the "rigorous teachers" 
were probably "the authors of classical antiquity, from whom 
Arnold got his first lessons in naturalism . . . .  "? Continu­
ing his explication of the personal references in the lines, 
he adds, "As for "the high, white star of Truth,' the context 
of the poem clearly shows that Arnold means the aspiring 
toward that kind of faith that may dispense with a base of 
supernaturalism." Lubell concludes that "what emerges clearly 
from Arnold's interest in all these philosophers is that he
was looking for some sort of philosophical faith to replace
3
the religious faith he had lost in his earlier years."
Aside from the pocket diaries, the only other extant 
documents that indicate Arnold's interests and concerns during 
these years are his letters to Arthur Hugh Clough, In them 
we have already observed certain indications that the young 
Arnold had been bereft of his early religious faith. Although 
one of the pervasive themes in the letters is Arnold's 
recurrent rebukes of Clough's efforts "to solve the Universe" 
in his poems, there are nevertheless some indications that 
Arnold himself was also engaged in his own private quest for 
a vision of the nature of ultimate reality. For instance, in 
the letter dated December, 1847, by Lowry, Arnold writes of
2
Albert J. Lubell, "Matthew Arnold: Between two
Worlds," Modern Language Quarterly, XXII (September, 1961), 250.
^Ibid., p. 251.
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his "sinews cracking under the effort to unite matter , . .
In another letter, dated "after September 1848," Arnold dis­
cusses a source of confusion in the poetry of Browning and 
Keats and then asserts, "They will not be patient neither 
understand that they must begin with an idea of the world in 
order not to be prevailed over by the world's multitudinous­
ness . . . . Yet the confusion of worlds reflected even 
in Arnold's 1849 volume of poems suggests that he himself 
was still involved in the process of conceiving his own "Idea 
of the world."
Only with the publication of The Strayed Reveller and 
Other Poems in 1849 is the consequence of the young poet's 
tentative groping and grasping in his quest for a vision of 
reality clearly revealed. The volume is perhaps as much a 
collection of questions as a collection of answers. But the 
poems reflect his emerging ideas of God and nature in a 
manner much more intimate and explicit than any other source. 
His letters to Clough contained only hints of his evolving 
conceptions. The letters to his mother and sisters are silent 
on these matters, perhaps because he did not wish to disturb 
them with his heterodoxy. Only in his poems did he express 
and reveal certain of his deepest feelings and thoughts.
4
The Letters of Matthew Arnold to Arthur Hugh Clough,
p . 63.
^Ibid., p. 97.
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The Image of Nature in the Poems
In a critical study of Matthew Arnold's poetry,
W. Stacy Johnson declares that for many Victorian poets, and
especially for Arnold, "the questions of a man's proper
relation with other men, and with God or the Universe, are
peculiarly serious . . . Moreover, he asserts;
Most of Arnold's poems are problem pieces. The basic 
and recurring problem is that of finding a valid image 
for man in his world, whether the image of God's 
creature, of a very god, or of an uncreated uncreating 
thing--the orthodox or the Romantic or the naturalist 
image.'
Of course, the image of man is ultimately dependent 
upon and derived from the image of nature or of God. It is 
specifically to apprehend the images of nature and of God 
as created and expressed in the poetry of Arnold that the 
examination of his poems is here undertaken. Therefore, the 
principle determining the selection of poems for examination 
is that they be relevant to this topic and representative of 
his attitudes about it. Further, the object in examing these 
poems is not to arrive at a comprehensive apprehension of 
their essential significance or ultimate intention but only to 
sense the image of nature or God that is implicit or explicit 
in them.
^W. Stacy Johnson, The Voices of Matthew Arnold 
(New Haven; Published for Smith College by the Yale University 
Press, 1961), p. 1.
^Ibid., p. 38.
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The Strayed Reveller and Other Poems, by "A" in 1849, 
began with a poem simply entitled "Sonnet" (later retitled 
"Quiet Work" in the two-volume edition of Arnold's poetry in 
1869). The sonnet is directly addressed to "Nature," as the 
poet expresses his desire to learn two lessons (in later 
versions, one lesson with two duties) from nature— "Of toil 
unsever'd from tranquillity." He admires the slow, silent, 
inexorable activity of nature's "sleepless ministers," with 
which he contrasts the loud, busy, "vain turmoil" in the lives 
of men. The sonnet concludes with the reflection that the 
inexorable labor of nature "shall not fail, when man is gone."
The central intention of the poem is to express a 
quality of attitude and of action that the poet admires. The 
nature of this quality is revealed by an illustrative com­
parison: it is like that exhibited in nature. But what is
the image of nature that is thus incidentally reflected? The 
aspect of nature that the poem emphasizes is determined, of 
course, by the larger purpose of the poet. Yet his choice of 
nature to illustrate the admired quality indicates his concep­
tion of nature itself as a vast process of inexorable and 
purposeful activity, differing in the kind and degree of its 
laborious motions from the quality of activity exhibited by 
men. The nature of the cosmos here seems clearly to be 
contrasted with the nature of men.
The second poem in the 1849 volume was "Mycerinus," 
one of the major poems in the volume. Mycerinus had grown up
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believing in divine justice, believing that the actions of 
men are rewarded or punished by just gods, "the Powers of 
Destiny," that govern the universe. He trusted that the 
supernatural powers that controlled the operation of nature 
(according to his cosmology) were greatly concerned with the 
lives of men and with the administration of justice in human 
life. But the juxtaposition of the career of his father, who 
had lived wickedly but had been granted a long life of plea­
sure, with the condition of himself, who had lived a righteous 
life but was doomed to early death, revealed an incongruity 
that resulted in the loss of his faith in divine justice.
The existence of the incongruity convinced him that the gods 
took no cognizance of man's life, or at least not of the moral 
quality of man's life. No more fearing the judgment of the 
gods, Mycerinus gave himself to revelry until his death. And 
there was no judgment.
The poem turns on the shift in Mycerinus's conception 
of nature and the gods. The change in his life-style is the 
consequence of the shift in his understanding of the relation 
of the cosmos to man. He has come to understand that there 
is not any personal or moral relation between them. Nature is 
indifferent to man. The incongruity in the juxtaposition of 
the lives and deaths of father and son has had certain cosmic 
implications for Mycerinus. Those implications are summed up 
in the last six lines of the poem, in which "the murmur of the 
moving Nile"— used earlier in the poem to illustrate a
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postualted Power of Necessity over "earth, and heaven, and 
men, and gods"— rolls along entirely oblivious of the revelry 
of Mycerinus and his crew. As a symbol of nature or of an 
ultimate power in nature, this image of the Nile reminds one 
of the concept of nature emphasized in the opening "Sonnet"—  
a vastprocess of inexorable motion, ignoring the loud busy 
lives of little men.
The title poem in the 1849 volume, "The Strayed 
Reveller," also implies a relation between the gods and man.
The effect of the wine that the Reveller drinks in the poem 
has been variously interpreted as poetic inspiration, 
excapist fantasy, or the Romantic vision of life. In any 
case, our interest is in what it does for the Reveller. It 
enables him to behold the panorama of human life even as the 
gods. In the last long speech of the poem, "The Youth" or 
reveller speaks to Ulysses and Circe. All afternoon, he 
explains to them, he has watched the activity of men. And 
he has been happy as, like the gods, he surveys the wide 
world of living men. He catalogues a series of human scenes 
whose beauty he has appreciated. But the Youth then contrasts 
the detached attitude of the gods with that of the "wise 
Bards" who, like the gods, behold the spectacle of men but 
who, unlike the gods (and unlike the "intoxicated" youth), 
sympathetically experience the human suffering that they 
behold. Again, the indifference of the gods to the human 
condition is emphasized. Man is alone in life; only he himself 
is concerned with the quality of his existence.
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Even the "Fragment of an 'Antigone'" in the 1849 
volume reflects a similar impression of the human condition.
In the second stanza of the poem, the Chorus declares that 
aside from the arbitrary beginning and ending of his life, 
man is essentially alone. The gods do not involve themselves 
in his life.
For from the day when these [the Birth- 
Goddess and Fates]
Bring him, a weeping child.
First to the light, and mark 
A country for him, kinsfolk, and a home.
Unguided he remains.
Till the Fates come again, alone, with death.
The poem "In Utrumque Paratus" reflects two images of 
nature. The first three stanzas express one alternative— the 
representation of the universe and human life as the creations 
of a supernatural source, God, The second half of the poem 
represents the naturalistic alternative of man as the Father­
less son, as it were, of a Husbandless mother nature. In 
their commentary on the poem. Tinker and Lowry note that in 
the 1869 edition of Arnold's poems, an entirely new stanza, 
replaced the final stanza of the 1849 volume. In the revised 
stanza, the speaker in the poem addressee man.
Thy native world stirs at thy feet unknown.
Yet there thy secret lies!
Out of this stuff, these forces, thou art grown.
And proud self-severance from them were disease.
0 scan thy native world with pious eyes!
High as thy life be risen, 'tis from these;
And these, too, rise.
Whatever moved Arnold, after this single edition, to revert
to the original concluding stanza in succeeding editions
(stressing the lonely consciousness of man), this stanza from
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the 1869 edition is more consistent with the image of nature 
expressed in the preceding two stanzas, as Tinker and Lowry 
recognized.8 It clearly implies an acceptance of natural 
evolution.
But in such poems as "To the Duke of Wellington" and
"To an Independent Preacher," the unity of Arnold's image of
nature, as neglected in the several previous poems from The
Strayed Reveller and Other Boems, is seriously challenged. No
doubt it was the stubborn fact of such poems that moved
Lionel Trilling to assert that "conflicting views of nature
appear in each of the two early volumes and seem to have been
held simultaneously."^ The two poems vividly demonstrate the
problem, for one poem seems to commend a man for his "vision
of the general law" in the life of all nature and for his
conformity to it, but the other poem seems to assert that
for a man to be in harmony with nature is utterly impossible.
Surely the strictures of A. 0. Lovejoy ate applicable here:
For 'nature' has, of course, been the chief and the most 
pregnant word in the terminology of all the normative 
provinces of thought in the West; and the multiplicity 
of its meanings has made it easy, and common, to slip 
more or less insensibly from one connotation to another, 
and thus in the end to pass from one ethical or 
aesthetic standard to its very antithesis, while 
nominally professing the same principles.10
O
C. B. Tinker and H. F. Lowry, The Poetry of Matthew Arnold: 
A Commentary (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 55.
^Trilling, p. 94.
^^Arthur 0. Lovejoy, "'Nature' as Aesthetic Norm," Essays 
in the History of Ideas (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1948), p. 69.
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the 1869 edition is more consistent with the image of nature 
expressed in the preceding two stanzas, as Tinker and Lowry 
recognized.^ It clearly implies an acceptance of natural 
evolution.
But in such poems as "To the Duke of Wellington" and
"To an Independent Preacher," the unity of Arnold's image of
nature, as iseflected in the several previous poems from The
Strayed Reveller and Other Boems, is seriously challenged. No
doubt it was the stubborn fact of such poems that moved
Lionel Trilling to assert that "conflicting views of nature
appear in each of the two early volumes and seem to have been
held simultaneously."^ The two poems vividly demonstrate the
problem, for one poem seems to commend a man for his "vision
of the general law" in the life of all nature and for his
conformity to it, but the other poem seems to assert that
for a man to be in harmony with nature is utterly impossible.
Surely the strictures of A. 0. Lovejoy ate applicable here:
For 'nature' has, of course, been the chief and the most 
pregnant word in the terminology of all the normative 
provinces of thought in the West; and the multiplicity 
of its meanings has made it easy, and common, to slip 
more or less insensibly from one connotation to another, 
and thus in the end to pass from one ethical or 
aesthetic standard to its very antithesis, while 
nominally professing the same principles.10
®C. B. Tinker and H. F. Lowry, The Poetry of Matthew Arnold; 
A Commentary (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 55.
^Trilling, p. 94.
l^Arthur O. Lovejoy, "'Nature' as Aesthetic Norm," Essays 
in the History Of Ideas (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1948), p. 69.
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"To the Duke of Wellington" is a tribute to the Duke's 
awareness that "the wheels of life stand never idle, but go 
always round" and that, therefore, man must adapt himself to 
life's changing conditions. The role of Wellington in 
England's history attested to his acting on the basis of this 
insight, "this vision of the general law," for he had the 
capacity to adapt himself to changing times. In this case, 
nature is not represented as revealing a moral lesson to man; 
rather, man is represented as discovering in nature the 
insight that the condition for his survival and prosperity is 
a continuing adaptation to the changing circumstances of life. 
On the other hand, in "To an Independent Preacher," the 
natural is represented as apparently antithetical to the human. 
To be good, man must be not like nature but different. Some­
how, the distinctively "human" in man must transcend the 
"natural" in the universe.
The poem in which the supposedly conflicting views of 
nature intersect and resolve themselves is the sonnet entitled 
"Religious Isolation." The "Friend" to whom it is addressed 
is probably Arthur Hugh Clough. The theme of the poem is one 
that we have noted as common to many of the poems in The 
Strayed Reveller and Other Poems— the human condition in a 
naturalistic universe. The sonnet urges the friend to accept 
in a mature manner the validity of the naturalistic interpre­
tation of the universe and its implications and consequences 
for human life:
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What though the holy secret which moulds thee 
Moulds not the solid Earth? though never Winds 
Have whisper'd it to the complaining Sea,
Nature's great law, and law of all men's minds?
To its own impulse every creature stirs:
Live by thy light, and Earth will live by hers.
In a strictly naturalistic interpretation of the universe,
even the peculiarly human must be acknowledged as ultimately
a specific aspect of nature in general. Man is part of the
whole that is nature. Yet every part in the whole of nature
operates in accordance with the law that is applicable to
its own level of being: "To its own impulse every creature
stirs." In this sense, even morality is characteristic of
nature, at least of the nature that is represented in the
constitution of man, although it is not characteristic of
"the Solid Earth." Hence it is natural for man to be moral,
for it is in accordance with the peculiar organization of
nature on his particular level of existence: it is the law
of his being— the impulse to which he stirs.
Thus there is not so much a confusion in Arnold's
concept of "nature" in the 1849 volume as an occasional
inconsistency in his use and application of the word. For
instance, if the "Nature" in "To an Independent Preacher"
(later retitled "In Harmony with Nature") is understood to
designate the general nature of the universe outside man, its
significance becomes immediately reconcilable with the image
of nature reflected in the other poems of the volume. As
Professor J. W. Beach explains in The Concept of Nature in
Nineteenth-Century English Poetry, Arnold was here using the
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word "to designate the 'world of things' as opposed to the 
moral world of man; whereas it is often used to designate the 
natural order which includes man and his moral world together 
with the world of t h i n g s . T h e  poem, then, is simply 
declaring that man must live not by the law that is operative 
in other aspects of nature (such as "the Solid Earth") but 
by the moral law that is operative on the level of nature as 
it exists within his own being.
Thus the content of Arnold's concept of nature, as 
clarified and emphasized in the sonnet on "Religious Isola­
tion," is relatively consistent in the poems of the 1849 
volume. Apparent discrepancies are reconcilable, for seeming 
differences are attributable to the various senses in which 
the word is used. Moreover, the image of nature reflected in 
the sonnet may even be regarded as the genesis of the sense 
in which Arnold was to use the concept in his religious writ­
ings of the seventies. For the title of the poem suggests 
that although man is isolated in a universe without God, it 
is still possible for him to be religious— that is, in Arnold's 
view, to be moral. But, as Beach paraphrases Arnold's idea,
1 9"Man must learn to play alone his religious game."
^^Joseph Warren Beach, "Arnold," The Concept of Nature 
in Nineteenth-Century English Poetry (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1936) p. 398.
IZlbid., p. 399.
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In discussing the poems in Arnold's early volumes,
W. Stacy Johnson discerns in them the expression of the poet's
"conflict between two needs, the need for faith in a moral
order and the need for faith in some ultimate unity of things."
When he sees the world from a moral point of view, as 
a social creature, Arnold is a dualist: he perceives
that loving, suffering man and inaminate nature are 
distinct. But when he writes from his need for whole­
ness Arnold is . . .  a monist: he can imagine only
one nature in the universe, ordering an apparent 
multitude of apparently self-centered, aimlessly colliding 
fragments.13
On the basis of the explanation of Arnold's concept of nature 
heretofore given, it should be clear by now that there is not 
really a "conflict" between these two needs in the poet. For, 
as a naturalist, Arnold assumes an ultimate unity in the entire 
universe. In some sense, nature a whole, for it is all.
And within the whole, Arnold also perceives that there are 
parts, each fulfilling the law of nature as expressed within 
the peculiar organization of its own being. This discussion 
of the poems has up to now, however, focused only on the dis­
tinction between, on one hand, the amoral nature of the general 
universe and, on the other, the moral dimension of nature as 
it exists specifically within man. The final poem of the 
volume, "Resignation," affords a clear statement of Arnold's 
monistic view of the "ultimate unity of things."
In "Resignation" the speaker, conversing with Fausta, 
describes the wide and deep vision of life that the Poet enjoys:
13 Johnson, p. 41.
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Before him he sees Life unroll,
A placid and continuous whole;
That general Life, which does not cease.
Whose secret is not joy, but peace;
That Life, whose dumb wish is not miss'd 
If birth proceeds, if things subsist:
The Life of Plants, and stones, and rain . . . .
The "general life" here seems to refer to the entire cosmic 
proGess, at least as it is experienced on Earth, with its 
ever-recurring cycle of the seasons. Here in the last poem 
of the 1849 volume we encounter a more distinct image of the 
nature that was casually suggested in the first poem, the 
sonnet on "Quiet Work," wherein the poet expressed his admir­
ation of the "toil unsever'd from tranquillity" exemplified 
in the vast inexorable process of nature. Indeed, "Resigna­
tion" is in its way a restatement in a grander form of the 
theme stated in "Quiet Work"— the poet's desire to learn a 
life-style from the operation of nature in the world. But 
there is also an experience of deep satisfaction afforded by 
the contemplation of the"general Life" of nature in the 
universe as a whole. It is a satisfaction that is, to Arnold, 
not ethical but esthetic in tone. Indeed, it is perhaps an 
intellectual version of the mystical experience— the vision 
of a reality of unity that pervades the variety of appearance.
In 1852 Matthew Arnold's second volume of poetry was 
published— Empedocles on Etna and Other Poems. The poems in 
this volume differ in theme from those of the first volume.
In 1849 the poems persistently dealt with man's relation to 
nature, in the sense of the universe or the cosmos. But in
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1852 the emphasis has changed. The poems are more concerned 
with human frustration, especially the personal frustra­
tion of the speaker in the poems, who seems to be identical 
with Arnold the poet. Persistent themes are the desires 
and regrets of youth, the distress of love, and the melan­
choly sense of mortality. There is a greater concern with 
social relations, at least on the level of interpersonal 
relationships.
However, the title poem in the second volume, 
"Empedocles on Etna"— the first and longest of the poems— is 
principally concerned with the theme of the human condition 
in a naturalistic universe, with the relation of man to nature, 
like the poems in the earlier volume. Especially is this 
the case in the first act of the dramatic poem. The length and 
placement of "Empedocles on Etna," as well as the rather 
different themes in the remainder of the poems, suggest that 
perhaps Arnold was trying once for all to get the matter of 
man's relation to nature settled for himself. It is as if 
he desired to get the matter out of his system, to establish 
his image of nature permanently so that he could assume it as 
his cosmic background and then go on to express other human 
concerns.
Tinker and Lowry suggest that Arnold incorporated in 
"Empedocles on Etna" much of the meaning that he had intended 
to express in a projected but uncompleted poem on Lucretius.
They note, first of all, that in the list of poems that Arnold
6 6
intended to compose in 1849 (included in an unpublished 
manuscript in the Yale Library)/ the first item reads "Chew 
Lucretius" and the second, in the line immediately below it 
and after the word "Compose," reads "Empedocles— refusal of 
limitation by the religious sentiment." Apparently the 
direction "Chew Lucretius" is a reminder to himself not to 
compose the poem but to reflect upon it more. Further, Tinker 
and Lowry point out that among Arnold's notes on the projected 
poem about Lucretius (now in the possession of Mrs. Norman 
Thwaites), there are. three stanzas that were included in only 
a slightly altered form in "Empedocles on Etna." Moreover, 
they observe that much of the poem is obviously Lucretian in 
spirit;
Most of the important themes of Empedocles' instruction 
to Pausanias are stressed at great length in De Rerum 
Natura: the vanity of luxuries and the contrast with
the simple joys of outdoor life; the reiteration that 
the gods have not arranged the world for man's benefit; 
the working of nature without respect even to the gods; 
the conviction that lust and inordinate desire— not the 
gods— tear man to pieces; the necessity for enjoying the 
simple pleasure of this life; the power of right reason 
to overcome our ills; and the conception of "mind as 
the master part of us."14
One reason why the poem on Lucretius was never finished, the
commentators conclude, is that its basic ideas had already
been expressed in "Empedocles on Etna."
The essential image of nature or God that the dramatic
poem reflects is explicitly expressed in Empedocles' long
speech to Pausanias, in which the relation of man to the
14Tinker and Lowry, Commentary, p. 295.
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universe is the declared topic. The image of nature and the
conception of the relation between nature and man that emerge
from the poem are essentially the same as those reflected in
the poems of The Strayed Reveller and Other Poems ; the vast
cosmic process of nature is indifferent to man, who must
therefore be responsible for his own life. He must fulfill
his own nature, the part of general nature that exists only
within himself. Empedocles rebukes mankind for "peopling the
void air" with gods whom they bless or curse for their fortune
and misfortune. Against this consequence of the unbridled
"religious sentiment"— the control of the imagination by the
wish-fulfilling fantasies of the human heart— Empedocles
recommends a pantheistic naturalism that is rather more Stoic
or Spinozist than the strictly atomic materialism of Democritus,
whose cosmology was adopted by the Epicureans and subsequently
reflected in Lucretius' De Rerum Natura.
All things the world which fill
of but one stuff are spun, so
That we who rail are still.
With what we rail at, one;
One with the o'er-labour'd Power that through the breadth 
and length
Of earth, and air, and sea.
In men, and plants, and stones.
Hath toil perpetually.
And struggles, pants, and moans;
Fain would do all things well, but sometimes fails in 
strength.
And Patiently exact 
This universal God 
Alike to any act 
Proceeds at any nod.
And quietly declaims the cursings of himself.
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This is not what man hates.
Yet he can curse but this.
Harsh Gods and hostile Fates 
Are dreams! this only is;
Is everywhere; sustains the wise, the foolish elf.
(I, ii, 287-306)
That Arnold's conception of nature and God is essen­
tially Stoic was asserted in 1942 by John H i c k s . A n d  it has 
recently been reaffirmed by a classicist. Professor Warren D. 
Anderson, in his book-length study entitled Matthew Arnold and 
the Classical Tradition (1965). According to Anderson, the 
stoics believed in an "invisible unity created by a logos 
penetrating the universe. The cosmos, then, was far more 
than a mere design (for the idea of order is inherent in the 
Greek work kosmos itself); it was a sentient and intelligent 
o r g a n i s m . F u r t h e r ,  one must "realize one's own part in 
the logos. To acknowledge this great scheme of things is to 
'follow nature' (naturam sequi, for the original Greek phusei 
hepesthai) by acknowledging the leadership of the 'guiding 
principle' (to hegemonikon) within oneself." In concluding 
his description of the cosmology of Stoicism, Anderson 
observes, "Finally, the Stoic conceived of the divine in terms 
that tended strongly towards monotheism, but he found it
difficult to posit the existence of a God who was not in every
1 7way identical with the universe." Thus, for the Stoic as
^^John Hicks, "The Stoicism of Matthew Arnold," 
University of Iowa Studies, VI (1942), 7-62.
^^Warren D. Anderson, Matthew Arnold and the Classical 
Tradition (Ann Arbor; The University of Michigan Press, 1965), 
p. 132.
l^Ibid., p. 133.
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as for Arnold, God was not transcendent but immanent. Indeed, 
neither Arnold nor the Stoics conceived of God as even in 
nature. Rather God ^  nature,((or nature is God).
Much of Anderson's book is devoted to the analysis of 
these Stoic ideas in Arnold's poetry. Estimating the degree 
of Stoic influence discernible within the poetry, he concludes, 
"In his early poems it ^Stoicism] is incomparably' stronger 
than Christianity: it constitutes their central intellectual
force. Its doctrines are the foundations upon which he 
attempts to build an adequate idea of the world through 
p o e t r y . B u t  Anderson observes that in the later poems the 
Stoic views are nearly absent. In them the Stoic cosmology 
is more or less assumed; and the ethics of Stoicism, he adds, 
were largely relegated to private expression in Arnold's note­
books of personal reflections and meditations. And even later, 
in the prose essays and religious writings, Arnold was not so 
much Stoic as eclectic— fusing Stoic, Christian, and elements 
from many other sources in his own original synthesis.
But Anderson's interpretation must be contrasted with 
that formulated by an eminent Orientalist, Professor Nagarajan, 
who has demonstrated the influence of Hindu thought upon 
Arnold in a significant article. After citing Arnold's 
appreciative remarks on the Bhagavad Gita in his letters to 
Clough, Nagarajan asserts that "the intellectual frame of
IGlbid., p. 139.
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reference in 'Empedocles on Etna' is substantially derived 
from the Bhagavad Gita," and he proceeds to point out many 
parallels in the ideas of both w o r k s . F o r  instance, in 
paraphrasing an idea of Empedocles in terms of Hindu religious 
philosophy, Nagarajan writes, "The will of man insists that 
he is unique, separate, that the world exists but for his 
welfare. This is an illusion. It is we who must mark the 
world's course."20
Is it possible for Arnold's early poems to reflect 
ideas that are not only "essentially" those of Stoicism but 
also "substantially" those of Hinduism? The answer is, simply, 
yes. As Arthur 0. Lovejoy explained in discussing the study 
of the history of ideas, most systems of thought consist of 
a particular complex of elements drawn from a fund of relatively 
few "unit-ideas." "Most philosophic systems are original or 
distinctive," he declared, "rather in their patterns than in 
their components."21 In terms of this explanation, the 
fundamental similarity between certain elements in Stoicism and 
in Hinduism is to be understood as the consequence of their 
holding certain "unit-ideas" in common.
19g. Nagarajan "Arnold and the Bhagavad Gita; A 
Reinterpretation of 'Empedocles on Etna,'" Comparative 
Literature, XII (Fall, I960),. 338.
20lbid., p. 340
^^Arthur 0. Lovejoy, "Introduction; the Study of the 
History of The Great Chain of Being : A Study of the
History of an Idea (First Harper Torchbook Edition; New York: 
Harper and Rowe, Publishers, 1960), p. 3.
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Professor Anderson himself has noted the resemblance 
between the cosmology of the Stoics and that of Spinoza; 
"Spinoza's pantheistic universe resembles the Stoic cosmos 
infilled with the divine logos ; moreover, the requisite for 
individual happiness— realizing one's small place in the great 
pattern— is virtually the same in each system." So we are 
prepared when other scholars inform us that the cosmology of 
Arnold, especially that reflected in his later religious 
writings, is "basically" Spinozoic. Such is the contention, 
for instance, of William Robbins in his definitive study of 
Arnold's moral and religious ideas. The Ethical Idealism of 
Matthew Arnold. The reason for this variety of interpretation 
is, of course, that Arnold was an eclectic humanist: he took
his ideas from various sources, from wherever he found them. 
And the "unit-ideas" in Stoicism, Hinduism, and Spinozism 
mutually supplement, reinforce, and complement each other in 
the original synthesis of ideas from these and other sources 
that Arnold ultimately achieved in his own thought.
After having clearly formulated an essentially natura­
listic cosmology in Act I of the dramatic poem, Empedocles 
leaped into the crater of Etna in Act II. And in the 1853 
edition of his poems, Arnold refused to republish "Empedocles 
on Etna," explaining in the "Preface" to the volume that the 
passive response of the central character to his situation 
made a poem that, for lack of decisive action, was not suffi­
ciently affirmative in its resolution. Two questions need
29
Anderson, p. 136.
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to be answered before we can understand the later developments 
in Arnold's images of nature and of God as reflected in his 
religious writings of the seventies. Why did Empedocles jump 
into Etna? And why did Arnold, in 1853, regard "Empedocles 
on Etna" as an unsatisfactory poem?
The motivation for Empedocle's suicidal leap into the 
volcano was certainly not, as some writers have suggested, his 
inability to accept the consequences of the austere cosmology 
that he had explained for the sake of Pausanias in Act I . For 
it was presented to Pausanias as a sounder basis for ordering 
one's life well in the world than supernaturalistic supersti­
tions. Empedocles enunciated the naturalistic cosmology as 
a philosophical basis for living. And after Pausanias left, 
Empedocles reflected:
He has his lesson . . .
And the good, learned, friendly, quiet man 
May bravelier front his life . . . .
(11,7-9)
Empedocles' conception of nature and of man's relation to God, 
then, was not what motivated his suicide.
The source of Empedocles' despair, his utter loss of 
hope in life, is to be sought elsewhere— specifically, in 
his relations to society and to himself. In their commentary 
on "Empedocles on Etna," Tinker and Lowry print Arnold's 
prose outline plan for the poem, preserved among the Yale 
papers. After stating in the outline that the youthful 
Empedocles had held his vision of nature and God joyfully among
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friends and that "even now he does not deny that the sight is 
capable of affording rapture and the purest peace," Arnold 
proceeded in his plan to describe the situation of Empedocles 
in old age as he intended to express and create it in the 
poem;
But his friends are dead: the world is all against him,
and incredulous of the truth: his mind is overtasked by
the effort to hold fast so great and severe a truth in 
solifiude: the atmosphere he breathes not being modified
by the presence of human life, is too rare for him.23
And, as represented in the poem itself, this is the actual 
situation of Empedocles. He is an exile, living in an 
unsympathetic age, alienated from others and even from him­
self. Alone, he sums up his condition: "Thou canst not live
with men nor with thyself." Soliloquizing, he continues:
But he, who has outliv'd his prosperous days.
But he, whose youth fell on a different world
From that on which his exiled age is thrown.
Whose mind was fed on other food, was train'd 
By other rules than are in vogue to-day.
Whose habit of thought is fix'd, who will not change.
But in a world he loves not must subsist
In ceaseless opposition, be the guard
Of his own breast, fetter'd to what he guards.
That the world win no mastery over him;
Who has no friend, no fellow left, not one;
Who has no minute's breathing space allow'd 
To nurse his dwindling faculty of joy—
Joy and the outward world must die to him.
As they are dead to me I (II, 261-275)
It is against the Sophists, whose influence had begun
to dominate his age, that Empedocles was in "ceaseless
opposition." He fears what they are making of the times with
^^Tinker and Lowry, Commentary, p. 291.
74
their ignoble doctrines. In the continuous intellectual con­
tention with them, with no opportunity to cultivate the 
emotional aspect of his nature, he has lost the balance and 
unity of his being. One thinks of Coleridge's "Dejection:
An Ode," in which he attributed his loss of joy in part to 
his "abstruse research," and of John Stuart Mill's mental 
crisis, diagnosed by himself as the consequence of an imbal­
ance of intellect and emotion. The imbalance in Empedocle's 
being is symbolically suggested by the imagery of the four 
elements in the poem. He has become a "devouring flame of 
thought" (II, 329, italics mine); he is situated on the arid 
earth of the volcano cone, far away from access to the 
refreshing stream of water below; and the air he breathes 
is thin, causing him to gasp for life (II, 215). In terms of 
Empedocles' view, as Arnold represents it in the poem, the 
unity or poise of the elements in oneself is the essential 
condition for his release from the limitations of human life 
and for his reunion with nature or God, the "All." This con­
dition of poise, unity, or balance he has been unable to 
achieve in the age of the Sophists. In his fierce disputations 
with them, he had lost touch with his soul: he had not lived
in the light of his own true deep-buried self, "Being one with 
which we are one with the whole world" (II, 372).
For Empedocles, the soul or buried self of man is a 
subconscious source of wisdom concerning the true needs of 
his real nature— the vital demands of his whole being. To
75
know this self and to realize it in action, as the fulfillment 
of his nature, is the ultimate goal of man. The "buried self" 
in Arnold's poetry reflects the Hindu doctrine of the "Self,"
I take it, in agreement with Nagarajan's interpretation of 
"Empedocles on Etna" as demonstrating the influence of certain 
ideas that Arnold had acquired from his study of the Bhagavad 
Gita. When one is in right relation with himself, or his Self—  
that is, when he in effect i^ his Self— then he will be in 
right relation to society and to nature or God. But in an 
age of intellectual contention and confusion, Empedocles has 
not had the opportunity and solitude to behold and follow the 
inward light of his soul. He has not actualized the potential 
of his Self— the true needs of his real nature.
However, for a moment Empedocles has an intimation 
that because he has resisted the tendency of these Sophistic 
times to alienate him from his Self, "it hath been granted me/ 
Not to die wholly, not to be all enslav'd." And in that 
moment, when he can "breathe free," perhaps because he has 
been partially and momentarily reunited with his Self, he 
jumps into the crater to rejoin the elements, the All.
In his excellent study of Arnold's poetry entitled 
Imaginative Reason, A. Dwight Culler suggests that Empedocles' 
suicide represents the destruction of his defiant self in the 
purifying fire of the volcano and that the 1853 Preface, with 
its explanation for the omission of the dramatic poem from 
the volume, constitutes a second exorcism of the spirit of
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Empedocles in Arnold h i m s e l f . A n d  Walter E.. Houghton has 
interpreted the poem as Arnold's attempt to portray "the image
n c
of a nineteenth-century intellectual." That the poem is
contemporary in its significance is confirmed by. Arnold'soown
admission in the 1853 Preface that there existed in the
character of Empedocles "much that we are accustomed to consider
as exculsively m o d e r n . But that Empedocles in any sense
represented himself, Arnold denied in a letter written on
November 12, 1867, to Mr. Henry Dunn:
You . . . appear to assume that I merely use Empedocles 
and Obsermann as mouthpieces through which to vent my 
own opinions. This is not so . . .  . Traces of an 
impatience with the language and assumptions of the 
popular theology of the day may very likely be visible 
in my work, and I have now, and no doubt had still 
more then, a sympathy with the figure Empedocles presents 
to the imagination; but neither then nor now would my 
creed . . . by by any means identical with that con­
tained in the preachment of E m p e d o c l e s . ^7
But the statement in his letter must be contrasted with the
view expressed in another letter— one written in the summer
of 1849 to Arthur Hugh Clough by an acquaintance of Arnold
named J. Campbell Shairp: "I saw the said Hero— Matt— the
Dwight Culler, Imaginative Reason: The Poetry of
Matthew Arnold (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966),
p. 154.
^^Walter E. Houghton, "Arnold's 'Empedocles on Etna,'" 
Victorian Studies, VI (June, 1958) , 314.
Super, I, 1.
27prom an unpublished letter printed by Tinker and 
Lowry in their Commentary, pp. 287-88.
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day I left London. . . .  He was working at an 'Empedocles' —  
which seemed to be not much about the man who leapt in the 
crater— but his name and outward circumstances are used for 
the drapery of his own thoughts.
Now, which of these two letters are we to believe? 
Probably both letters are to be credited to a certain degree. 
Although "Empedocles on Etna" was composed in the objective 
mode of dramatic poetry and did not express a "creed" that 
was identical with that of the poet, Arnold nevertheless 
undoubtedly did project certain aspects of himself, of his 
ideas, and of his own situation into the character of 
Empedocles in the poem.
Perhaps what Arnold most desired to disassociate him­
self from and to disown in the character of Empedocles was 
his negative response to his situation— his suicidal plunge 
into Etna. The rationalization in the 1853 "Preface" for 
the exclusion of the poem specifically cites the inadequacy 
of Empedocles' passive action to resolve the poem in a satis­
factory manner. Such situations, "in which a continuous state 
of mental distress is prolonged, unrelieved by incident, hope, 
or resistance," afford no poetical enjoyment. "When they 
occur in actual life, they are painful, not tragic . . . ."29
One must be careful here not to confuse Arnold's 
esthetics with his ethics, his art with his life. But if there
ZGlbid., p. 287.
^^Super, I, 2-3.
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•* actually is a parallel to be drawn between the situations 
of Empedocles and of Arnold, what is the result when it is 
carried out to its logical conclusion? Both men hold similar 
conceptions of nature or God; both men live in periods in 
which they find it difficult if not impossible to live well, 
to lead a fully satisfying life; and the response of one of 
the two men to the situation is suicide— the ultimate act of 
escapism. But Arnold, of course, did not leap off the cliffs 
of Dover. However, his letters do often express his desire, 
especially as a young man, to leave England, to live in Europe, 
specifically in Switzerland.
Surely A. Dwight Culler is correct, then, in suggest­
ing that Arnold's decision not to republish "Empedocles on 
Etna" constituted as exorcism of the spirit of Empedocles 
within himself. Insofar as Empedocles reflected the poet's 
attitude, Arnold changed his mind about the appropriateness 
of the philosopher's passive plunge. I would suggest that 
the inclusion of an entirely new poem in the volume of 1853 
(from which "Empedocles on Etna" was excluded) expresses 
the change of attitude in Arnold's response to his situation—  
"The Scholar Gipsy."
Various interpretations of "The Scholar Gipsy" have 
been propounded. But perhaps the clearest approach to under­
standing the essential significance of the poem is simply to 
ask what the speaker most admires in the scholar gypsy whom 
he seeks. Certainly the speaker in the poem is not striving 
to find what the scholar gypsy himself is seeking. For in
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Arnold's source, Joseph Glanvil's The Vanity of Dogmatizing, 
the Oxford student was seeking a more complete understanding 
of the secret and mastery of the art of the gypsy fortune­
tellers— what we recognize now as hypnotism and what Arnold 
himself knew then as mesmerism. Nor does the speaker desire 
to find the scholar gypsy merely in order to see or to talk 
with him. For, in the end, he actually bids the scholar 
gypsy to flee even from the poet himself. What the poet, or 
the speaker in the poem, really admires is the manner in which 
the scholar gypsy pursues his quest.
The pastoral element in the poem is used especially 
to emphasize the contrast between, on the one hand, the simple 
and serene manner in which the gypsy figure pursues his 
quest and, on the other hand, the complex confusion in the life 
of the poet himself and of the contemporaries for whom he 
speaks. The quest of the gypsy is the business of his life.
IH a sense, it is-~his life. And the quest of the speaker 
mid his contemporaries is, likewise, their pursuit of life 
itself— the business of living. The poet, addressing the 
scholar gipsy and speaking for his contemporaries, exclaims:
0 Life unlike to ours I 
Who fluctuate idly without term or scope.
Of whom each strives, nor knows for what he strives. 
And each half lives a hundred different lives;
Who wait like thee, but not, like thee, in hope.
In contract with the ununified lives of the speaker and his 
contemporaries, the scholar gipsy had "one aim, one business, 
one desire."
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The speaker envies the age in which the scholar gypsy 
lived— "Before this strange disease of modern life,/ With 
its sick hurry, its divided aims"~and warns the scholar gypsy 
against the effects of life in the modern world:
But fly our paths, pur feverish contact flyI 
For strong the infection of our mental strife.
Which, though it gives no bliss, yet spoils for rest; 
And we should win thee from thy own fair life.
Like us distracted, and like us unblest.
The implication is that the scholar gypsy was able to live
with such equanimity and unity of purpose because he was born
in a different age, that there is something in modern life
that makes such a unified life difficult if not impossible.
And that which is singled out as most responsible for the
disunity is the strong infection of "mental strife." The
Victorian period itself was, of course, an age of mental
strife. Religion, politics, economics, education, science,
the arts— all were fields of intellectual contention. The
entire cultural ideology inherited from the past, with its
traditional conceptions of the nature, purpose, and relations
of God, of nature, of the structures and functions of the
institutions in society, and of man himself, was being
vigorously challenged and seriously questioned. For the
Victorian period was experiencing the climax of a cultural
revolution, both ideologically and technologically, in the
evolution of western civilization.
"Mental strife," we remember, was the source of
imbalance and disunity in Empedocles. Entering into the
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intellectual contention of his time, he neglected the true 
needs of his real nature. He became alienated from his "Self." 
He was not an integrated personality, with the intellectual 
and emotional balance and wholeness of a unified person. This 
is essentially the state that the speaker in "The Scholar 
Gypsy" describes in himself and his contemporaries. And it 
is the opposite of this state in the scholar gypsy that the 
speaker admires and himself desires to enjoy.
If indeed "The Scholar Gypsy" actually incarnates 
a personal ideal of Arnold, it is his own desire to achieve 
a unified life, to live by the light of his own true deep- 
buried self, in an age when circumstances seemed to conspire 
against it. The conditions under which he desires to pursue 
his quest or to live his life, Arnold in effect declares, are 
not those of Empedocles but those of the scholar gypsy. This 
is advice that he had before given to Clough: not to try "to
solve the Universe." He would not, in an effort to change 
the age so that it would foster the unity of individuals, 
fiercely dispute with the Sophists of the age, and thus lose 
the very unity that he desired in the process of striving for 
it. Nor would he entirely disengage himself from the age or, 
like Empedocles at the last, escape from life itself. Instead, 
almost like the slow, silent, sure process of general nature 
itself, his specific nature would pursue its quest to realize 
the true needs of his real Self, even as the scholar gypsy was 
quietly and patiently intent upon his single goal— "waiting 
for the spark from Heaven to fall."
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The "spark from Heaven" is a phrase that suggests 
some sort of inspiration— a revelation of truth, an insight 
of profound significance, or a vision of ultimate reality.
What the "spark" signified to the scholar gypsy (the secret 
of the gypsy art) is of little import, for the speaker most 
admired the manner in which he pursued the quest. But what 
the "spark" represented for the speaker in the poem and for 
his contemporaries is an interesting matter for speculation.
Is it only a deep insight into the significance of his own 
life and purpose that is suggested? Or is it a revelation that 
would perhaps resolve all the "mental strife" of the age?
A Dwight Culler offers an intriguing interpretation: "He
is waiting for the spark to fall which has fallen in Culture 
and Anarchy, and the secret he would learn from the gypsies 
is not dissimilar from the method and secret of Jesus in 
Literature and Dogma."
Ultimately, I think, Arnold is suggesting both an 
individual significance and a social application. Neither 
the achievement of wholeness in the life of the individual 
nor the resolution of the problems of the age can be expected 
from following the way of Empedocles. Rather, both the 
immediate unification of the person and the ultimate integra­
tion of the society can be won only by the method and secret 
of the scholar gypsy. And in all his writings, in the 
politically oriented Culture and Anarchy as much as in the
30culler, p. 193.
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religiously oriented Literature and Dogma, Arnold traces the 
anarchy of society to the anarchy in the life of the individual. 
He recognizes that the influence is mutual: that the condition 
of the society affects the condition of the individual and that 
the state of the latter affects the state of the former. But 
transformation must begin with the individual. For only a 
transformed person can or will contribute effectively to the 
transformation of his age. And to transform the individual is 
to contribute to the transforming of society.
In "The Scholar Gypsy" Arnold had, as Culler phrases 
it, "poised" his life. He had found the way to develop and 
maintain his own unity, and he was consequently prepared to 
begin his contribution to the transformation of Victorian 
society.
The Image of God in the Essays
One of Arnold's greatest contributions to this process 
of social transformation, at least in his own estimation, was 
his religious writings of the seventies. And it was in these 
writings on religion that, of course, Arnold most concerned 
himself with the concept of God. In them he was engaged in 
the task of explicitly expressing his images of God and of 
nature in specifically religious terms. In a subsequent 
chapter, Arnold's essays on religion will be examined as 
criticisms of the theory and practice of the religious insti­
tution in Victorian society. Our concern in the present 
chapter is to examine his religious essays only in order to
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apprehend more clearly and fully the images of God and of 
nature that he reflected in his mature thought. The effort 
to apprehend the image of God that Arnold envisioned and pro­
jected in his writings on religion must necessarily concentrate 
on the several controversial definitions of God that he 
formulated. The goal must be to grasp clearly the full 
significance, implications, and assumptions involved in 
these definitions and then to relate them to the images of 
God and of nature that were reflected in the earlier poem.
Arnold's first book-length essay on religion was St. 
Paul and Protestantism, published in 1870. Although it was 
primarily concerned with the exposition of the "method" and 
"secret" of Jesus as understood and expressed intthe Pauline 
Epistles, Arnold nevertheless had occasion to venture a 
definition of God. Early in the book he defines God as that 
"stream of tendency by which all things strive to fulfill the 
law of their being. O n  the same page, Arnold also writes 
that the use of the word "God*is no doubt "the least inadequate 
name for that universal order which the intellect feels after 
as a law . . . ." Approximately halfway through the book, he 
offers another variation in his definition of God, describing 
Him or It as "the universal order by which all things fulfill 
the law of their being.
31]v[atthew Arnold, St. Paul and Protestantism 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1902), p. 8.
32%bid., p. 47.
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The second and the most famous of Arnold's book-length
essays on religion was Literature and Dogma, published in
1873. In it a significant alteration in the definition of God
is advanced. Arnold approached this second definition of God
by discussing the manner in which the idea of God was grasped
and expressed by the ancient Hebrews.
They had dwelt upon the thought of conduct and right 
and wrong, till the not ourselves which is in us and all 
around us, became to them adorable eminently and 
altogether as a power which makes for righteousness; 
which makes for it unchangeable and eternally, and is 
therefore called The Eternal.33
Later in the book, Arnold puts all of this together in a
succinct definition of God as that "enduring power, not ou±-
selves, which makes for righteousness."
From St. Paul and Protestantism and from Literature 
and Dogma, then, we emerge with two rather different defini­
tions of God, both italicized by Arnold for emphasis: on the
one hand, God is described as the "stream of tendency by 
which all things strive to fulfill the law of their being"; 
and, on the other hand, God is described as the "enduring 
power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness." In 
his Ethical Studies, originally published in 1876, F. H. 
Bradley dismissed Arnold's definitions of God with derision, 
confessing that "when 'culture' went on to tell us what God
33Matthew Arnold, Literature and Dogma (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1902), p. 28.
34ibid., p. 52.
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is for science, we heard words we did not understand about ' 
'streams,' and 'tendencies,' and 'the Eternal,'" and conclud­
ing that "'the Eternal' . . .  is nothing in the world but a 
piece of literary c l a p - t r a p . A n d  Lionel Trilling readily 
agreed! in his own Matthew Arnold (1939) with Bradley's treat­
ment. However, William Robbins advances a dissenting opinion 
in his study of Arnold's religious thought (1959), asserting 
that "Arnold's position was not so intellectually naive as 
Bradley makes out . . . On the basis of our understand­
ing of Arnold's image of nature in his poems, perhaps we can 
arrive at a comprehensive apprehension of the essential 
consistency in Arnold's image of God in his religious essays.
First of all, it is of course important to note the 
contexts in which Arnold offers his several definitions of 
God. The definition in St. Paul and Protestantism— the 
"stream of tendency by which all things strive to fulfil the 
law of their being"— is intended and offered as a statement 
about God that will be acceptable to the "scientific sense" 
of m a n . 37 Arnold's understanding of what is "scientific" 
has often been denounced as inadequate. However, F. A. Dudley 
has written an article in which he concludes that there were
^^F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (Second Edition; 
Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1927), p. 317.
^^William Robbins, The Ethical Idealism of Matthew 
Arnold (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1959), p. 78.
"3 7
Arnold, St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 8.
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two senses in which Arnold used the term "science": "the
older and broader sense of thorough, systematic knowledge in 
any field"; and, in a narrower sense, "the comprehension and 
interpretation of the [physical] w o r l d . "^8 In the former 
sense, Arnold used the term "science" to refer to truly 
disinterested knowledge, as opposed to irrational prejudice 
without basis in the facts of experience. Yet Dudley concludes, 
"As a lay critic of physical science itself [as opposed to 
the humanities, in his writings on education], Arnold can 
hardly be regarded with great s e r i o u s n e s s . "^9
But it seems in his definition of God that Arnold is 
drawing on both of these senses of the term. For he is 
engaged in defining an aspect of the physical world; yet his 
definition is acceptable, if at all, not to the physical 
sciences, which demand experimental verification, but to an 
older, less exact, more humanistic "science," experiential 
in its approach to knowledge. That Arnold's definition indeed 
has reference to the physical world is clearly indicated by 
the expression that he uses as synonomous with his definition:
"that universal order which the intellect feels after as a 
law." This "universal order" is, when transposed, the "order 
in the universe"—  an "order" which is, moreover, sensed as a 
"law," Yet it is impossible to verify experimentally the
^^Fred A. Dudley, "Matthew Arnold and Science," PMLA, 
LVII (March, 1942), 276-66.
3 9 l b i d . , p .  2 9 2 .
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existence, constitution, or direction of this law of order in 
the universe. Nor indeed did Arnold intend to specify that it 
is possible to do so. Rather, his statement is to be under­
stood as asserting only that we sense, experientially, there 
is order in the universe and that, insofar as we can apprehend 
it, the order consists in the activity of all things to fulfill 
the law of their own being. This is to assert, after all, no 
more than that the functions of phenomena are determined by 
their structures and that, therefore, each object acts in 
accordance with its own nature.
It should begin to become apparent now that the concept 
of God which Arnold expresses in this first definition is 
essentially the same as the image of general nature that he 
reflects in his earlier poetry. For in both cases he is 
suggesting the vast, impersonal, cosmic process. In other 
words, the definition postulates that God is either the 
cosmos itself (the natural universe) or the process at work 
within the cosmos. This view we recognize as a version of 
Spinozist pantheism. In a technical exposition of Spinoza's 
cosmology, H. F. Hallet distinguishes between his concept of 
God as process and his concept of nature as cosmos, using 
the traditional terms from scholastic philosophy— "Natura 
naturans" and “Natura naturata." "'Nature' as creative potency- 
in-act is God— Nature as creating a nature for itself : Nature
' naturing herself; Nature regarded as a determinate totality
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of determinate being— as having received a nature— is the 
world or Nature 'natured.'"^^ Throughout his Ethics, Spinoza 
insists on the virtual identity of God and of nature. He 
habitually uses the phrase "God or Nature." Matthew Arnold's 
acquaintance with and admiration for Spinoza's thought is 
well known, for it was indicated both publicly in the sëveral 
essays that he devoted to the philosopher and privately in his 
letters to Clough. And the relation of his own cosmological 
view to that of Spinoza is revealed in the "unit-ideas" that 
are common to both. For both of them, "God" is but nature 
under one of its aspects. Nature is the complex of structures 
in the universe— the cosmos. And God is the complex of func­
tions in the universe~the process. Thus, as Robert Shafer 
has asserted, Arnold's position is clearly and thoroughly 
"naturalistic because it refused to admit the possibility of 
anything beyond the regular 'course of nature.
The context in which Arnold advanced his second defini­
tion of God (that in Literature and Dogma) was entirely 
different from that of the first. This second definition of 
God— as the "enduring power, not ourselves, which makes for 
righteousness"— is conditioned by at least three other 
factors: first, it is presented as the notion of God that was
F. Hallett, Benedict De Spinoza: The Elements of 
his Philosophy (London: The Athlone Press, 1957), p. 14.
^^Robert Shafer, "Matthew Arnold," Christianity and 
Naturalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926_, p. 168.
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grasped by the ancient Hebrew people; second, the definition 
emphasizes only that aspect of God which is apprehended in the 
strictly ethical dimension of human experience; and, third, 
it is an idea of God intended not to satisfy the scientific 
sense (although it is offered as a view of God not incompatible 
with or offensive to science) but specifically to enable the 
reading of the Bible to be a morally inspiring experience for 
the contemporary Victorian. All three of these factors are 
insisted on in God and the Bible; A Review of Objections to 
Literature and Dogma (1875).
Arnold's first and general definition of God, having 
served its purpose in St. Paul and Protestantism, was no more 
invoked. But the second and specifically religious definition 
of God figures prominently in all of his subsequent essays on 
religion. And Arnold's clearest exposition of its significance 
is to be found in the three opening chapters of God and the 
Bible; "The God of Miracles," "The God of Metaphysics," and 
"The God of Experience." In these chapters, Arnold contrasts 
his own concept of God with, onethe one hand, the God of 
popular superstition and with, on the other hand, the God of 
scholastic theology. In so doing, he is himself challenged 
to clarify explicitly the assumptions, inplications, and 
ambiguities in the earlier work.
Perhaps one difficulty that prevents a ready understand­
ing of Arnold's second definition of God is his use of the 
phrasee "not ourselves" in it. Why does he insist on the
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insertion of this qualifying phrase? It seems to be the one 
dispensable element. If it were omitted, the definition would 
read, simply, "the enduring power that makes for righteousness" 
or, in another common variation, "the Eternal that makes for 
righteousness." What is lost, if anything, by its omission?
One loss, when the phrase "not ourselves" is omitted, is that 
the remaining word "Eternal" then seems to be an adjective 
without a noun to modify. It is true that Arnold sets off the 
phrase "not ourselves" with a pair of commas as a nonrestric- 
tive element and that, in so doing, he is signaling his use 
of "Eternal" in a substantive sense. But it is also true 
that in some cases he omits the commas, as when he writes, 
for instance, of "having led the reader to face . . . what 
'God' means in the Bible, and to see that it means the Eternal 
not ourselves that makes for eighteousness."^^ And, too,
Arnold often uses the phrase "not ourselves" even alone in a 
clearly substantive sense, as when he writes of "the not 
ourselves, mighty for our weal or woe."^^
This difficulty in the definition is removed and we 
are well on our way toward a clear apprehension of Arnold's 
meaning when we recall that the "not ourselves" is another way 
of saying the "not-self," the "other." The "not-self" is, 
of course, one in an opposing set of philosophical terms used
^^Matthew Arnold, God and the Bible (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1903), p. 26.
^^Ibid. , p. 69
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in a traditional dualistic distinction between the "Self" and
the "Not-self." In this dualism the "Self" is the egoistic
source of consciousness in the individual; and
the "Not-self" is the world that he experiences outside his
subjective consciousness— the objective world of nature,
society, and even his own body. In this light, then, Arnold’s
"Eternal not ourselves" is none other than nature itself— the
eternal world. That this is indeed the sense in which Arnold
intended the phrase is clearly indicated by its use of it in
the context of Literature and Dogma where he originally
introduced the term:
The not ourselves, which is in us and in the world 
around us, has almost everywhere . . . struck the minds 
of men as they awoke to consciousness, and has inspired 
them with awe. Every one knows how the mighty natural 
objects which most took their regards became the objects 
to which this awe addressed itself.44
The genius of the Hebrews, Arnold insists throughout
his religious essays, consisted in their apprehension of one
aspect of the "not ourselves": the insight that, in effect,
the nature of the world, at least in the universe of human
experience, is such that "righteousness makes for life and
happiness." This, he contends in Sod and the Bible, is a law
of experience.
That there is an Eternal not ourselves which makes for 
righteousness and is càlled God, is admitted; and indeed 
so much as this human experience proves. For the constitu­
tion and history of things shows us that happiness, at 
which we all aim, is dependent on righteousness.45
44Arnold, Literature and Dogma, p. 2 6 .  
4^Arnold, God and the Bible, p. 2 9 .
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Here the words "the constitution and history of things" is 
but a step away from "the structure and function of nature." 
Or, again, "constitution" is nearly synonymous with "cosmos," 
as "history" is with "process." Arnold is apparently suggest­
ing that in the natural world, or at least within the world 
of human nature and experience, happiness and life are 
contingent on righteousness. We can perhaps better grasp, his 
meaning if we express the obverse statement that is implicit 
in his assertions that the "not ourselves" (in the sense of 
"the world") makes for righteousness and that, in turn, 
righteousness makes for life and happiness. The obverse 
statement is that whatever truly makes for life and happiness 
in human experience is to be construed (by definition) as 
"righteous." And the constitution of human nature is such 
that man necessarily strives for life and happiness. Thus 
man is required by his own nature to conduct himself 
"righteously," as it were, in order to fulfill the true needs 
of his whole being. This is the condition for his life and 
happiness. It is in this sense, then, that nature or the not 
ourselves that is "in us and in the world around us" fosters 
"righteous" behavior.
If the interpretation of Arnold's definition of God 
suggested here is correct, then nature fosters "righteousness" 
in human conduct because, in the course of evolutionary 
development, such behavior is "selected" by the process of 
natural adaptation, because it contributes to the survival
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and fulfillment of the human species. It is not surprising, 
therefore, to discover in "The God of Experience" (the third 
chapter of God and the Bible) that Arnold is willing to grant 
the supposition that "our moral perceptions and rules are all 
to be traced up, as evolutionists say, to habits due to one 
or other of two main i n s t i n c t s t h e  reproductive instinct 
and the instinct for self-preservation."^6 For Arnold's point, 
as he argues it, is simply that such virtues as chastity and 
charity are ultimately adopted by man and perpetuated inhis 
his traditional morality as desirable precisely because 
experience eventually demonstrates that they actually foster 
social survival and personal happiness and that the failure to 
practice them somehow detracts from the quality of life and 
happiness in the society and in the individual. And the 
reason that this is so can be attributed only to the constitu­
tion of the cosmos, insofar as it involves mankind: it is
simply the scheme of things. Apparently, righteousness is 
(so it seems) the will of nature. In Arnold's view, at least, 
the natural Condition for vitality and happiness is that kind 
of conduct which men commonly designate as "righteous"; and, 
to him, this view is pragmatically verifiable: the history of
nations and the lives of individuals attests its verity. That 
the human condition thus fosters righteousness "is really a 
law of nature, collected from experience, just as much as the 
law of gravitation is; only it [gravitation]is =alaw of nature
4Gibid., p. 126.
95
which is conceived, however confusedly, by very many more of 
mankind as affecting them, and much more nearly [than the 
law that righteousness makes for life and happiness].
Such is the nature of the universe, the "not ourselves," at 
least insofar as it is manifested in the nature of man.
Arnold will not commit himself to a more specific 
definition of God. His reason is that more precise specifi­
cations are not "scienficially" verifiable. He opposes those 
who would assert the personal or anthropomorphic nature of 
God with his own essentially agnostic stance.
All we [arterial pluralj say is that men do not know 
enough about the Eternal not ourselves . . .  to warrant 
their pronouncing this either a person or a thing. We 
say that no one has discovered the nature of God to be 
personal, or is entitled to assert that God has con­
scious intelligence. Theologians assert this and make it 
the basis of religion. It is they who assert and profess 
to know, not we. We object to their professing to know 
more than can be known, to their insisting we shall 
receive it, to their resting religion upon it. We want 
to rest religion on what can be verified, not on what 
cannot.
About the nature of God, Arnold insists, man can know nothing. 
All he can know is what he experiences, and all he can 
experience is only the effect that God— or, as we have seen, 
the order of nature— causes in the life of man: it fosters
righteousness. In God and the Bible, Arnold refuses to assert 
anything about the "being" of God; he refuses even to assert
4?Ibid., p. 77.
4Gibid., pp. 31-32.
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that God ^  a being at all. Her prefers to speak of "the 
enduring power that makes for righteousness" rather than of 
"the Eternal Being that makes for righteousness"; for, as he 
says, "Power is a better word [than Being], because it pre­
tends to assert nothing more than effect on us, operation.
In an article entitled "Matthew Arnold's 'Eternal Not 
Ourselves . . Eugene Williamson, Jr. adds an interesting
note to the history of Arnold's idea of God. He first points 
out that in Arnold's definitions of God as "the stream of 
tendency by which all things strive to fulfill the law of 
their nature" and as "the eternal not ourselves that makes 
for righteousness," there is implicit "a view of divine
c n
immanence," Then he attempts to trace the source of the 
view. Although he grants that it "might be expected in one 
who had previously published an appreciative study of Spinoza" 
in Essays in Criticism 11865), he cites the evidence in 
Arnold's letters to Clough to show that Arnold had access to 
"the immanentist position" even as early as 1847, when he was 
reading the Bhagavad Gita. Yet, Williamson asserts, it is 
possible to demonstrate that Arnold may have originally become 
acquainted with the notion of immanent God in 1834, for in 
that year Professor Jacob Abbot, an American correspondent 
with Dr. Thomas Arnold, sent the latter a copy of his book
49%bid., p. 93.
^^Eugene L. Williamson, Jr., "Matthew Arnold's 'Eternal 
Not Ourselves . . .,'" Modern Language Notes, LXXV (April, 
1960), 310.
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entitled The Corner Stone, in which he defined God as "the 
all-pervading Power, which lives and acts through the whole 
universe."51 it is at least possible if not probable, 
Williamson contends, that the young Arnold may have discovered 
the genesis of his later concept of God in his own home— from 
his father's talk or from the book in his father's library 
(although Dr. Arnold himself was opposed to pantheistic views 
of God). "
The most recent and most ambitious study of Arnold's 
writings on religion is William Robbins' The Ethical Idealism 
of Matthew Arnold (1959). In a chapter entitled "The Idea of 
God," Robbins discusses at length Arnold's concept of 
divinity. He concludes that the primary source of Arnold's 
idea of God was the cosmology of Spinoza, which Goethe had 
highly praised. After suggesting that Arnold was "driven by 
a need for authority as urgent as that of Coleridge and 
Newman," Robbins asserts that Arnold went beyond Spinoza, "in 
his objectifying of an immanent moral principle, to a non-
52pantheistic statement of a controlling power outside man."
In so doing, as Robbins intends to convey by the title of his 
book, Arnold was manifesting an "idealizing" tendency. But 
surely this is not the case. In no sense can Arnold's 
position be construed as a metaphysical idealism. Rather,
S^Ibid., p. 311.
52william Robbins, "The Idea of God," The Ethical 
Idealism of Matthew Arnold (London: William Heineman LTD,
1959), p. 110.
98
instead of postulating a guasi-idealistic "controlling power 
outside man," his view of God was fundamentally naturalistic: 
"The not ourselves . . .  is in us and in the world around 
us . . . ." For Arnold, as an agnostic, the Eternal, not 
ourselves, which makes for righteousness was an immanent 
effect whose cause could not be teleologically categorized 
either as intentional or as accidental. The only sense in 
which he wished to "objectify" God was as a religious symbol,
not as a transcendent metaphysical actuality. Robbins is on
safer ground when he used the term "idealism" to refer to
Arnold's ethical concern, which is indeed his primary
referent.
Whether or not William's conjecture is correct, it 
is nonetheless clear that Arnold's view of God as either 
immanent in or identical with nature is present in his early 
poetry and persists throughout the later prose. The image 
of nature in the poems, it may be asserted, is essentially 
the same as the image of God in the essays. The distinction 
that we noted in the poems between nature as it exists gener­
ally in the universe and as it exists specifically in man 
(who fulfills the law of nature only as it is expressed in 
the peculiar organization of his own being) corresponds 
closely to the difference between the two definitions of 
God that Arnold advances in his essays on religion. The 
definition of God as "the stream of tendency by which all 
things fulfil the law of their own being" is clearly related
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to what we have referred to as the concept of "general 
nature" in the poems. And the definition of God as "the 
enduring power that makes for righteousness" is likewise 
clearly related to the concept of "specific nature" in the 
poems— of that aspect of nature which is operative in the 
strictly ethical dimension of the human condition, wherein 
the "law of being" is, in Arnold's view, essentially moral.
In his essay on "Pagan and Medieval Religious Sentiment," 
Arnold asserted that "the main element of the modern spirit's 
life is neither the senses and understanding, nor the heart 
and imagination; it is the imaginative reason." In the Pagan 
epoch, so Arnold argues in the essay, the element by which man 
lives was the "senses and understanding"; and in the Medieval 
epoch the predominant element was the "heart and imagination." 
What modern man needs, he concludes, is a happy synthesis of 
both elements. Such a synthesis he calls the element of 
"imaginative reason." He points out that the "imaginative 
reason" was a prominent element in the poetry of the early 
Greek classical poets, claiming that "no other poets who have 
so well satisfied the thinking-power, have so well satisfied 
the religious sense."
It would seem that the image of God which Arnold 
reflected in his essays was intended to appeal to the imagina­
tive reason of modern man. On the one hand, he proffers his
S^Super, III, 230.
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definition of God as verifiable, or at least as not incompat­
ible with or offensive to modern man's scientific sense. It 
is intended to satisfy his "thinking-power," as no "God of 
Miracles" now can. On the other hand, the simplicity and 
sublimity of his "Eternal" is intended to appeal fo the 
"heart and imagination." It is intended to satisfy his 
"religious sense," as no "God of Metaphysics" ever can.
CHAPTER III 
THE IMAGE OF SOCIETY
Many of Matthew Arnold's essays are devoted to the 
criticism of society. Much of his writing is concerned with 
matters that in the increasingly specialized contemporary 
period are regarded as properly the province of what we should 
now call a "social critic." Even as a specialized profession, 
social criticism requires a rather broad knowledge and general 
interest, for actually the social critic is involved in the 
criticism of culture. And culture, as a concept in the social 
sciences, refers to all of the inventions of human ingenuity, 
as opposed to the products of natural processes. Human cul­
ture thus includes both the technological and ideological 
(or material and spiritual) inventions and creations of man­
kind. In practice, the social critic is particularly interested 
in these aspects of human culture that determine the group life 
of the members of a society— its mechanisms of adaptation for 
social living. Specifically, these cultural mechanisms are 
the social institutions of the society; economic, political, 
educational, religious, recreational, and familial.^
^See Samuel Koenig, "The Meaning and Function of 
Institutions," Sociology; An Introduction to the Science of 
Society (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1957), pp. 69-73.
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A social critic, then is not so much the critic of a society 
as of its culture— specifically, of the theory and practice, 
the structures and functions, of the institutions in the cul­
ture of the society.
The student of the social sciences is one who, for one 
reason or another, is interested in acquiring a specialized 
knowledge of the structure and function of society as an 
organism (or as a mechanism, depending upon his point of 
view). But the social critic is, as it were, a general student 
of the social sciences who elects actively to apply his know­
ledge to the evaluation of the institutions in ansociety. 
Presumably, he has had a vision of what these institutions 
ought to be and is not content with what they are. He is a 
student with a point of view. His studies are conducted with 
a practical end in mind. His goal is likely to be either the 
conservative reformation or the radical transformation of the 
social order, or the order of society— its institutional 
structure.
Ultimately, the evaluation of any human activity— be 
it technology, recreation, or objects of worship— is an 
exercise in cultural criticism. Such judgment is properly 
regarded as a specialized endeavor within the larger context 
of cultural criticism in general. Thus literary criticism, 
for example, is concerned with the evaluation of a specific 
cultural creation, verbal art forms. Literature, in turn, 
is only one among numerous modes of esthetic expression.
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Collectively, the arts of all kinds constitute an important 
dimension in the ideological aspect of human culture. But 
the arts are still only a part of a larger whole,, that of 
culture in general.
As a Victorian man of letters, Matthew Arnold ventured 
into the criticism of literature, a specific activity of 
culture in gneeral. But eventually he gravitated from the 
part to the whole— from literary criticism in particular to 
cultural criticism in general. Ultimately Arnold concerned 
himself in his essays with most of the institutions in 
Victorian England, especially with the political, educational, 
and religious institutions. The evolutionary course of his 
critical concern from a specific cultural activity to culture 
in general may be clearly traced in several declarations about 
the nature and function of criticism that he delivered on 
several occasions in his career. If the shift near the begin­
ning of his critical career from Essays in Criticism, First 
Series (1865) to Culture and Anarchy represents the movement 
by a literary critic from a specifically literary criticism to 
a generally cultural criticism, then the shift at the end of 
his career from Discourses in America to Essays in Criticism, 
Second Series (1888) represents merely a movement in critical 
activity from one to another of several cultural interests by 
an established and accomplished social critic.
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Criticism, Culture, and Civilization
The effort to analyze Arnold's concept of criticism 
necessarily begins, of course, with a consideration of his 
first, most explicit, and extensive statement about the 
critical endeavor— the early essay entitled "The Function of 
Criticism at the Present Time." The essay was originally 
delivered as an Oxford lecture in October of 1964 and subse­
quently published in The National Review the next month, but 
its most notable appearance was in Essays in Criticism 
(1965), where it was given the place of honor as the first 
essay in the volume. Its position there was obviously 
intended to emphasize its introductory purpose— the definition 
of the critical point of view exemplified in the remaining 
essays of the volume.
"The Function of Criticism at the Present Time" begins
with a quotation from Arnold's lectures on translating Homer
and remarks upon the opposition that these words had generated,
as if the quotation were his text and as if his essay were
then to be an exegetical defense of it. But as S. M. B.
coulling has observed, the occasion for the essay "was no more
the opposition to the Homeric lectures than is it subject the
2
nature of literary criticism." Arnold's subject is rather, 
on the one hand, the nature of criticism in general and, on
^S. M. B. Coulling, "The Background of 'The Function 
of Criticism at the Present Time,'" Philological Quarterly,
XLII (January, 1963), 36.
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the Other hand, the specific function of criticism during a 
stipulated time— the present time of transition from an epoch 
of concentration to an epoch of expansion.
Criticism
In the first paragraph of his essay on "The Function 
cf Criticism at the Present Time," Arnold defined the nature 
of the "critical effort" that motivates criticism in general; 
it is the spirit of the age— the Zeit-Geist: "the endeavor,
in all branches of knowledge, theology, philosophy, history, 
art, science to see the object as in itself it really is.
\x «
He used the term disinterested to characterize the truly
critical attitude, an attitude that he insisted was deplorably
lacking in Victorian England.
Our organs of criticism are organs of men and parties 
having practical ends to serve, and with them those 
practical ends are the first thing and the play of the 
mind second; so much play of mind as is compatible with 
the prosecution of those practical ends is all that is 
'wânéed.^
He cites the Edinburgh Review as being bound and limited by 
the interests of the old Whigs; the Quarterly Review, by the 
Tories; and the British Quarterly Review, by the Dissenters.
In contrast to these he cites the French Revue des Deux Mondes 
as an example of truly disinterested critical endeavor. Men 
who are bound and limited by personal interest, he asserts,
^Super, III, 258.
^Ibid., p. 270
106
cannot truly criticize, cannot really "see the object as in 
itself it truly is."^
The nature of criticism, so it seems, is the ability 
to discern the truth--or, more comprehensively, the true and 
the good (if not the beautiful). For, in seeing the object 
as it is, the critic discerns not only its nature but also 
its value. Truly to see or know an object necessarily involves 
a consciousness of its worth. Or, once it is known as it is, 
then its value is assumed to be obvious. That the critic 
possessed this capacity for correctness in evaluation as well as
^Of course, Arnold's own capacity for disinterested­
ness has been seriously questioned. Geoffrey Tillotson's 
essay entitled "Matthew Arnold: The Critic and the Advocate"
in his Criticism and the Nineteenth Century inspired E. K. 
Brown's book-length study entitled Matthew Arnold: A Study
in Conflict. Brown's contention is that Arnold inveterately 
violated his own ideal of disinterestedness and that his 
works are the worse for his lack of esthetic detachment:
"there are times when he is impelled by the old Adam in him to 
speak with the naked intensity of interestedness . . . "
(p. 23). In Brown's zeal to prove his point, he perhaps over­
looks the sense in which Arnold used the term "disinterested." 
For him, it meant simply the endeavor to divest oneself of 
irrational and purely selfish ties, the endeavor to be rational 
for the sake of the society as a whole. He never intended 
disinterested to mean unconcerned. For one should be vitally 
concerned to implement what he sees— from a truly critical 
viewpoint— to be right, just, and good. It is true, however, 
that Arnold was a little too ready to assume that his own 
views were absolutely identical with "right reason." But at 
its best, the ideal that he strove to follow involved a 
synthesis of both "critical detachment" and ^passionate 
commitment," as Sidney M. B. Coulling observed in "Matthew 
Arnold's 1853 Preface: Its Origin and Aftermath," Victorian
Studies, VII (March, 1964), 262.
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for clarity in perception is implied in the definition of 
criticism that he offers near the end of his essay, italcized 
by Arnold for emphasis: "a disinterested endeavor to learn and
propagate the best that is known and thought in the world.
This second definition also emphasizes another dimension in 
his conception of the nature of criticism. It not only 
learns but also propagates the true and the good.
Much of the essay elaborates on the effect that
criticism causes by its propagation of the true and the good.
This effect is actually the function that criticism serves.
Arnold's concept of the function of criticism in the present
epoch, as noted in Chapter I of this study, was that it should
create the conditions for an age of creative expansion in all
human activities. Criticism ultimately fosters cultural
creativity. Indeed, it was the critical activity of the
Frensh philosphes, Arnold states, that resulted in the French
Revolution, whose greatness derived "from the force, truth,
and universality of the ideas which it took for its law."
Yet the French Revolution also illustrates the fatal "mania
for giving an immediate political and practical application
to all these fine ideas of the reason."
Joubert has said beautifully: . . . .  (Force and right 
are the governors of this world; force will right is 
ready.) Force till right is ready; and till right is 
ready, force, the existing order of things, is justified, 
is the legitimate ruler. But right is something moral,
^Ibid., p. 283.
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and implies inward recognition, free assent of the will; 
we are not ready for right,--right, so far as we are 
concerned, is not ready,-.-until we have attained this 
sense of seeing it and willing it.?
In this passage we may clearly observe, on the one 
hand, the conservative influence of Edmond Burke in Arnold's 
support of the establishment and its traditional institutions 
for their value in preserving the social order. On the other 
hand, we observe a Miltonic insistence on the right and duty 
of the individuals in a society collectively to choose their 
destiny, to determine the shape of their social order, by the 
free exercise of their wills after acquiring a knowledge of 
alternatives. Clearly, the implication is that the task of 
criticism is to enable the members of a society to attain 
"this sense of seeing it and willing it [the right^." If 
criticism is true to its nature and performs its function 
well, then the people will gradually come to a knowledge of 
the true and of the good and (it is assumed) will consequently 
choose to transform the real and thus to actualize the potential 
tial of the ideal. This, then, is the function of criticism.
And it is the task that Arnold proposed to himself as 
a social critic: gradually to transform the culture of
Victorian England by subjecting his countrymen to a program 
of critical education until they recognized the incongruity 
between the imperfect reality of their social institutions 
and the ideal of the truly good and until, by their own
^Super, III, 265-66.
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decision, they committed themselves to the transformation of 
their social institutions and individual life-styles.
Culture
If "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time" 
was the manifesto of Arnold's critical program, then Culture 
and Anarchy was his first major excursion into critical 
activity that professedly was not concerned specifically with 
literary matters ; for, as even the subtitle of the book 
indicates, Culture and Anarchy was expressly An Essay in 
Political and Social Criticism. The content of its political 
criticism we shall examine later; our immediate concern with 
the volume is to understand Arnold's concept of "culture" 
and its relation to "criticism."
The essential purpose of Culture and Anarchy is to 
recommend the pursuit of culture to Arnold's countrymen. In 
Chapter I, "Sweetness and Light," he defines his concept of 
culture. He begins by distinguishing between two kinds of 
culture, or rather between two motives for the pursuit of 
culture. One motive is personal; the other, social. Culture 
based on the personal motive is simply the consequence of 
intellectual curiosity, a "liberal and intelligent eagerness
O
about the things of the mind." Such personal culture (or 
self-cultivation), Arnold declares, is eminently worthwhile 
for its own sake; but it was not specifically to recommend 
this kind of culture that he wrote Culture and Anarchy.
^Super, V, 90.
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The other type of culture, which Arnold is desirous to 
recommend, is socially oriented. Its motive is not curiosity 
but morality. As he indicates, its impetus is derived from 
"the moral and social passion for doing good," and its ultimate 
aim is "to ascertain what perfection is and to make it prevail."^ 
But this type of culture is not merely moral; it is to be 
distinguished from simple moral passion (which he later calls 
"Hebraism") in that "it is possessed of the scientific passion 
as well."^^ In other words, this culture is the consequence 
of a vital synthesis of both Hebraism and Hellenism, the 
nature of the latter being "Sweetness and Light," or beauty 
and truth.
In the "Preface" to the volume, Arnold enunciated
perhaps his most comprehensive statement about the type of
culture that he desires to recommend in the book:
The whole scope of the essay is to recommend culture 
as the great help out of our present difficulties; 
culture being a pursuit of our total perfection by means 
of getting to know, on all the matter which most concern 
us, the best which has been thought and said in the 
world; and through this knowledge, turning a stream of 
fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and 
habits . . . .
The relation of Arnold's conception of criticism, as defined 
in "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," to his 
concept of culture, as defined in Culture and Anarchy, is
^Ibid., pp. 91-93 
l°Ibid., p. 92. 
l^Ibid., p. 233.
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clearly revealed in this statement. Both are devoted to 
learning "the best which has been thought and said in the 
world." Insofar as criticism is devoted only to learning the 
true and the good, it would seem to be identical with personal 
culture. But as we have seen, Arnold insists that the 
endeavor of criticism is not only to learn but also to 
propagate what it learns. And the effect or function of its 
propagation (at the present time, at least) is to create a 
current of fresh ideas, so that an opoch of creativity may 
be stimulated. Likewise, the effort of culture is to turn 
■'"a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions 
and habits." And the goal of culture, as of criticism, is 
ultimately to stimulate creative activity; but its creative 
activity is explicitly stipulated— the creation of "perfection." 
Thus the culture based on the social motive strives to know 
things as they really are not simply for its own sake, as an 
end in itself, but rather as the means of eventually implement­
ing a social order whose foundation is grounded on an adequate 
concept of the true and the good. As we have seen, this is 
essentially identical with the function of criticism as 
described in the earlier essay.
The "pursuit of perfection," as the central aim of 
culture, is insisted upon by Arnold again and again in Culture 
and Anarchy. And the concept of perfection that he propounds 
is that of an internal, general, and harmonious development 
of human powers, It is internal, because it involves the
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"expansion of those gifts of thought and feeling, which make 
the peculiar dignity, wealth, and happiness of human nature"; 
general, because "the individual is required, under pain of 
being stunted and enfeebled in his own development if he 
disobeys, to carry others along with him in his march towards 
perfection, to be continually doing all he can to enlarge 
and increase the volume of the human stream sweeping thither­
ward"; and harmonious, because it includes "all the powers 
which make the beauty and worth of human nature, and is not
consistent with the over-development of any one power at the
12expense of the rest."
It is important that we understand precisely what 
Arnold has done in designating human perfection as the goal 
of "culture," or of what we may refer to in our terms as 
"cultural criticism." He is here expressing an ideal of 
humanism— the ethical concept of the good man. And in making 
an ideal concept of man the measure of all things, he is 
clearly within the humanistic tradition. What Arnold has 
done, then, is to define his point of view as a social critic; 
he has announced his vision of what ought to be— a humanistic 
vision of man and of society. He has formulated his standard 
and function of social institutions: do they foster or frus­
trate the actualization of man's potential for human perfec­
tion? The criterion that Arnold was to apply in his social
l^ibid., p. 94.
113
criticism of Victorian England is that of whether or not its 
institutions contributed to the humanization of his countrymen. 
The ideal society is that which fosters the development of 
ideal men. Hence "culture" is (in at least one of its senses) 
Arnold's name for his humanistically oriented social criticism.
It is interesting to note one variation in Arnold's 
description of the aim of culture. At one point in Culture 
and Anarchy, when trying to make clear the aim of culture, he 
offers as a synonymous expression for "the pursuit of perfec­
tion" a saying by Biship Wilson: "To make reason and the will
of God prevail!" And the "will of God" he defines as "the 
universal order which seems to be intended and aimed at in the 
world, and which it is a man's happiness to go along with or 
his misery to go counter to."^3 immediately we recognize the 
relation of Arnold's definition of the "will" of God to the 
definition of "God" Himself that he later proposed in St. Paul 
and Protestantism (1879) : "the stream of tendency by which
all things fulfil the law of their being." As we noted in 
Chapter II, this definition of God corresponds to the 
Spinozist conception of a general nature in the cosmos as 
a whole, whose processes of causal determination are designated 
as "God." The definition of the "will of God" in Culture and 
Anarchy clearly indicates that God's will is essentially
^^Ibid., p. 93.
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identical with the normative processes of causal determina­
tion in general nature— "the universal order which seems to be 
intended and aimed at in the world."
Again, the second clause in Arnold's statement about 
God's will— "which it is a man's happiness to go along with or 
his misery to go counter to"— immediately reminds us of his 
second definition of God, that proposed in Literature and 
Dogma (1873): "the Eternal, not ourselves, that makes for 
righteousness" (which in turn fosters life and vitality).
This definition we described in Chapter II as Arnold's concept 
of nature as it relates specifically to the moral structure 
of human personality. For Arnold, of course, the moral 
element was fundamental in human nature— in nature, that is, 
as manifested on the level of man. As he often said, "Conduct 
is three-fourths of life." It is the basic law of man's being. 
But he also insisted that although morality or Hebraism is, 
and rightly so, the largest part of human nature, it is never­
theless only a part of the greater whole. Much of Arnold's 
writings was devoted to the cultivation of the other one-fourth 
of life. And this part he designated as the Hellenistic 
aspect of man. In order to be a complete person, one must 
achieve a vital synthesis of both Hebraism and Hellenism in 
his nature. And the cultivation of this completeness, the 
pursuit of this perfection, is the end of culture; and the 
means of culture is social criticism— the evaluation of the 
institutions in the culture of a society by the ideal standard
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of humanistic wholeness. The continuity and consistency of 
naturalistic humanism as Arnold's critical orientation is 
evident: it is plainly present as much in his essay in
political criticism, Culture and Anarchy, as in his essay in 
religious criticism. Literature and Dogma.
Civilization
In 1879 Arnold published a volume whose title. Mixed 
Essays, aptly describes not only the content of the single 
volume to which it was affixed but also the contents of all 
the volumes of prose criticism that he composed during the 
course of his career. It symbolizes what we have referred to 
as the problem of variety in the canon of Arnold's composi­
tions as a man of letters. Fortunately, in the "Preface" to 
Mixed Essays, he himself recognizes the problem of his own 
variety, as exemplified in the contents of the volume. He 
begins the "Preface" by noting that the contents of the volume 
span almost two decades, for one of the essays was first 
published nearly twenty years earlier. This is the essay 
entitled "Democracy," which originally appeared as the 
"Preface" to the first of his blue-book reports for the 
Education Department, subsequently published in regular book 
form for the generàl public as The Popular Education of 
France (1861). Besides the subject of education, the essays 
of the volume are also concerned with political, literary, 
and (indirectly) religious matters. In short. Mixed Essays
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is an extremely typical volume ^ for it is truly representative 
of the variety of Arnold's, critical interests.
In the "Preface," Arnold states that although the 
essays in his volume touch upon "a variety of subjects," the 
volume nonetheless has a certain "unity of t e n d e n c y . T 
The unifying tendency at work in the various essays, so he 
points out, is their common concern with the matter of 
civilization. "Civilization," he declares, "is the humanisa­
tion of man in society. Man is civilized when the whole body 
of society comes to live with a life worthy to be called
T_5human, and corresponding to man's true aspirations and powers." 
After postulating the existence of an instinct toward "expan­
sion" in human nature, he proceeds to enumerate the "powers" 
that this instinct prompts man to develop as the elements 
that constitute his "civilization."
They are the power of conduct, the power of intellect 
and knowledge, the power of beauty, the power of social 
life and manners. Expansion, conduct, science, beauty, 
manners,— here are the conditions of civilization, the 
claimants which man must satisfy before he can be 
humanised.16
In the "Preface" to Mixed Essays, whose contents 
represent his typical concerns during the twenty-year span of 
his entire active career as a social critic up to that time,
14Matthew Arnold, Mixed Essays (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1904), p. vii.
^^Ibid., p. viii.
^^Ibid., p. X.
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Arnold reaffirmed that the ideal of human perfection was 
indeed the central concern in his social criticism, as he had 
announced ten years earlier in Culture and Anarchy. His notions 
of human perfection have perhaps been somewhat refined.
Instead of the simple duet of Hebraism and Hellenism, the 
elements in the harmonious human life now form a quartet—  
conduct, knowledge, social life, and beauty. Or, in other 
words, the perfectly cultured man has advanced to a highly 
civilized cultivation of ideas, manners, morals, and the arts. 
Arnold uses the terms "civilized" and "humanized" as practic­
ally synonymous, both referring to the state of human 
"perfection." If a distinction is to be made, it would seem 
that, generally, the process of "civilization" is the pursuit 
of perfection, or the development of the conditions for human 
wholeness, in the culture of a society and that, specifically, 
the process of "humanization" is the pursuit of perfection, 
the cultivation of completeness, in the personality of the 
individual. Ultimately, however, civilization is the meang 
to the end of humanization: the effectiveness of a culture
is to be evaluated in terms of the personalities that, as an 
environment, it tends to foster.
That the aim for all of us ig to make civilization 
pervasive and general . . .  : such is the line of thought
which the essays in the present volume follow and 
represent. They represent it in their variety of subject, 
their so frequent insistence on defects in the present 
actual life of our nation, their unity of final aim.l?
l^ibid., p. X.
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So Arnold concludes his "Preface." And perhaps nowhere else 
has he expressed more precisely and concisely the unifying 
purpose of his life and works. For his dedication to the 
humanization of his countrymen is the motivating purpose that 
informs far more than the variety of subject matter in Mixed 
Essays. His devotion to the cause of civilization, as 
expressed in the ^Preface," may indeed be recognized as the 
truly unifying theme in the new edition of The Complete Prose 
Works of Matthew Arnold. His essays in cultural criticism—  
literary, educational, religious, and political or social—  
are clearly related to the several elements of human perfec­
tion, the primary powers of man, the marks of civilization: 
beauty, knowledge, conduct, and social life. Thus, broadly, 
the essays on religion focus on conduct or morals; the essays 
on education focus on knowledge or ideas; the essays on 
politics focus on social life or manners; and the essays on 
literature focus on beauty or the arts. Of course, the 
relation between the types of criticism and the elements of 
civilization is scarcely so sharply focused in practice as 
this theoretical scheme suggests; nevertheless, it does 
enable us to grasp the general scope of Arnold's critical 
endeavor. As Walter J. Hippie, Jr. recognized, "Man's 
aspirations and powers I It is the analysis of these aspira-
18tions and powers which is the ground of all Arnold's thought."
1 O
Walter J. Hippie, Jr., "Matthew Arnold, Dialectician," 
University of Toronto Quarterly, XXXII (October, 1962), 4,
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The intention in the remainder of this chapter is to 
conduct a general survey of Arnold's essays in cultural criti­
cism with a running commentary, designed to indicate the scope 
of his vision of the ideal society— one whose culture is truly 
civilized, promoting the humanization of its members. The 
commentary on these essays is not presented as a radically new 
interpretation of their significance, for the explanation of 
particular works is largely in agreement with the treatment 
accorded them by such men as Lionel Trilling, Edward Alexander, 
and William Robbins. However, no treatment of Arnold's essays 
in cultural criticism— social, political, educational, 
religious, and even literary— has traced through them the 
specifically humanistic principles that inform the general 
body of these works with an intensive, extensive, and compre­
hensive consistency. To do so is the purpose of the present 
treatment.
The Political Institution
The subtitle of Culture and Anarchy, published in 1869, 
is An gssay in Political and Social Criticism. As we have 
already noted, it is a book devoted more to theoretical than 
to practical criticism. Specifically, it was concerned with 
enunciating a theoretical rationale for cultural criticism. 
Nevertheless, the volume did include illustrative application^ 
of the proper critical procedure; culture, as criticism in 
action, made its debut. Actually, even ten years earlier.
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Arnold had published a pamphlet entitled England ahd the 
Italian Question (1859). While abroad visiting foreign schools 
(especially those of France) in order to prepare a report on 
elementary education for the Education Department, he took 
advantage of his on-the-spot opportunity to explain to the 
English people back home what was happening on the continent 
between Austria, Sardinia, and France. But the inauguaration 
of his active concern with political and social questions is 
more properly marked by the appearance of Sulture and Anarchy, 
in which his critical orientation is more maturely expressed.
The sense in which Arnold uses the term "social" to 
describe a certain category of his cultural criticism should 
perhaps be clarified. He seems to use the term to refer, 
among other things, to the social organization or class 
structure in Victorian England (the relations of upper, middle, 
and lower classes); at other times, to the quality of "manners," 
or of social life in general; and, at certain times, even to 
the condition of "civilization" as a whole. To attempt to 
separate Arnold's specifically "social" criticism from his 
"political" criticism is a difficult task, for they are intri­
cately interrelated in his thought, as the subtitle of Culture 
and Anarchy suggests. Nevertheless, for the sake of orderli-n 
ness in discussion, I have ventured to classify his essays 
in political and social criticism into four general categories: 
English social criticism, Irish political criticism, American 
social criticism, and English political criticism. In some
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instances, the classification of essays is admittedly 
arbitrary. Thus, for instance, the essays on English 
politics often deal with the political problems of Ireland, 
since Irish problems constituted such an important matter 
in English politics. But it is hoped that this system of 
classification, as an organizational device, will be convenient 
and useful.
English Social Criticism
In "Sweetness and Light," Chapter I of Culture and 
Anarchy, we have already noted Arnold's theoretical considera­
tion of the ends and means of "culture" as humanistic social 
criticism. In Chapter II, "Doing As One Likes," he begins 
the practical application of his critical theory. Against 
what he characterizes as the typical Englishman's assumption 
that doing what he likes is the supreme good in itself,
Arnold urges the notion that liberty is only a means; that 
it affords an opportune condition for the achievement of 
excellence or perfection, as true end of life. What one 
does with this liberty— the quality of his actions— is more 
important than his merely having the liberty to do anything 
he likes.
In the chapter entitled "Barbarians, Philistines, and 
Populace," then,he discusses the quality of life that charac­
terizes the three social classes in England— respectively, the
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upper, middle, and lower c l a s s e s . H e  examines each class 
in turn and, first, pronounces the ordinary concerns of the 
upper class, the aristocratic Barbarians,, to be essentially
20material— "worldly splendour, security, power, and pleasure."
Next the bourgeoise middle-class Philistines, with their
interest in industrial wealth and non-conformist religion,
are declared to be vulgar. Finally, the proletariot lower-
class Populace are, or at least have been made to be, brutal;
referring to recent demonstrations of political activity
among the working class, Arnold describes the class as "now
issuing from its hiding place to assert an Englishman's
heaven-born privilege of doing as he likes . . . marching
where it likes, meeting where it likes, bawling what it likes,
21breaking what it likes . . . .  But these qualities—
materialism, vulgarity, and brutality— are not peculiar to the 
respective classes. There is doubtless, Arnold suggests, a 
little bit of each of them in all of us; for "all of us, so 
far as we are Barbarians, Philistines, or Populace, imagine 
happiness to consist in doing what one's ordinary self likes,
^^Patrick J. McCarthy, in Matthew Arnold and the Three 
Classes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), has
examined Arnold's treatment of the upper, middle, and lower 
classes in Victorian England and concludes that his concepts of 
the Barbarians, Philistines, and Populace are more rhetorical 
than sociological: their characterization is a generalized
and "idealized" literary creation for the purposes of his 
cultural criticism,
20super, V, 140.
21lbid., p. 143.
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What one's ordinary self likes differs according to the class
to which one belongs . . . However, all is not lost.
In each class there are born a certain number of natures 
with a curiosity about the best self, with a bent for 
seeing things as they are, for disentangling themselves 
from machinery, for simply concerning themselves with 
reason . . . and doing their best to make these prevail:—  
for the pursuit, in a word, of perfection.22
Among the many, there are a few who use culture— the quest for
truth by wide reading, keen observation, and clear reflection—
in order to advance toward perfection: to transcend the
"ordinary self" and to actualize the potential of the "best
self."
Having formulated in "Doing As One Likes" and in 
"Barbarians, Philistines, Populace" what to him seems the 
cause and the effect of the imperfection in the British 
character— the beat of the "ordinary self" to assert itself in 
unreflecting activity— Arnold proceeds in "Hebraism and 
Hellenism" to explore the nature of this uncritical drive to 
practical action without adequate theoretical basis. As a 
trait of human nature, it was dominant among the ancient 
Hebrews. Therefore, he names it "Hebraism." It may be 
contrasted with the "sweetness and light" that was dominant 
among the ancient classical Greeks and that, therefore, may be 
named "Hellenism." "The upper-most idea with Hellenism is 
to see things as they really are; the uppermost idea with 
Hebraism is conduct and obedience." As Hebraism is
Z^Ibid., p. 145.
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characterized by energy, doing, and "strictness of conscience," 
so Hellenism is characterized by intelligence, thinking, and
"spontaneity of c o n s c i o u s n e s s ."23 The trouble with the
Englishmen of the present, Arnold theorizes, is that they are 
dominated by the spirit of Hebraism, especially as it is 
manifested in the puritanical Nonconformist religion of the 
powerful Philistine middle class.
In the chapter entitled "Porro Unum Est Necessarium," 
Arnold continues his reflections, searching (in the spirit of 
culture, or Hellenism) for a solution to the problem. He 
concludes that, although a balance of both Hebraism and 
Hellenism is essential to human perfection, what is wanted 
now— the one thing needful— is a Hellenistic reaction to 
Hebraism; ,an excess of Hellenism to correct the defect of 
Hebraism, so that a desirable mean may ultimately be restored 
as the ideal of perfection.
In the final chapter of Culture and Anarchy, entitled 
"Our Liberal Practictioners," Arnold presents a demonstration 
of culture (as the critically reflective spirit of Hellenism) 
in action, confronting a practical problem that is being 
mishandled, so he thinks, because of the incapacity of the 
active but uncritical English-Hebraic character to see what 
is the reality in the situation. The matter that he selects 
to examine is the proceedings for the disestablishment of the
Z^Ibid., p. 165.
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Irish Church. He asserts that, to one who sees clearly 
because his vision is not obscured by a private interest, the 
established Irish Church is plainly "contrary to reason and 
justice, in so far as the Church of a very small minority of 
the people there jjbhe Protestants of the establishment^ takes 
for itself all the Church-property of the Irish people," the 
majority of whom are Catholic. His argument (which his 
critical culture enables him to grasp) is that the State, as 
in several nations on the continent, should endow all the major 
denominations in Ireland, for "the State is of the religion 
of all of its citizens, without the fanaticism of any of 
them."24 Examining the motives of those who oppose the endow­
ment of religion, he observes that "the actual power, in 
shoft, by virtue of which the Liberal party in the House of 
Commons is now trying to disestablish the Irish Church, is 
not the power of reason and justice, it is the power of the 
Noneconformists' antipathy to Church establishments." He 
concludes by declaring the necessity for a disinterested 
critical approach to such problems, or rather an approach 
interested not in establishing what it likes but in establish­
ing what is required in order to conform to the ideal of 
perfection, which culture fosters. Such culture Arnold earnestly 
recommends to his countrymen as a light to lead the nation.
24ibid., p. 193.
Z^ibid., p. 194.
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In Culture and Anarchy, Arnold was apparently react­
ing to: certain ideas in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty (1959) 
that he thought incorrect and dangerous. In response to 
Mill's concept of a free and open society in which various 
groups should all be allowed to promote their private interests 
vigorously, Arnold sets up a dilemma to which his title 
points ; that is, culture or anarchy? Arnold is arguing for 
a general principle of authority to which the eccentricities 
of individuality may be referred for correction. The principle 
which he proposes is simply that of right reason— another name 
for what Arnold has variously presented as intelligently 
directed curiosity or criticism (in "The Function of Criticism 
at the Present Time") and as culture or Hellenism (in Culture 
and Anarchy).
At this point in his career as social and political 
critic, Arnold has fully formulated his critical rationale— the 
use of "culture," the intelligent pursuit not of private 
interests but of human perfection— and is now ready to apply 
it generally to social problems.
Culture and Anarchy was published in 1869; in 1871 
appeared a volume entitled Friendship's Garland, "edited" by 
Matthew Arnold. It consisted of a series of twelve letters
This view of the relation between Arnold and Mill is 
developed both by Lionel Trilling in Chapter IX, "Culture or 
Anarchy," of Matthew Arnold (second edition; New York:
Columbia University Press, 1949) and by Edward Alexander in 
Matthew Arnold and John Stuart Mill (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1965).
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that had been previously published in the Pall Mall Gazette 
from July, 1866, to November, 1870— that is, irregularly, both 
before and after Arnold's composition of the essays that were 
reprinted in Culture and Anarchy. The letters purported 
to be the correspondence between Arnold and Arrainius, a fic­
titious Prussian Baron, as carried on through long letters-to-•!: 
the-editor in the Pall Mall Gazette. Their publication in 
book form as Friendship's Garland was an arrangement between 
the editor and Arnold to carry the fictional joke one step 
further by publishing the letters as a memorial volume in 
honor of Arminius, who (so it was represented) had died in 
the Franco-Prussian War. As a character created by Arnold, 
then, Arminius is presented as an intelligent, frank, out­
spoken critic of English society. The role assumed by Arnold, 
as he represents himself in the letters, is that of a well- 
meaning but somewhat muddle-headed defender of the English 
way of doing things. The letters are truly delightful—  
charming, witty, and critically cutting. The invention of 
the acerbic Arminius apparently enabled Arnold to shed 
"light" without the trouble of having to intermix it with 
"sweetness."
The episodic consideration of topics as presented in 
Friendship's Garland necessarily precludes any coherent 
examination of the whole. The letters are filled with 
critical digs, here and there, in the ribs of English society. 
However, several of the more important matters may be
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mentioned. At one point, after describing "the three powers . 
which go to spread that rational human life which is the aim 
of modern society: the love of wealth, the love of intelli­
gence, the love of beauty," Arminius proceeds to characterize 
the earlier Victorian period of active reform as administering
well to the love of wealth through its commercial legislation
27but as neglecting to nurture the other two powers. "The 
legislation of your middle class in all that goes to give 
human life more intelligence and beauty, is no better than 
was to be expected from its own want of both."28 A recurring 
note throughout the letters is Arminius ' icqmmahdi to the 
English to "Get 'Geist,'" which he interprets as 
"intelligence."29
"Letter V" (November 8, 1866) in Friendship's Garland 
is of especial interest because of its relation to the Irish 
land question. After John Bright had recently called public 
attention to the land reforms of Stein (the Prussian Minister 
in the first decade of the nineteenth century), Arnold used 
Arminius as an authoritative voice through which to make 
public a general explanation of Stein's land reforms, for the 
English were largely uninformed about the matter while Arnold, 
who had visited Prussia, was well informed.According to
27guper, V, 20.
28ibid., p. 21.
29%bid., p. 42
80lbid., "Explanatory Notes," p. 3#4.
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Arminius, the essence of Stein's reforms was his compulsion 
of landlords to sell a certain percentage of their lands to
O T
their tenants, who were granted an extended purchase period. 
(This is a matter that was later to influence Arnold's own 
consideration of affairs in Ireland.)
In "A Recantation and Apology," also included in 
Friendship's Garland, Arnold engages in a mock repentance for 
not previously acknowledging the wisdom of the Liberals in 
their handling of Irish affairs. The occasion of his "recanta­
tion" is, in 1869, the disestablishment of the Irish Church. 
However, he manages sublty to convey his awareness that, as a 
conciliatory measure, it is a failure; for it was undertaken 
(as he had pointed out in Culture and Anarchy) not in a spirit 
of justice and friendship but in response to Nonconformists' 
antipathy to religious establishments, and the Irish are doubt­
less aware of this. The spirit of a measure as well as its 
letter, Arnold insists, is important.
Finally, Arminius' dying words to England, as conveyed
by one who was with him in the Franco-Prussian War when he
dies, may be noted:
Your nation is sound enough, if only it can be taught 
that being able to do what one likes, and say what one 
likes, is not sufficient for salvation. Its dangers 
are . . . due to the false notion that liberty and 
publicity are not only valuable for the use to be made of 
them, but are goods in themselves, nay, are the summum 
bonum'32
31lbid., pp. 57-64. 
32Ibid., p. 353.
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The next important stage in the English social criticism 
of Arnold is marked by the publication of the. volume entitled 
Mixed Essays in 1879. Three essays from among the "mixed" lot 
included in the volume are relevant to Arnold's social criticism; 
"Democracy," "Equality," and "Porro Unum Est Necessarium" (not 
to be confused with the chapter of the same name in Culture and 
Anarchy). "Democracy" begins by developing two ideas: on the
one hand, the rise of the middle class to power; on the other 
hand, the concommitant decline in aristocratic influence.
Arnold accepts the coming of democracy as natural and inevitable. 
It grows out of an instinct.for expansion (perhaps somewhat 
like Adler's "will to power") implanted in each individual.
"The vital impulse of democracy is . . . identical with the
3 O
ceaseless vital effort of human nature itself." However,
with the decline of aristocratic influence, Arnold foresees a
serious social problem.
On what action may we rely to replace, for some time 
at any rate, that action of the aristocracy upon the 
people of the country, which we have seen exercise an 
influence in many respects elevating and beautiful, but 
which is rapidly, and from inevitable cause, ceasing?
In other words . . . what influence may help us to 
prevent the English people from becoming, with the 
growth of democracy, Americanized? I confess I am 
disposed to answer; On the action of the State.34
What Arnold meant by "Americanized" is indicated by his refer-
en
ence to "the dangers 6f America . . . which come from the
33Matthew Arnold, "Democracy," Mixed Essays (New York; 
Macmillan Company, 1904), p. 8..
^'^Ibid., p. 17.
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multitude being in power, with no adequate ideal to elevate 
or guide the multitude."
But what does he mean by his conclusion that the 
answer to this social problem lies in "the action of the 
State"? The State, he suggests, can do more for the middle 
aaid lower classes than they can do for themselves. As a 
practical example, their schools can be greatly improved by 
"the intervention of the State in public e d u c a t i o n . A t  
this point in "Democracy" (ôrèginally the "Preface" to a book 
on continental education systems)j Arnold is presenting the 
conclusions that he has drawn from his observation of the 
school system in France. He was highly impressed with the 
educational results that had been wrought in France by the 
exertion of State authority. Therefore, he recommends tohthe 
middle and lower classes in England the advantages to be 
gained from placing their schools, which are presently 
denominational or voluntary schools established by private 
initiative, under state control so that adequate standards for 
educational quality can be set up, supported, and enforced. 
Thus their children will enjoy the benefit "of breathing in 
their youth the air of the best culture of their nation."
Anticipating objections to State control from liberty- 
loving English individualists, Arnold proceeds to discuss the
35ibid., p. 20.
3Gibid., p. 25.
3?Ibid., p. 26.
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issue. It is not State-action as such to which the English
should object, he argues; the action of the State is to be
feared only when it is the instrument of an alien and hostile
element. However, in England, what is the State?
The State is properly just what Burke calèed it— the 
nation in its collective and corporate character. The 
State is the representative acting-power of the nation; 
the action of the State is the representative action of 
the nation. Nominally emanating from the Crown, as the 
ideal unity in which the nation concentrates itself, 
this action, by the constitution of our country, really 
emanates from the ministers of the C r o w n . 38
In England the State is but the people themselves I— or rather
the delegation of their collective power to ministers who
will administer the will of the people. Hence it is not to
be feared. Instead, it should be welcomed as the instrument
that, in the coming democratic age, may institute means to
forestall the Americanization— that is, the vulgarization—
of the English: in short, it may provide the light of culture
for the masses.
Arnold's political thought, particularly his notion of 
the "State," has not fared well with the critics. His emphasis 
on enlarging and strengthening the powers of the state has been 
construed, for example, as a movement toward "a sort of 
absolute monarchy" and consequently roundly criticized by 
Sir Ernest Barker in the chapter entitled "The Political Theory 
of Literature" in his Political Thought in England, 1848 to 1914, 
(second edition; London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 175.
Lionel Trilling's chapter entitled "Culture or Anarchy" in his
38%bid., p. 31.
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Matthew Arnold remains one of the most influential treatments 
of Arnold's idea of the State. Referring to Arnold's 
recommendation that the Ministers of the government, as the 
representative "best selves" of the nation, be fully empowered 
to implement their assigned functions in efficiently executed 
administrative activity. Trilling insists that his position 
rests on the assumption that "the possession of reason by 
some people gives them the right to coerce others."^9 Further, 
Trilling asserts that Arnold "believed so firmly in reason 
that he was certain it justified the use of its antithesis, 
force, without which it was p o w e r l e s s . what Trilling and 
others especially protest against is Arnold's advocacy of the 
occasional use of coercive measures. However, as Basil Willey 
points out;
The particular "anarchy" confronting Arnold . . . .  as he 
composed Culture and Anarchy was the anarchy, or the omens 
of it, associated with shooting Niagara," with the second 
reform bill, with trades-union disturbances, Fenian out­
rages, Reform League riots in Hyde Park, the campaign of 
John Bright, the Murphy riots at Birmingham and Manchester, 
and the like.41
What Trilling and others do not sufficiently consider is that 
Arnold advocated coercive measures only to restore the
^^Lionel Trilling, "Culture or Anarchy," Matthew 
Arnold (second edition; New York: Columbia University Press,
1949), p. 253.
40lbid., p. 260.
^^Basil Willey, "Matthew Arnold," Nineteenth Century 
Studies: Coleridge to Matthew Arnold (London: Chatto and
Windus, 1949), p. 254.
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conditions in which reason can exert its influence. Never did 
he intend to suggest that the State (in the sense of legisla­
tive and administrative officials) has the right to impose 
even the right reason of its best self upon the nation by 
force. Always he insisted that the State is a representative 
agent of action which the people themselves elect and approve 
voluntarily. The strength of the state is essential not to 
impose its unwanted policies but to implement the desired 
means of civilization that require concerted action on a scale 
larger than individuals or private organizations can command. 
Along with the educational and ecclesiastical institutions 
that it establishes, the State functions as a model and guide 
to inspire and teach a noble ideal of humanization and civiliza­
tion. It is not a forceful power imposing a determinative 
environment upon the individual but a reasonable agent creating 
an ennobling atmosphere of attractive culture. As J. Dover 
Wilson sums up Arnold's view,
All he really contended was that more state activity was 
essential to a developing civilization in England, as, 
indeed, has been abundantly proved, and that in an ideal 
community the best thought and aspiration would find their 
expression in communal action . . . .42
Another essay reprinted in Mixed Essays, "Equality," 
was originally delivered as an address to the Royal Institution 
and subsequently published in The Fortnightly Review in March,
Dover Wilson, "Matthew Arnold and the 
Educationists," The Social and Political Ideas of Some 
Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age, ed. F. J. C. 
Hearnshaw (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1930), p. 190.
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1878. Essentially, the essay is an indictment of the English
practice of inequality as it exists in the structure of social
classes and a demand for ultimate equality through a revision
of the law of bequest. Especially interesting are the grounds
upon which Arnold bases his indictment: "It is in its effects
upon civilisation that equality interests m e . C i v i l i z a t i o n
he proceeds to define as "the humanisation of man in society.
To be humanised is to make progress towards . . . our true 
and full humanity. And to be civilised is to make progress 
towards this in civil society . . . .  To be the most 
civilised of nations, therefore, is to be the nation which 
comes nearest to human perfection, in the state which that 
perfection essentially d e m a n d s . 45
Now, he continues, the elements in human perfection are several: 
"the power of intellect and science, the power of beauty, the 
prower of social life and manners"— all of which the ancient 
Greeks so eminently prized. "The power of conduct is another 
great element . . .," for which Israel may stand as the 
representative.46 in Arnold's analysis here of the elements 
comprising human perfection, one recognizes the Hellenism and 
Hebraism of which he had written in Culture and Anarchy. How­
ever, in addition to the beauty and intelligence, or sweetness 
and light, that he had before ascribed to Hellenism, he has
4^Matthew Arnold, "Equality," Mixed Essays, p. 45
44ibid., p. 48.
45ibid., p. 48.
4Glbid., p. 49.
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now included "the power of social life and manners." Thus 
the nature of human perfection includes the elements of intelli­
gence, conduct, social life, and beauty. Or, in current terms, 
the humanized man is he who has cultivated himself in ideas, 
manners, morals, and the arts. To have done so is to be a 
cultured man. This point Arnold restated and re-emphasized 
later in his "Preface" to Mixed Essays, which we have previously 
examined.
As a critical frame of reference, Arnold in "Equality" 
designates Germany as the modern nation in which ideas are most 
cultivated; France, manners ; England, morals ; and Italy, arts. 
Using this standard, then, he finds the civilization of England 
not ideally constituted to foster the humanization of its 
peoples; for the situation of inequality among the classes 
greatly inhibits the development of excellence in English 
social life and manners. He contrasts the grace and vitality o 
of social intercourse among the more truly democratized French 
with the condition of society in England, which is pronounced 
to be far inferior. As Prance owes "her civilisedness to 
equality," so we English (Arnold concludes) owe "our uncivil­
isedness to inequality."47
Nevertheless, social equality is not to be desired as 
an immediately accomplished condition; for as "in America . . . 
we see the disadvantage of having social equality before there
^7Ibid., p. 64.
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has been a . . . high standard of social life and manners
4- Rformed," even so our present social organization . . . will 
and must endure until our middle class is provided with some 
better ideal of life than it has now."^^ However, in order to 
effect a gradual development toward social equality, Arnold 
proposes a change in the law of bequest whereby primogeniture 
(the exclusive right of the eldest sons to inherit the 
aristocratic estates) will be done away: a change which would
ultimately, not immediately, evolve a desirable condition of 
social equality— essential to a civilization whose intended 
effect is to foster the humanization of its peoples.
The third essay involving English social criticism in 
Mixed Essays is "Porro Unum Est Necessarium." The one thing 
that is needful, so Arnold proposes in this essay, is to 
establish an adequate system of state-supported, public, 
secondary education so that the middle classes— who seem 
destined to set the standards for the nation— may "undergo 
transformation" and become "homogeneous, intelligent, 
civilised.
What is really needed is to follow the procedure of the 
Elementary Education Act ]}the Education Act of 187(0 by 
requiring the provision throughout the country of a 
proper supply of secondary schools, with proper buildings 
and accommodations, at a proper fee, and with proper 
guarantees given by the teachers in the shape of either 
a university degree or a special certificate for 
secondary instruction.51
4%Ibid., p. 70.
SOMatthew Arnold, "Porro Unum Est Necessarium," Mixed 
Essays, p. 132.
Sllbid., p. 129.
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Throughout Arnold's. essays in social criticism of 
England— in Culture and Anarchy, in Friendship's Garland, and 
in Mixed Essays--one sees the development of his critical pro­
gram. He fashioned as his instrumental approach the notion 
of criticism as a disinterested endeavor to discover reality.
He set it about the task of discovering reality as the basis 
upon which society may be reorganized in order to correspond 
more closely to an ideal of human perfection. He formulated 
a four-point frame of reference— German ideas, French manners, 
English morals, and Italian arts— as the criteria for any 
adequate conception of civilization. And he practically 
applied this frame of reference and set of standards in examin­
ing the condition of society in England; finding it wanting 
in certain respects, he consequently advocated certain measures 
as the means of correction or improvement.
Irish Political Criticism
After English social criticism, the second category of 
Arnold's social and political essays to be examined is that 
of Irish political criticism. Although Arnold has often been 
characterized as a dilettante dabbling in political criticism, 
at least one scholar, WilliamsRobbins, defends him: "With
respect to the Irish question, one of the persistant major pro­
blems of English politics, Arnold's prophetic insight was weak, 
but there is in his writing on this subject a rare blend of 
sound diagnosis, practical remedial proposals, and a balanced
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historical perspective."^^
Conveniently, Arnold collected a number of his essays 
that deal most directly with the political problems of Ireland 
in a volume entitled Irish Essays and Others, published in 1882. 
The essays reprinted in this volume had all been written and 
published in periodicals after the appearance of Mixed Essays 
in 1879. However, a single essay among the miscellaneous 
collection contained in Mixed Essays, "Irish Catholicism and 
British Liberalism" (originally composed in 1878), may be taken 
as the starting point of Arnold's active interest in Irish 
affairs. After a brief examination of this earlier essay, 
a representative sample of those in Irish Essays and Others 
will be considered, since the content of several of them is 
somewhat, repetitious.
The salient points in "Irish Catholicism and British 
Liberalism" may be quickly summarized. In this essay Arnold 
is arguing for the reason and justice of the demand by the 
Irish Catholics to have a state-endowed Catholic university.
In substantiating his charge of the injustice of the English 
Parliament in refusing to grant this demand, Arnold points 
to the practice of continental nations that support the higher 
education of all the principal denominations, and even in 
Scotland the Presbyterian university at Glasgow is endowed; 
but in Ireland, where Catholicism is not merely one among
^^William Robbins, "Matthew Arnold and Ireland," 
University of Toronto Quarterly, XVII (October, 1947), 52.
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several principal denominations but the religion of a great 
majority of the people, this support is withheld. Arnold then 
castigates British Liberals as being too responsive and 
susceptible to the pressure of optnion from their Nonconformist 
constituency, which is opposed to all religious establishment 
or endowment. This is a repetition of the charge against 
"Our Liberal Practictioners" in Culture and Anarchy as being 
motivated by a private interest rather than a concern that 
reason and justice should prevail. Evidently Arnold believed, 
like Burke again, that those elected to positions of political 
representation should not pander to the lower "interests" of 
their constituency. Instead, they should assume the responsi­
bility to govern wisely and rightly, led by their own highest 
lights.
"The Incompatibles" is an extremely long essay, 
divided into two parts, in Irish Essays and Others. Part I of 
the essay was composed immediately before the Irish Land Bill 
of 1881 was brought into Parliament for debate. In it ARnold 
proposes to "look faiily into that incompatibility, alleged to 
be incurable, between us and the Irish nation."^3 He 
explicates the cause of the incompatibility by examining the 
history of relations between England and Ireland. After the 
original conquest of Ireland by the English, with the accom­
panying confiscation of lands, Arnold declared, "the sense of
Matthew Arnold, "The Incompatibles," Irish Essays 
and Others (New York: Macmillan Company, 1904), p. 277.
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prescription %an acceptance by the Irish natives of the English
right of ownershiE^ never a r o s e . T h e  reason that it did not
arise, he continues, is that "where there is misery going on
for centuries after a conquest, acquiescence in the conquest
55cannot take place." And he quotes vivid accounts by Edmund 
Spenser in the sixteenth century, Jonathan Swift in the 
eighteenth century^ and General Gordon in the present nineteenth 
century, all graphically describing the actual misery suffered 
by the Irish peasantry.
In the course of 1881, Arnold edited a volume entitled 
Letters, Speeches, and Tracts on Irish Affairs by Edmund Burke; 
therefore, being familiar with his views, he invokes his aid 
in the present essay. "Burke is clear in the opinion that . . . 
Irish misery and discontent have been due more to English 
misgovernment than to Irish faults"^® Further, he quotes 
Burke directly: "'Concessions, extorted from embarrassment
and fear produce no gratitude, and allay no resentment.'"^7 
Arnold grants that great concessions have already been made 
to the Irish in the form of Catholic emancipation, the 
abolition of tithes, and disestablishment of the minority 
Irish Church, and the Land Act of 1870. "But with respect to
54ibid., p. 278.
55lbid., p. 281.
56lbid., p. 284.
57lbid., p. 284.
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every one of them . . . they were given too late . • • and
seemed to be given not from a desire to do justice, but from
the apprehension of danger."^8
What is most needed, in dealing with the land in Ireland 
is to redress our injustice, and to make the Irish see 
what we are doing so. And the most effective way, surely, 
to do this is not to confer boons on all tenants, but to 
execute justice on bad landlords.59
Of the landlords it is proposed to expropriate only the 
worst so as to found for the good ones security and 
prescription; and the compensation assigned to the bad 
expropriated landlords by the English Parliament is sure 
to be not insufficient, rather it will be too ample.60
Part II of "The Incompatibles" was written immediately
after the Irish Land Bill of 1881 was brought into Parliament
for debate. The point which Arnold is trying to make in this
part of the essay hinges on his distinction between material
and moral grievances. Even if the Land Bill should satisfy
the Irish material grievance— effecting a change that will pre-
vent future suffering-tthem the moral grievance, were it left
unsatisfied, would continue to fester and irritate relations
between England and Ireland. The moral grievance— the sense
of England's great injustice in inflicting the centuries of
past suffering— may best be met by some such act as the
expropriation of bad landlords, which Arnold proposed in Part I,
Since Irish agitation for Home Rule is currently
active, Arnold proceeds to consider the matter in the essay.
SGlbid., p. 288. 
^^Ibid. , p.“ 287. 
GOlbid., p. 292.
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"The present Land Bill is not so defective as that it need 
prevent cordial union, if . . . other things are accom­
plished."^^ In order for the Irish to feel a sense of union 
with the English, he asserts, "they must feel an attractive 
force, drawing and binding them to us, in what is called our 
civilisation . . .
At this point in his essay, then, Arnold has reverted 
to English social criticism. After contrasting the defective 
social life and manners of the English with the more charming, 
genial, and attractive social life and manners of the Irish, 
he concludes that "if we wish cordially to attach Ireland to 
the English connection, not only must we offer healing 
political measures, we must also, and that as speedily as we 
can, transform our middle class and its social civilization," 
principally by the establishment of a state-supported system of 
public secondary schools.
An ironical slant in Arnold's Irish political criticism 
is adopted in "An Unregarded Irish Grievance," another essay 
in Irish Essays and Others. In this essay Arnold sets forth as 
an Irish grievance when the Irish themselves scarcely regarded 
as such. He proposes that since the English middle class does 
not desire the advantages of state-supported public secondary 
schools, then perhaps it should be granted to the Irish. But
G^Ibid., pp. 312-13, 
G^ibid., p. 314. 
G^Ibid., p. 332.
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he ultimately includes England's, condition in his pleas for the 
establishment of secondary education, describing England's pre­
sent practice as being analogous to that of Ireland: "Our sig­
nal deficiency in England, also, ^is] the want of all general 
organisation of the service of secondary instruction, of all 
co-ordination of the existing resources scattered over the 
country . . . ."64 gg affirms his conviction that secondary 
education for the middle class in both England and Ireland 
"can only become adequate by being treated as a public service, 
as a service for which the State, the nation in its collective 
and corporate character, is responsible."®^ But he anticipates 
that, so far as endowed secondary education for mostly 
Catholic Ireland is concerned, the influence of English Non­
conformist antipathy toward the Catholics will prevent any 
immediate action. He concludes the essay with a philosophical 
resignation to his role as a persevering propagandist in the 
service of this grievance.
We who lament {jthe middle class choice not to have an 
adequate education by consenting to a public secondary 
systemj . . . can only resolve . . .  to work with 
patience and perseverance for the evocation of that 
better spirit which will surely arise in this great class 
at last.
Meanwhile, however, the English middle class sacri­
fices . . . not only its own education, but the education 
of the Irisji middle class also. 66
®^Matthew Arnold, "An Unregarded Irish Grievance,"
Irish Essays and Others, p. 342.
®®Ibid., p. 345.
®®Ibid., p. 350.
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American Political Criticism
It is interesting to turn from Matthew Arnold’s Irish 
political criticism to the third category of his political 
and social essays— that of American social criticism. This 
phase in Arnold's criticism was inaugurated by the publication 
of his essay entitled "A Word About America," which appeared 
in Nineteenth Century magazine in May of 1882. Although he 
had never visited America, Arnold presumed to challenge 
those who described it as a land in which an appreciable 
degree of culture was widespread among its peoples. The 
reason for his skepticism is his notion that "whereas out 
society in England distributes itself into Barbarians, 
Philistines, and Populace, America is just ourselves, with 
the Barbarians quite left out, and the Populace nearly."
In other words, Arnold conceives of Americans as primarily 
constituting a huge middle class. As such, he suspects that 
they share many characteristics with their Philistine brothers 
in the middle class of England, where "the civilisation of 
the most important part of our people is impared by a defective 
type of religion, a narrow range of intellect and knowledge, 
a stunted sense of beauty, a low standard of manners . . .
He hopes that this is not the case in America but strongly
^^Matthew Arnold, "A Word About America," Five 
Uncollected Essays of Matthew Arnold, ed. Kenneth Allot 
(Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool, 1953), p. 6.
G^ibid., p. 19.
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suspects that it is so.
As it happened, Arnold accepted an opportunity to con­
duct a lecture tour in America in 1883. Upon his return to 
England, therefore, he was enabled to speak with the more 
authoritative voice of personal experience when he wrote an 
essay entitled "A Word More About America," which appeared 
in the February issue of Nineteenth Century in 1885. Somewhat 
surprisingly, he began with praise for America, for he had 
been deeply impressed with the division of government into 
federal and state jurisdictions, each efficiently handling 
the affairs that most directly concern it. In contrast to 
this eminently suitable arrangement, Arnold dwells on the 
muddled situation in England, where affairs that often affect 
Scotland, Ireland, or Wales alone are handled by the English 
Parliament as a whole at London.
As the reader continues, it shortly strikes him that 
this is not really an essay about America at all. Instead it 
is more properly another essay in Irish political criticism; 
for, after establishing the value of the general principle 
of division of political responsibilities (as illustrated by 
American government), the author proceeds to apply it
69Howard Mumford Jones in "Arnold, Aristocracy, and 
America," The American Historical Review, XLIX (April, 1944), 
393-409, ridiculed Arnold's lack of insight into the promise 
of American democracy, contending that Arnold was more 
authoritarian than democratic, despite his pleas for equality, 
and that his authoritatian predisposition consequently 
incapacitated him for valuable criticism of democracy in 
America.
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specifically to the 'Irish demand for Home Rule. He proposes 
that the ideal solution to the problem between Ireland and 
England is to establish a provincial government in Ireland to 
handle strictly Irish affairs while matters of national con­
cern continue to be handled by the Parliament in London, the 
capital city of the kingdon. Further, the system should also 
be extended to the other natural provincial regions. Indeed, 
the notion of local government should be carried out to its 
logical conclusion, so that Arnold here adds another reform 
to his list of favorite proposals, designed to create a better 
civilization: "more equality, education for the middle
classes, and a thorough municipal s y s t e m ."^0
Apparently as a sort of token acknowledgement of his 
title topic, Arnold concludes "A Word More About America" with 
the reflection that although the political problem seems to 
be solved in America, the human problem remains— how to create 
a better civilization for the humanization of the people in 
the United States.
In 1886, Arnold accepted the opportunity to conduct 
another lecture tour in America. Most of his lectures dealt 
with literary subjects. But one, entitled "Numebers; Or, the 
Majority and the Remnant," dealt with American civilization 
itself. Originally delivered in New York, the address was
^^Matthew Arnold, "A Word More About America," Five 
Uncollected Essays of Matthew Arnold, ed. Kenneth Allot, p. 38.
148
published in Nineteenth Century upon Arnold's, return to Eng­
land. In many ways, "Numbers" seems very like a sermon. As 
its subtitle suggests, the lecture turns on the Biblical 
distinction between the few and the many. After pointing out 
that not only Isaiah and Jesus but also Socrates placed their 
faith in the few, Arnold points out that the existence of 
democracy in America assumes (contrary to these saints and 
sages) a faith in the many. But Arnold contends that the 
salvation of the nation depends upon the saving remnant in 
its midst— those who follow St. Paul's admonition; "Having in 
mind things true, things elevated, things just, things pure, 
things amiable, things of good report; having these in mind,
studying and loving these," so Arnold paraphrases Paul, "is
71what saves States."
Ultimately Arnold's contention here is, as in Isaiah's 
moral vision, that the fate of a nation, its destiny, depends 
on the quality of its men. Although in the past he has had 
occasions to praise the civilization of France, that nation is 
in danger at this point because it is "a worshipper of the 
great goddess Lubricity ^impurity]," at least in its popular 
c u l t u r e . 72 this flaw continues to enervate the integrity
of France, so Arnold is moved to prophesy, then "she will more 
and more lose her powers of soul and spirit, her intellectual
7^Matthew Arnold, "Numbers," Discourses in America 
(New York, Macmillan Company, 1 9 0 6 ) ,  p. 3 2 .
72ibid., p. 40.
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productiveness, her skill in counsel, her might in war . • • 
and the life of that famous State will be more and more 
impaired, until it p e r i s h . H e  extends a like admonition 
to Americans"
If the failure to mind whatsoever things..are elevated 
should be real in your American democracy, and should 
grow into a disease, and take firm hold on you, then 
the life of even these great United States must inevitably 
suffer and be impaired more and more, until it perish.
Thus he concludes with, in effect, a call for conversion to the
cause of culture.
The final essay of Arnold in American social criticism, 
"Civilisation in the United States," appeared in the April 
issue of Nineteenth Century in 1888, the year of his death.
It apparently constitutes the "last word," as it were, about 
fflnerica. It concerns what Arnold had previously observed—  
the"human problem" in the United States. Using the criterion 
of whether or not life in America is "interesting," he surveys 
the state of its ideas, manners, morals, and arts. Although 
he finds points for praise— its social equality, for example—  
he is forced to conclude, "The human problem, then, is as yet 
solved in the United States most imperfectly; a great void 
exists in the civilisation over there: a want of what is
elevated and beautiful, of what is interesting."
73lbid., p. 63.
^^ibid., p. 67.
^^Matthew Arnold, "Civilisation in the United States," 
Five Uncollected Essays, p. 59.
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Even worse is the fact that the Americans are largely unaware 
of their imperfection because they have no real source of 
responsible criticism, for their daily newspapers sing only 
the praises of the nation and its peoples.
English Political Criticism
The final category of Matthew Arnold's social and 
political essays to be considered is that of English political 
criticism, a matter which concerned him much in the last 
decade of his life. Although his views on politics in England 
have obviously been either expressed or implied in the contexts 
of the other categories, these essays are selected as represen­
tative of those that deal most directly with the criticism of 
English politics.
The first of the essays to be examined in this phase 
of Arnold's critical career appeared as one of the "other" 
essays in the volume entitled Irish Essays and Others, pub­
lished in 1882— "The Future of Liberalism." In effect, this 
essay constitutes a challenge to the Liberal party after its 
recent return to power in 1880. Arnold begins by announcing 
the guiding principle that orients his own political concerns. 
"The master-thought by which my politics are governed is . . . 
the thought of the bad civilisation of the English middle 
class." However, he is disappointed to observe that it is 
not a major concern with either the Liberals or the
^^Matthew Arnold, "The Future of Liberalism," p. 379.
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Conservatives. He reflects on the nature and purpose of the 
political institution.
The true and noble science of politics is even the very 
chief of the sciences, because it deals with this 
question Eof how to live] . . . for the benefit of man 
in society. Now of man in society the capital need is, 
that the whole body of society should come to live with 
a life worthy to be called human, and corresponding to 
man's true aspirations and powers. This, the humanisa­
tion of man in society, is civilisation. The aim for all 
of us is to promote it, and to promote it is above all 
the aim for the true politician.77
q After elaborating a theory of history as the succession
of alternating periods of concentration and expansion (a 
distinction previously suggested, as has been noted, in "The 
Function of Criticism at the Present Time"), Arnold identifies 
the Conservative party as that most suited to foster the values 
of order, stability, and consolidation in periods of concen­
tration and identifies the Liberal party as that most suited 
to foster the values of progressive development in periods of 
expansion. The present age, he states, is a time for expan­
sion. And it is therefore up to the Liberals to respond to 
the challenges of the present age with wise leadership. If 
they do not respond effectively, then the nation must turn to 
the Conservatives. But what is most wanted is a progressive 
development toward a more perfect civilization.
Let Liberal statesmen despise and neglect for the cure 
of our present imperfection no means, whether of public 
schools, now wanting, or of the theater, now left to 
itself and to chance, or of anything else which may
77lbid., p. 385.
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powerfully conduct to the communication and propagation 
of real intelligence, and of real beauty, and of a life 
really humane.
In concluding, Arnold lists several other matters of moment 
in which the Liberals must exercise humane leadership— in such 
matters as the injustice of social inequality and the enduring 
questions of Ireland's land and ecclesistical affairs.
"The Future of Liberalism" is a significant essay in 
Arnold's canon of social and political criticism. It presents 
very clearly his view of the relationship between society and 
politics. The end that all of Arnold's criticism strives to 
foster is an ideal of human perfection, the humanization of man 
in society, a civilization possessing an adequate culture in 
its ideas, manners, morals, and arts. But the principal means 
by which this end is to be implemented and cultivated are 
political, such as the establishing of adequate secondary 
schools or the institution of social equality through altera­
tions in the law of bequest. Thus, in Arnold's criticism, 
social ends and political means are inextricably interrelated. 
His own purpose, as a critic, is to conduct a private propa­
ganda campaign for these goals. Sometimes he seems to be an 
agent in a guerrilla war, harassing now the people, now the 
statesmen themselves, to grant his conditions— for their own 
sakes. At other times he seems to project the image of a 
prophet, voicing a vision of the ideal and urging his country­
men, with faith, to realize it in England.
7Gibid., p. 402.
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The occasion for Arnold's next essay in English polit­
ical criticism, "The Nadir of Liberalism," was again the recent 
return of the Liberal party to power— in February of 1886, 
after the brief Conservative interlude that began when the 
Liberals fells from power in June of 1885. "The Nadir of 
Liberalism," then, was published in the May issue of Nineteenth 
Century in 1886. The essay scrutinizes rather closely the 
leader of the Liberals, William Gladstone. Arnold's central 
point is that Gladstone has been a victorious politician in 
his measures but that he has not been a successful statesman 
in his policies (although Arnold praises the man personally). 
That is, his measures have consistently been passed, but they 
often have not really solved the problems with which they were 
intended to cope. Many of his measures did not really 
"satisfy vital needs and remove vital dangers of his country.
He mentions particularly Gladstone's policies in relation to 
Ireland (apparently since it had been the announcement of Glad­
stone's conversion to Home Rule that had ultimately precipitated 
the present resumption of power by the Liberals). And he pro­
ceeds to examine specifically Gladston's "project of giving a 
separate Parliament to Ireland [as one that] has every fault
p Q
which a project of State can have." To Arnold it is plain 
that the geographical proximity of the islands of Great Britain
^^Matthew Arnold, "The Nadir of Liberalism," Essays, 
Letters, and Reviews of Matthew Arnold, ed. Fraser Nieman 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 267.
GOlbid., p. 217.
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and Ireland demand— reasonably and naturally— a single system 
of government. Further, separation might endanger them both, 
either from without or from each other. However, he concedes 
that the Irish have legitimate grievances and that some 
successful solution must be found. He himself proposes here 
what he had previously set forth in "A Word More About 
America" (1885): a system of provincial government in Ireland 
to handle strictly Irish affairs (including even a separate 
district for Ulster, if it is found to be best) and of national 
government centered in the Parliament at London for affairs of 
national import— a system analogous to that of the American 
division of federal and state powers. V
If Arnold had known that at the time when "The Nadir 
of Liberalism" was published (May, 1886) the Liberals had but 
three more months to remain in power, then perhaps he would 
not have written it. In August, 1886, the Liberals fell and 
Conservatives returned to power with the Marguess of 
Salisbury as Prime Minister. Therefore, as he had challenged 
the recently elected Liberals in "The Future of Liberalism," 
so now Arnold undertook to arouse and stimulate the Conserva­
tives in another essay, "The Zenith of Conservatism" which 
appeared in the January issue of Nineteenth Century in 1887. 
However, in his effort to influence the Conservative statesmen, 
he adopts a stategy different from his approach to the Liberals. 
In this essay, Arnold represents himself as voicing "the 
mind of the country, the great power of quiet reasonable
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opinion in E n g l a n d . I t  is a role that he plays consis­
tently in subsequent essays addressed to the Conservatives.
He seems to suppose that this approach will best appeal to 
the Conservative disposition. •
It is this constituency (the large body of quiet rea­
sonable men), Arnold suggests in the essay, that has reacted 
against the ineptitude of the Liberals and has now placed the 
Conservatives in power. And these men expect the Conservative 
party to deal not just victoriously but quite successfully 
with the matters that await its constructive hand, especially 
with such matters as the obstruction of procedure in Parlia­
mentary debate, the disestablishment of the Church in Wales, 
and the condition of Ireland. Arnold discusses each of these 
issues in turn, emphasizing the kind of actions that the 
"quiet reasonable men" would approve. With respect to the 
tactics of obstruction by the Irish members in Parliament,
"the body of quiet reasonable opinion throughout the country
8 2is in favor of a most stringent reform . . . . " He 
recommends the use of closure by a majority of three-fifths 
or of two-thirds. To the question of church disestablishment 
in Wales, where the majority of the people are Dissenters, 
Arnold proposed the same sort of answer that he had urged 
in the case of Ireland, where the majority are Catholic:
^'^Matthew Arnold, "The Zenith of Conservatism,"
Essays, Letters, and Reviews by Matthew Arnold, p. 314.
G^ibid., p. 316.
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"To maintain the establishment in Wales for the sole benefit 
of a small minority of the population is an absurdity there, 
just as it was in I r e l a n d ."83 It is against reason and jus­
tice. Finally, Arnold deals at some length with the condition 
of Ireland, where theesabotage of landlords by the Plan of 
Campaign is now in operation. His basic recommendation is 
for a more stringent policy of coercion: "the habit of
defiance must not be allowed to establish itself, must be
o A
quelled when it seeks to establish itself."
It is perhaps somewhat surprising to discover this 
cultured advocate of humanity so strongly endorsing the 
policy of coercion. But one must understand that, for Arnold, 
social order is the sine qua non of civilization. The alter­
native is chaos or anarchy, which is (as any reader of Culture 
and Anarchy knows) the arch-enemy of culture. Before anything 
at all constructive could be achieved, so Arnold held, 
anarchy must be quelled.
Arnold's next excursion into English political criticism 
occurred in May of 1887, when his essay entitled "Up to Easter" 
was published in Nineteenth Century. This essay constitutes a 
a review of the progress that the Conservative party had made 
in this session of Parliament since the appearance of "The 
Zenith of Conservatism" in January. Again Arnold projects
83lbid., p. 319.
G^Ibid., p. 323.
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the image of himself as representative of "the reason of the 
nation." In the course of the essay, he surveys the perform­
ance of the Conservatives in the areas that he had singled 
out in the earlier essay as demanding responsible treatment.
He praises them highly for revising the procedures of Parlia­
mentary debate with a new closure ruling, so that the practice 
of filibuster by the Irish members has been satisfactorily 
inhibited. Further, although not yet passed, a Crimed Act 
for implementing a more vigorous policy of coercion is pre­
sently being considered in Parliament as a means to combat the 
Plan of Campaign. He urges its passage.
Then he turns to the enduring Irish problems, for 
which satisfactory solutions remain to be found. Again he 
recommends his system of provincial governments, which he 
especially advocates as a means to resolve the tension between 
the Protestant North (Ulster) and the Catholic South (the 
remainder of Ireland); for, he asks, is it likely that, if 
Ireland were now to be given any version of Gladstonian Home 
Rule, the Catholic majority would extend entire religious 
liberty to the Protestant minority at this time? As to the 
land question, he reiterates his earlier objections to the 
Irish Land Act of 1881 as being too little and too late.
"What we all now see to be desirable, is to have one owner, 
and that owner, as far as possible, the cultivator."®^
®^Matthew Arnold, "Up to Easter," Essays, Letters, 
and Reviews of Matthew Arnold, p. 351.
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Arnold concludes by. encouraging the Conservatives to persevere 
in their quest for really successful solutions to these 
problems.
Arnold's last essay in English political criticism 
to be considered is "From Easter to August," which appeared 
in the September issue of Nineteenth Century in 1887. As the 
title indicates, it is a continuation of his commentary on the 
Salisbury Conservative ministry, initiated in the two previous 
essays. Written after the adjournment of this session of 
Parliament, the present essay takes a backward glance at the 
road that has been traveled to this point. Again speaking for 
the body of quiet reasonable people, he offers somewhat 
belated praise to the Liberal-Unionists for having earlier 
defeated Gladstonian Home Rule and thus enabling the Conserva­
tives to come to power. He is also pleased to observe that 
the Crimes Bill— which he had advocated in "Up to Easter"—  
was passed. However, on the whole, it seems to him that the 
position of the Conservative party has been weakened by its
failure to act decisively in other areas. "Plainly, then,
8 7Conservatism is not now any longer at its zenith." He 
points out that it is notably in the area of Irish affairs 
that the big questions remain, and foremost among them at the 
moment is the question of Irish landlordism. He encourages
^^Ultimately, in the passage of the Irish Land Pur­
chase Act of 1903, they were successful in this matter.
87Matthew Arnold, "From Easter to August," Essays, 
Letters, and Reviews by Matthew Arnold, p. 358.
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others to stand with him. "The greatest possible service, 
which the body of quiet reasonable people in England can now 
render . . .  is to set their face like a flint against all 
paltering with this question, to insist on a thorough and
O O
equitable settlement of it.
Arnold concludes this last essay in a note of obvious
satisfaction with his role as an essayist who has made some
small contribution to his country through his criticism. "To
be a quiet reasonable person always answers, always makes for
happiness; there is always profit in being . . .  a counter-
89influence to asperity, envy, and anger . . . ."
In the course of this short survey and running 
commentary on the four categories of Matthew Arnold's essays 
in social and political criticism— English society, Irish 
politics, American society, and English politics— certain 
features have been noted. It has been observed how, in tAe 
first place, the lack of a creatively inspiring environment 
moved Arnold to undertake criticism in general as a means to 
remedy the defect; for, to Arnold, the degree to which a 
society can nourish culture (in the sense of esthetic and 
intellectual activity) is an index to the quality of its 
civilization, its power to humanize its citizens. After 
gradually formulating a critical rationale— including the
G^Ibid., p. 366.
^^Ibid., p. 369.
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goal of human perfection, a fourpoint standard for evaluation 
(intellect, conduct, social life, and beauty), and an approach 
of disinterested objectivity— he ^egan to apply his critical 
apparatus to practical situations of social or political concern 
in Ireland, America, and England. Finding the social civiliza­
tion of England to be lacking in certain respects, especially 
in ideas anddsocial life, he used a calculated strategy to 
advocate certain political measures (fixed upon in the process 
of envolving his critical program) as the means of ultimately 
correcting these imperfections; specifically, by enlarging 
and strengthening the power of the State itself, by executing 
a more just administration of ecclesistical matters, by alter­
ing the law of bequest to create greater social equality, by 
instituting local government in appropriate regions, and by 
establishing state-supported public secondary education for 
the middle class.
With the largest problem in Victorian politics— Irish 
affairs— Arnold dealt at length in all of the categories, even 
within his essays on American society. He seems to have 
regarded relations with Ireland as a special test of the quality 
of civilization in England proper. He assigns the original 
cause of the bad relations to failures in English civilization 
itself. And he insists that ultimately the only means of 
healing the relations is by transforming the civilization of 
England— through the acceptance of the proposals that he 
repeatedly advocated.
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The Educational Institution 
A discussion of Arnold's political and social criticism 
establishes the foundation for a discussion of his other cul­
tural criticism, for his critical interest in educational and 
in religious matters was certainly evident in his writings on 
politics and society. Many of his recommendations for specific 
political action directly involve education and religion. The 
political institution is, after all, a structure whose function 
is to organize many of the other activities of the society in 
an orderly and effective form. Part of Arnold's political 
criticism dealt with the institution of politics itself: he
proposed alterations in the structure of the political institu­
tion in order to enable it to execute its function more 
effectively. Most notably, he advocated the enlarging and 
strengthening of the powers of the State so that it would 
operate as a more efficient, beneficent, and rational instru­
ment in ministering to the needs of the people by creating the 
conditions for a more nearly perfect civilization. Much of 
his political criticism also dealt, consequently, with the 
proper function of such a State (enlarged and strengthened) in 
relation to the other social institutions. Thus he proposed 
that the State reorganize the institution of education and 
that it adopt certain policies with respect to the institution 
of religion in England. These we have encountered briefly in 
the course of our survey and commentary on Arnold's body of
162
criticism dealing with the political institution. As Stuart 
Sherman observed, "Arnold's political and his social thought 
are indetachably related. He always treated politics as an 
instrument for the renovation of s o c i e t y ."^0
However, besides his indirect treatment of questions 
and issues about education in certain of his essays on 
politics, Arnold wrote several rather lengthy works devoted 
exclusively to educational matters. Two of these— The Popular 
Education of France (1861) and Schools and Universities on 
the Continent (1868)— were orginally prepared as blue-book 
reports for Royal Commissions and subsequently published in 
regular book-form for the general public. Arnold also wrote 
numerous letters-to-the-editor, an article, and a pamphlet, 
all concerned with the controversy about the Revised Code in 
1861-6 2, a proposed measure whereby government grants to 
schools would be determined not by need but by performance 
("payment by results"), which Arnold strongly opposed. But 
his third most important writing on education was a short book 
entitled A French Eton (1864), a rather informal and personal 
report on education. With The Popular Education of France, 
Schools and Universities on the Continents, and A French Eton 
should also be included Arnold's popular lecture entitled 
"Literature and Science," published in Discourses in America 
(1885).
^^Stuard P. Sherman, Matthew Arnold; How to Know Him 
(New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1914), p. 225.
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The careers of the Arnolds, father and son, in educa­
tion were the subject of a book by Sir Joshua Fitch, a 
younger contemporary and colleague of Matthew Arnold— Thomas 
and Matthew Arnold and Their Influence on English Education 
(1899). But his treatment of the younger Arnold has since 
been superseded. Arnold's ideas of education (as expressed 
in his books, essays, pamphlets, lectures, articles, and 
letters) have been thoroughly and competently examined, dis­
cussed, and evaluated in The Educational Thought and Influence 
of Matthew Arnold (1950) by W. F. Connell, a professional 
student of English education. However, the purpose of our 
examining Arnold’s criticism of the educational institution 
is not to present an exhaustive analysis of his pronouncements 
but only to indicate his central proposals and to relate them 
to the general purpose of his social criticism.
From March through August in 1859, Arnold traveled 
about France, Holland, and Switzerland, visiting schools. 
Appointed by the Newcastle Royal Commission on elementary 
education, he inspected representative elementary schools in 
order to prepare a blue-book report. Given permission by the 
commission, he decided to publish the report also in regular 
book-form for the general public, so that it could exert even 
greater influence. In May of 1861, only a few weeks after its 
appearance as part of the Newcastle Commission’s report. The 
Popular Education of France With Notices of That of Holland
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and Switzerland was published.
The Popular Education of France is largely taken up 
with an historical account of the development of elementary 
education in France, with a series of chapters discussing its 
present constitution and administration, and with similar but 
briefer accounts of elementary education in Holland and in 
Switzerland. Although the requirements of his position as a 
commission-appointed, fact-finding school inspector discouraged, 
if it did not preclude, Arnold's personal judgment in his 
report, his enthusiasm for the French system is nevertheless 
evident, especially in Chapter XIII, "The Popular Education of 
France and England Compared— Legislation," and in Chapter XIV, 
"The Popular Education of France and England Compared— Results 
on the People." These chapters are conducted not so much as 
a comparative study as a study in contrast, with the juxtaposi­
tion of the French and English systems reflecting unfavorably 
on the latter. However, in the "Introduction: Democracy,"
Arnold explicitly expresses certain personal judgments and 
conclusions. (The "Introduction: Democracy" was reprinted
nearly twenty years later as the opening essay in Mixed Essays 
(1879), where it was simply entitled "Democracy.") This intro­
ductory essay is one of Arnold's most significant and revealing 
pronouncements.
Arnold's essay "Democracy" has already been discussed 
in its relation to the political institution. We noted its
^^Super, "Critical and Explanatory Notes," II, 330.
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demand that the powers of the State--the institutional struc­
ture whose function is to organize the communal activities in 
a society— should be enlarged and strengthened, so that it 
could fulfill its organizational function in relation to the 
other social institutions with greater effectiveness, thus 
creating a more civilized culture and so contributing to the 
humanization of the citizens. Such enlargement and strengthen­
ing of the State would be implemented only with the willing 
consent of the people, who must recognize that the ministers 
of the State, elected by them or appointed by the crown, truly 
represent their best interests. It is necessary here only to 
summarize the significance of the essay on "Democracy" in 
relation to the educational institution.
It must be remembered that "Democracy" was originally 
published as the introduction to a report on education. There­
fore, its recommendations with respect to the State should be 
understood in an educational context. Although the proposal to 
enlarge and to strengthen the State is presented as generally 
desirable for the sake of improving the structure and function 
of all social institutions, the original occasion for, and the 
immediate application of, the proposal was specifically in 
relation to the institution of education. As J. Dover Wilson, 
in an article entitled "Matthew Arnold and the Educationists," 
has indicated: "It was . . .  as the provider of schools that
Arnold first came to consider the nature and function of the
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State."92
The general argument of "Democracy" is simple to 
summarize. Democracy is increasing and aristocracy is decling- 
ing. Although the aristocracy had its faults, it nevertheless 
upheld a high and noble standard of culture. In short, it 
stood for the civilization of society and the humanization of 
man. And the effect of its stance was to prevent the standard 
of culture in the national life from being vulgarized. It pro­
vided an exemplary model and civilizing leadership in public 
affairs. But the aristocracy is declining in influence. 
Simultaneously, the development of democracy in England is 
increasing. The Reform Act of 1832 had dramatically signaled 
the birth and growth of the democratic spirit in England. And 
in 1861, when Arnold first published "Introduction: Democracy,"
agitation was rife for a second reform bill (which was finally 
passed in 1867); and in 1879, when he reprinted "Democracy" in 
Mixed Essays, the demand was again strong for a third reform 
bill (which was finally passed in 1884). As he said, "At the 
present time, almost everyone believes in the growth of 
democracy, almost everyone talks of it, almost everyone laments 
it; but the last thing people can be brought to do is to make 
timely preparation for it.
Dover Wilson, "Matthew Arnold and the Educationists," 
The Social and Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers 
of the Victorian Age, ed. F. J. C. Hearnshaw (New York: Barnes
and Noble, Inc., 1930), p. 183.
^^Arnold, "Democracy," Mixed Essays, pp. 21-22.
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Gaylord C. LeRoy contends in his chapter entitled 
"Matthew Arnold" in Perplexed Prophets; Six Nineteenth-Century 
British Authors that Arnold's attitude towards the coming of 
democracy was fundamentally ambivalent, that he welcomed it 
yet (like the middle class in general, of which he was a 
member) he feared the advancement and elevation of the uncul­
tured lower class.94 But this is scarcely the correct way to 
construe his attitude. What Arnold dreaded was certainly not 
the advance of democracy itself. As he affirms in "Democracy," 
it is natural and even good that democracy should spread, for 
it is an inevitable development from the instinct for "expan­
sion" implanted in human nature. And Edward Alexander has 
written, "The unifying purpose of the writings both Arnold and 
Mill was to prepare their culture for its imminent democrat­
ization."95 Yet the present study maintains that even the goal 
of "democratization" is only an organic part, although greatly 
important, in the larger context of Arnold's endeavors toward 
the humanization of his countrymen. Nevertheless, As Alexander 
suggests, Arnold did not fear nor fight democracy; on the 
contrary, he actively supported it. And he insisted that the 
growth of democracy would be lamentable only if it were permitted 
to spread without "timely preparation" for its development.
94caylord C. LeRoy, "Matthew Arnold," Six Nineteenth- 
Century British Authors (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press for Temple University Publication, 1953), 
pp. 40"^85.
95Edward Alexander, Matthew Arnold and John Stuart 
Mill, p . vii.
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What is to be lamented is the danger of the "vulgari­
zation" of society in a democracy. For without the presence 
of an aristocracy as a model and as a guide, the level of 
civilization seems destined to decline. "The individuals who 
compose it j^ a democratic society^ are, the bulk of them, 
persons who need to follow an idea., not to set one . . . .
The consequence in England will surely be much the same as 
that in the United States— the vulgarization of civilization 
and of the individuals who compose the society. This condition 
of vulgarization Arnold repeatedly refers to as the process 
of "Americanization." These notions of the dangers of 
democratic civilization we recognize as nearly identical, of 
course, with those forecast by Alexis de Tocqueville in his 
Democracy in America, which Arnold had read with interest and 
regarded with respect.
Americanization, the décliné of civilization, vulgari­
zation— this is the problem. But what is the solution that 
Arnold proposed in "Democracy"? What is the "timely prepara­
tion" that he advocated? The answer that he recommends in 
the essay is that England must rely on "the action of the 
State,"9^ He then develops his proposal for enlarging and 
strengthening the power of the State as the representative—  
through its well-chosen, qualified, and responsible ministers,
Arnold, "Democracy," Mixed Essays, pp. 19-20.
97
Ibid., p. 17.
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entrusted with adequate means to execute their ideas in 
action— of the "best-self" of the people. In general, he 
argues, such a State will foster the development and mainten­
ance of an admirable civilization in that "the nation may . . . 
thus acquire in the state an ideal of high reason and right 
feeling, representing its best self, commanding general respect, 
and forming a rallying point for the intelligence and for the 
worthiest instincts of the community . . . In so doing,
the State will be assuming the role previously performed by 
the aristocracy in holding aloft a high standard and noble 
ideal of civilization, which should serve as a model and as 
a guide for the middle and lower classes.
More particularly, the "action of the State" may make 
timely preparation for the inevitable development of demo­
cracy, Arnold continues, by reorganizing the structure and 
function of the educational institution. "Democracy," let us 
again recall, first made its appearance as the introduction 
to a report on education. The Newcastle Royal Commission for 
which Arnold prepared the report had been appointed "to con­
sider and report what Measures, if any, are required for the 
Extension of sound and cheap elementary Instruction to all 
Classes of the P e o p l e . The Popular Education of France was 
therefore concerned with the development, constitution, and
^^Ibid., p. 21.
^^Super, ‘."Critical and Explanatory Notes," II,
327-28.
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administration of the elementary schools for the children of 
France. But Arnold had also: visited in France a few represen­
tative secondary schools. And the proposal for State action 
that Arnold advocates in the introductory essay is specifically 
that the State intervene in educational matters in order to 
secure adequate public secondary education for the English 
youth, especially for those of the middle class. Fairly cer­
tain that elementary education would be provided, Arnold 
apparently used his introduction to direct the attention of 
the public to the next important matter in education— that of 
secondary education. His recommendation is that the middle 
and lower classes place their schools, which are presently 
demoninational or voluntary schools established by private 
initiative, under the control of the State so that adequate 
standards for educational quality may be established and 
administered. Thus their children will experience the humaniz­
ing and civilizing effect "of breathing in their youth the air 
of the best culture of their n a t i o n . E d u c a t i o n  of this 
kind is the best insurance of the English, Arnold believes, 
against the vulgarizing influences in democracies. But it is 
necessarily dependent upon an enlarging and strengthening of 
the powers of the State, with the creation of a Minister of 
Education (as in France), in order to implement it effectively.
In the Education Act of 1870, the principle of the 
provision by the state of elementary public education in
^^^Arnold, "Democracy," Mixed Essays, p. 26.
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England was securely founded. But the extension of the prin­
ciple of state intervention in education to include secondary 
public schools was not to be realized until the twentieth 
century— in the Education Act of 1902. Therefore, Arnold 
spent much energy (in his essays, books, and speeches on 
education) vainly pleading until his death that secondary 
education be made publicly available by the State, especially 
for the sake of the middle class, which was replacing the 
aristocracy as the leader of the nation. In 1861-64, the 
Clarendon Royal Commission was appointed to study and report 
on the secondary education of the aristocracy. Arnold's 
response to the activities of the Commission was a series of 
articles that were eventually published in book form as A 
French Eton (1864). The book compared the public secondary 
education provided in the schools of France (some of which 
he had previously visited) with that in the English schools 
for the sons of the aristocracy, concluding that the former 
is certainly not so fine as the latter but recommending 
that something similar to the French system bg instituted for 
English middle class. A French Eton helped give impetus^so 
R. H. Super suggests, to a third study— the Taunton Royal 
Commission on the desirability and feasibility of public 
secondary education in England. Again Arnold was appointed 
to report on education abroad,and again he published his blu& 
book report later in regular book form for the general public: 
Schools and Universities on the Continent (1868) , And
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throughout his life, Arnold continued— formally and informally,
professionally and personally, in speeches and in essays— to
urge the cause of education. As Stuarfi Sherman wrote of him,
"He became keenly interested in education and its practical
problems as soon as he fully grasped their relation to the
general changes which he wished to further in the social life
of his t i m e s . F u r t h e r ,  as a twentieth-century official
concerned with the British Department of Education has written,
"It is not too much to say that Arnold was the creator in this
country of what may be called, as a study, the 'politics' of 
102education." Finally, Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch once gave
Arnold an appreciative tribute for his service to education.
"In his hard-working official life he rendered services which 
those of us who engage in the work of English education are 
constantly and gratefully recognizing in their efforts; and 
we still toil in the wake of his ideajsi.'"^®^
In almost his last words on English education, com­
posed in 1886, Arnold summarized the comprehensive and coherent
system of public education that he desired to see the State 
empowered to implement and to execute.
lOlstuart P. Sherman, Matthew Arnold: How to Know
Him, p. 17.
102sir Fred Clark, "Introduction," in W. F. Connell's 
The Educational Thought and Influence of Matthew Arnold 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Limited, 1950), p. ix.
^^^Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, "Matthew Arnold,"
Studies in Literature (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1918), p. 237.
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May we live to see the coining of a state of things 
more promising. Throughout the country good elementary 
schools taking the child to. the age of thirteen; then 
good secondary schools, taking him to sixteen, with 
good classical high schools and commercial high schools, 
taking him on further to eighteen or nineteen; with good 
technical and special schools, for those who require 
them, parallel with the secondary and high schools—  
this is what is to be aimed at. Without system, and 
concert and thought, it cannot be attained: and these,
again, are impossible without a Minister of Education 
as a centre in which to fix responsibility, and an 
Educational Council to advise the Minister and keep him 
in touch with the tendencies, needs, and schoo1-movement
of the time.104
In this summary of his recommendations concerning the structure 
of the educational institution, Arnold emphasizes two essen­
tials: first, a greater provision of schools of various grades
and types; and, second, a sequential progression in all 
schools— from elementary through secondary to higher education.
There remains but one more matter to consider in 
Arnold's writings about the educational institution. This is 
the matter of the curriculum content that he advocated as the 
means to the end of a truly civilizing and humanizing educa­
tion. It is a matter that he dealt with in Chapter XXII, 
"General Conclusion: School Studies," of Schools and Univer­
sities on the Continent (1868). With the phenomental growth 
of scientific knowledge in the'nineteenth century, a contro­
versy developed between those who proposed that the content 
of popular education should be composed primarily of the modern
lO^Matthew Arnold, "Education," The Reign of Queen 
Victoria; A Survey of Fifty Years of Progress, ed. T. H. Ward 
(London: Smith Elder, 1887), II, 279.
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scientific knowledge and those who proposed that it should 
consist of the traditional course of study in ancient classical 
literature. It was the beginning of the educational controversy 
over the humanities and the sciences.
Since Arnold himself had been educated in the human­
istic and classical tradition at Rugby and at Oxford, one 
would naturally expect that his sympathies would like with 
the classical humanists. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, 
to discover that his position is a mean between the extremes, 
a happy balance— which is, after all, perhaps the more truly 
humanistic position, as Aristotle suggested. In developing 
his proposition as a recommendation in the concluding chapter 
of Schools and Universities On the Continent, he begins by 
asking and answering the question of what is the purpose of 
education: "its prime direct aim is to enable a man to know
himself and the world. Such knowledge is the only sure basis 
for action, and this basis it is the true aim and office of 
instruction to s u p p l y . I n  order to realize this twin aim 
of knowing both man and nature, the student must include both 
the humanities and the sciences in his education. Thus the 
extremists among both the humanists and the "realists" (advo­
cates of a primarily scientific public education) are both 
right and wrong. Each is right in assuming that their course 
of study is necessary to achieve the purpose of education, but
lOSArnold, Schools and Universities on the Continent,
p. 290.
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both are wrong in assuming that either the humanities or the 
sciences comprehend in themselves the whole of what is essen­
tial to an adequate education for modern man. "Meanwhile 
neither our humanists nor our realists adequately conceive 
the circle of knowledge, and each party is unjust to all that 
to which its own aptitudes do not carry it."^^^
Much later in his career, Arnold continued to enunciate 
essentially the same view in his popular lecture "Science and 
Literature," which was published in Discourses in America in 
1885. As part of his rhetorical strategy in the lecture,
Arnold selects Huxley as the representative of the realist 
position and charges that the realists have misunderstood his 
own position as humanist. For, although he is a humanist, 
he is not an extremist, he explains; further, pushing the 
argument into the enemy's encampment, he denounces the posi­
tion of the extreme realists as inadequate. Finally, to 
those frightened that the sciences may someday push the human­
ities out of the curriculum, Arnold concludes with an affirma­
tion of the enduring revelance of humane letters. Because 
man has instincts for beauty and conduct as much as for know­
ledge, his instinct for self-preservation and expansion will 
not suffer the humanities to be entirely neglected. They are 
essential to his wholeness.
For Arnold, the process of humanization was itself 
essentially a process of education; it required a continuing
^°^Ibid., p. 291.
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discipline of self-cultivation in order to actualize the poten­
tial of one's complete humanity— in order, that is, to achieve 
perfection. And public education at its best was to become, 
so he envisioned, a significant contributor to a humane 
civilization for his countrymeht
The Religious institution
In Chapter II, "The Images of Nature and of God," we 
have already examined Arnold's concept of God. There we found 
that "God"— "the Eternal, not ourselves, which makes for 
righteousness"— was an aspect of nature as experienced from 
the perspective of the moral viewpoint. In Chapter IV, "The 
Image of Man," we shall consider the experiential and 
psychological effect of religion, as Arnold understood it, 
upon the individual. Our present interest in Arnold's reli­
gious writings is in his criticism of religion as a social 
institution, in his analysis of its structure and function in 
the culture of Victorian England.
Of course, Arnold's own treatment of religion has itself 
been severly criticized in turn. His religious writings have 
been dismissed as the dabblings of a dilettante and neglected 
as the negligible meddling and scribbling of a vagrant man of 
letters. For instance, one critic describes his theological 
thought as "a hazy mixture of Germanized Hellenism and an 
Anglicanism excessively rarified and with the bony structure
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of dogma removed. Yet other writers have defended his
religious essays. Thus H. W. Garrod remarks, "It has been
found convenient to forget that it was by his theological
writings that he first rose into the rank, or esteem, of a
great writer."1^8 Further, George McClean Harper, commenting
on Arnold's qualifications as a student of religion, observed:
Matthew Arnold was much better equipped to treat of 
theological questions than many professional theologians; 
his knowledge of the Bible was extraordinary; his read­
ing in the early Christian fathers was wide; he was far - 
better acquainted than most of his clerical and academic 
contemporaries with the works of the great English 
divines . . .  ; and furthermore he was familiar with the 
processes and results of comparative historical study as 
practices on the continent of Europe.109
And, in a critical article, E. H. Hunt asks, "Is it not obvious
that religious thought is now closer to Arnold than to . . .
his critics ?"H0 Finally, Basil Willey has highly praised
the relatively neglected religious writings as among Arnold's
best works, at the very center of his life-purpose.
His literary essays should be viewed, not as the main 
current from which his other writings are offshoots, but 
as tributary rills swelling the mainstream of his life's 
effort. And his main effort was that of a sage, a 
teacher, a moralist and a physician of the human s p i r i t . m
19"^ John Heath-Stubbs, The Darkling Plain (London: Eyre
and Spottiswoode, 1950), p. 100.
^®®H. W. Garrod, Poetry and the Criticism of Life 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931), p. 79
lO^George McClean Harper, Spirit of Delight (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1928), p . 105
^^^E. H. Hunt, "Matthew Arnold and His Critics."
Sewanee Review, XLIV (April, 1936), 415.
^^^Basil Willey, "Matthew Arnold," Nineteenth Century 
Studies, p. 252.
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"Estote ergo vos perfectil--the motto of Culture and Anarchy, 
'the full perfection of our humanity'— that was Arnold's life­
long quest . . . ."112
The Function of Religion 
Arnold's four books devoted exclusively to religious 
matters— St. Paul and Protestantism, Literature and Dogma,
God and the Bible, and Last Essays on Church and Religion—  
were published during the period from 1870 to 1877. However, 
as we have noted in our examination of his political criti­
cism, his concern with religious matters is evident in much 
of his other writing. Even before the period of prose 
criticism, much of his early poetry— in its quest to define 
man's relation to the cosmos and man's relation to man— is 
obviously religious in its implications. But it is in the 
volume entitled Essays in Criticism (1865) that his interest 
in religious matters, which was later to express itself at 
length in the four books on religion, is more clearly 
indicated. Several of the essays in the volume deal at least 
indirectly with religion— "Maurice Guerin," "Eugenie Guerin," 
"Pagan and Medieval Religious Sentiment," and "§ourbert." But 
especially in the essay entitled "Marcus Aurelius" the nature 
of his interest in religion is directly revealed.
The essay on "Marcus Aurelius" opens with a general
consideration of the nature of morality and of the function of 
ll^Ibid., p. 254.
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religion in relation to morality.
Now the object of systems of morality is to take possession 
of human life, to save it from being abandoned to passion 
or allowed to drift at hazard, to give it happiness by 
establishing it in the practice of virtue; and this object 
they seek to attain by prescribing to human life fixed 
principles of action, fixed rules of conduct.
The object of morality is, in Arnold's view, to save men—  
individually and collectively— from the chaos (or "anarchy") 
of unrestrained passion. Any system of morality is to be 
valued insofar as it conduces to this end. Further, the 
ultimate positive goal of morality, beyond the rather negative 
influence of mere restraint, is to foster human happiness. The 
assumption is that happiness is desirable bpt that the trans­
lation of desire, or "passion," into action does not always 
lead to happiness, neither for the person nor for the society. 
The passions must be controlled for the sake of life and 
happiness; in other words, righteousness makes for life and 
happiness (and whatever makes for life and happiness is 
righteous). Such restraint and re-direction is the object 
of morality, and the more effectively it achieves this object, 
the better it is as a system of morality.
But there is a problem— one of inspiration. Even to 
know the good is not necessarily to act the right. To oppose 
the desire of a passion, there must be an emotional impetus 
to morality; for "moral rules, apprehended as ideas first, and 
then rigorously followed as laws, are, and must be, for the 
sage only."
^^^Super, III, 133.
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The mass of mankind have neither force of intellect 
enough to apprehend them clearly as ideas, nor force of 
character enough to follow them strictly as laws. The 
mass of mankind can be. carried along a course full of 
hardship for the natural man, can be borne over the 
thousand impediments of the narrow way, only by the tide 
of a joyful and bounding eiriotion.H^
It is at this point that morality, if it is to be widely appeal­
ing and deeply effective, must be reinforced by religion. For 
at least one of the functions of religion (its most important 
function) is to serve as a source of emotional inspiration for 
moral conduct. "The paramount virtue of religion is, that it 
has lighted up morality; that it has supplied the emotion and 
inspiration needful for carrying the sage along the narrow way
II 1  T  C
perfectly, for carrying the ordinary man along it at all.
The implication is that the more effectively a religion ful­
fills its primary function of reinforcing morality with 
emotional inspiration, the better it is as a religion. The 
best religion, then, will be that whose nature most inclines 
it to the effective fulfillment of this function.
It is on this ground, as an especially effective inspira­
tion for righteousness, that Arnold points to Christianity as 
singularly superior among religions. Christianity fulfills the 
function of religion with "unexampled splendour";
its distinction is not that it propounds the maxim,
"Thou shalt love God and thy neighbor," with more 
development, closer reasoning, truer sincerity than
ll^Ibid., p. 134.
ll^ibid., pp. 134-35,
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other moral systenis ; it is that it propounds this maxim 
with an inspiration which wonderfully catches the hearer 
and makes him act upon it.H^
And Arnold quotes several passages from the Bible to illustrate
how it is suffused with a depth of emotion admirably suited to
encourage people— to hearten them— in righteous behavior. It
>
is thus that Christianity most effectively fulfills the pri­
mary function of religion— to reinforce morality with emotional 
inspiration.
The argument of "Marcus Aurelius," as an essay in 
literary criticism, is that the Meditations is to be greatly 
valued among moral writings because it manages to infuse its 
Stoic ethics with an emotional element. Its inspirational 
value is less than that of the Christian Bible, but it nonthe- 
less provides more than mere intellectual resignation: "it
is a spirit, not so much of gladness and elation, as of gentle­
ness and sweetness; a delicate and tender sentiment . . .
The view of religion that Arnold sets forth in "Marcus 
Aurelius," first published in the November, 1863, issue of 
Victoria Magazine, anticipates the definition of religion that 
he expressed ten years later in Literature and Dogma (1873) and 
italicized with a sense of certainty and finality: there he
affirms that religion is "morality touched with emotion.
^^^Ibid., pp. 135-36.
1 1 7
'ibid., p. 149. 
l^^Arnold, Literature and Dogma, p. 18.
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And again Arnold insists that the essential distinction bet­
ween ethical systems and religions is simply that the former 
address their moral appeal to the intellect and that the latter 
address their moral appeal to the emotions. This definition 
of religion infuriated F. H. Bradley, who heaped scorn on it 
in his Ethical Studies. However, the definition is perhaps not 
quite so limited as may at first appear if we remember that 
Arnold is emphasizing the primary function of religion, from 
his point of view, rather than its nature. Had he deignedd 
to reply specifically to Bradley’s criticism, he might perhaps 
have clarified his statement by adding, for instance, that 
religion is morality touched with emotion— under the conditions 
of poetic truth and beauty requisite for inspiring human 
conduct I At any rate, this conception of the essential func­
tion of religion is the consistent and guiding principle in 
all of his writings on religion. We have noted, for example, 
how his definition of God was so fashioned as to emphasize the
moral significance of the divine nature and thus to enable
the reader to turn to his Bible for a morally inspiring 
experience, uninhibited by an irrelevant and unacceptable 
supernatural notion of God.
This redefinition of religion in moral terms has the 
effect of focusing not upon God, however, but upon man. It 
is thus a humanistic conception of religion: religious 
morality is valued as a means to the end of human happiness.
Man must obey '(God" (the natural conditions for life and
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happiness), but he does so not for God's sake but for his own. 
Ultimately, the value of religion consists in its contribution 
(no mean one) to the humanization of man, to his fulfillment 
as a complete human being. The criterion by which the exist­
ing religious institution in a society should be evaluated is 
its effect as a civilizing agent— the degree to which it 
fosters human wholeness.
Thus in St. Paul and Protestantism (1870), the first 
of his books on religion, Arnold's reinterpretation of Pauline 
doctine is clearly a specific application of his general 
principle that the function of religion is to humanize man by 
inspiring him to control his passions. Arnold attempts in 
the book to demonstrate that the current dissenting heirs of 
Puritanism— the Calvinistic Congregationalists and Baptists 
and the Arminian Methodists and others— with their emphases 
on, respectively, the fear of Hell and the hope of Heaven, 
were distorting the original epphasis of St.- Paul on righteous­
ness for its own sake. This he attempts to demonstrate by a 
reinterpretation of St. Paul's Epsitle to the Romans. Revers­
ing the traditional interpretation of English protestants 
(the Puritans), he declares that the essential concern of the 
Apostle Paul is not the relation of man to God but the relation 
of man to other men. Contrary to the orthodox view, Arnold 
argues, Paul's emphasis is not primarily on salvation by faith 
in God but on works of righteousness toward men. The former 
is secondary and subordinant to the latter. Again, this is
184
to say, in Arnold's terms, that the function of religion is 
to reinforce morality.
Precisely how the religious orientation of Pauline 
Christianity reinforces the Pauline concern for individual 
righteousness is the subject of the second half of the book.
In Part II of St. Paul and Protestantism, Arnold sets forth 
a radical reinterpretation of the orthodox doctrine of the 
crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. Later he refined 
and elaborated his reinterpretation in Literature and Dogma, 
wherein he objected to the literalistic orientation of the 
Puritan mind which made "salvation" conditionally dependent 
entirely upon an intellectual assent to the actual historicity 
of the event, which to him was essentially symbolic in its 
significance. As Arnold interpreted what he called the 
"necrosis doctrine" of St. Paul, the crucifixion and resurrec­
tion of Jesus was a figurative representation of the death of 
the old man (a person ruled by the passions of his flesh) and 
the rebirth of the new man (the same person now led by the 
spirit of righteousness). As the law of the flesh leads to 
death— spiritual decadence or sterility— so the law of the 
spirit leads to life more abundant. Arnold did not deny that 
St. Paul also accepted the resurrection of Jesus as a histori­
cal event; but his primary emphasis, Arnold insists, was upon 
the symbolic significance of the doctrine.
Arnold goes on, then, to discuss the moral function 
of this religious doctrine— how, by touching morality with
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emotion, it inspires and reinforces moral conduct. This 
effect of the doctrine Arnold referred to later in Literature 
and Dogma as the Christian "secret." This "secret," which 
enables one to lead a righteous life, is an imaginative 
identification of oneself with Jesus; "The motions of sin in 
ourselves we succeed in mortifying . . .  by sympathy with
11 9
Christ in his mortification of them."- Following the example
of Jesus, whose crucifixion and resurrection symbolized the 
continuing inner process of his entire life, one must "die" to 
the flesh and "live" by the spirit. The precise content of 
Arnold's concept of the "flesh" and of the "spirit" we shall 
discuss in the next chapter, "The Image of Man." But it is 
clear that the psychological process of imaginative identifica­
tion of the individual with Jesus is another means, as Arnold 
presents it, of attaching emotional associations to the 
ethical life of making moral decisions. Propagated by the 
social institution of religion, this religious doctrine may 
enrich the moral dimension of human experience with emotional 
inspiration. As a pprt of the process of civilization within 
the cultural environment of a society, the religious institu­
tion may thus fulfill its function of fostering the humanization 
of man.
The Structure of the Church 
On the basis of his understanding of the function of 
religion, Arnold advanced certain notions about the proper
l^^Arnold, St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 67.
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structure of the religious institution— the Christian church 
as it existed in Victorian England. The structural recommen­
dations that he advocated were intended to enable the church 
to fulfill its religious function more effectively. His 
notions about the proper structure of the church are most 
explicitly set forth in two of his writings: "Puritanism
and the Church of England" and "The Church of England."
The essay on "Puritanism and the Church of England" 
was included in Arnold's short book St. Paul and Protestantism, 
published in 1870. As we have noted, his effort in the book 
was to demonstrate how the English protestants, the noncon­
formist Puritans of whatever denomination, had misinterpreted 
certain essential doctrines of St. Paul, specifically the 
significance of the crucifixion and resurrection. Involved 
in his discussion was a consideration of the significance of 
such traditional Puritan doctrines as predestination, original 
sin, and justification in relation to his own reinterpretation. 
In the course of the reinterpretation, he had demonstrated 
(at least to his own satisfaction) that the Puritan doctrines 
were all quite unfounded in scripture, the Puritans' own 
source of authority for their faith; their doctrines, he 
argued,were based on misreadings and misunderstandings of 
St. Paul's meanings.
In "Puritanism and the Church of England," Arnold pro­
poses that since the Puritan denominations have based their 
existence on the validity of such doctrines and since these
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doctrines, as held by the nonconformist Puritans, have no# 
been shown to be a wresting of the scriptures (in St. Paul 
and Protestantism, to which the essay is attached), the 
Puritans no longer have any valid grounds, therefore, on which 
to base their continued existence. Consequently, he argues, 
the Puritan Nonconformists should all return within the fold 
of the established Anglican Church. "Puritanism and the 
Church of England" is thus, although perhaps not very tactful, 
an essay toward an ecumenical movement in nineteenth-century 
England.
Much of the essay is devoted to a discussion of the 
advantages to be gained— by the Puritans, by the established 
Church, and by the nation as a whole— if ecclesiastical unity 
were to be achieved. The current condition of separatism, 
confirming the Puritans in their parochialism and provin­
cialism, causes them "to be in the main, at present, an 
obstacle to progress and to true civilisation."^^® Once within 
the established Church, the misdirected energy of the Puritans 
would be redirected toward more creative activity.
The good of comprehension in a national Church is, that 
the larger and more various the body of members, the more 
elements of power and life the Church will contain, the 
more points will there be of contact, the more mutual 
support and stimulus, the more growth in perfection both
of thought and practice.121
^^®Matthew Arnold, "Puritanism and the Church of 
England," St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 104.
IZlibid., p. 105.
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One great advantage of an historic national church, 
Arnold emphasizes, is its capacity for change and progressive 
development. Sects of men that separate only for the sake 
of narrow notions tend "to be shut up in sectarian ideas of 
their own, and to be less open to new general ideas that the
T O O
main body of men . . . However, the "historic Church
cannot choose but allow the principle of development, for it
1 p O
is written in its institutions and history." And the
ability to adapt to the demands of the age is essential if 
the religious institution is to fulfill its function in the 
modern period. It must accommodate itself to what is valid 
in scientific and secular thought as well as adjust itself to 
the conclusions of recent continental higher criticism. All 
of this the historic and established Anglican Church is in 
a better position to do, he asserts, than the several Puritan 
sects.
In concluding his ecumenical essay, Arnold even proffers, 
as a tentative set of articles for confederation, the proposals 
of Tillotson and Stillingfleet for ecclesisatical unity, drawn 
up in 1689. These are seven broad and tolerant conditions, 
which he quotes entire. He offers them as a model to be 
studied not so much for their specific requirements for union 
as for their general spirit of reconciliation. He notes that
IZ^Ibid., p. 131.
123ibid., p. 121.
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these proposals were originally drawn up for the union of 
protestants in England, but he suggests that the advantages 
would be even greater if the Catholics were invited to join.
But such comprehensive unity he recognizes as unrealistic in 
his generation. Nevertheless/ he envisions a progressive 
movement "which may one day make a general union of Christen­
dom p o s s i b l e . M e a n w h i l e ,  the task of the religiously 
concerned is to create an adequate and uniform structure for 
the institution of the Church in England so that it may fulfill 
its function well.
"The Church of England," Arnold's second essay to deal 
explicitly and exclusively with the structure of the Church, 
was originally delivered as an address to the London clergy 
at Sion College and subsequently published in Last Essays on 
Church and Religion, which appeared in 1877. It is an essay 
in antidisestablishmentarianism. Against those who propose 
that the religious institution be disestablished, Arnold 
defends the Church as a civilizing influence whose activity 
deserves to be recognized, sponsored, and supported by society 
as a whole. The Church is not a private sect but a public 
institution that exists for the good of the whole society.
As a public institution, there is a public reason for its 
existence.
I regard the Church of England as, in fact, a great 
national institution for the promotion of what is commonly 
called goodness, and for promoting it through the most
^^^Ibid., p. 153.
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effectual means possible, the only means which are really 
and truly effectual for the object; through the means of 
the Christian religion and of the B i b l e . 125
The mere existence of a nationally instituted Church is a con­
stant and visible remainder to men of their moral responsi­
bilities. And the positive activity of the Church, in 
edification and inspiration, makes it an effective instrument 
for influencing conduct— which is, as Arnold often said, three- 
fourths of human life. As Benjamin F. Lippincott has written, 
"For him the Church was a society for the promotion of good­
ness; its establishment by the state was important, for he 
believed that an interest so deep and abiding as religion 
should be publicly and splendidly recognized.
Arnold remarks that it may seem strange for him to 
defend the establishment of the Church before the London 
clergy (the original audience of his address) but that he does 
so in order to deliver a challenge. The lower classes, the 
working masses, are regarding the Church as increasingly 
irrelevant to their concerns. The goal of these people is 
"an immense renovation and transformation of things, a far 
better and happier society in the f u t u r e . "1^7 Arnold reminds 
the clergy that although the popular notion of a good society
^^^Matthew Arnold, "The Church of England," Last Essays 
on Church and Religion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1902),
p. 312.
^^^Benjamin F. Lippincott, "Matthew Arnold," Victorian 
Critics of Democracy-(Minneapolis: The University of
Minnesota Press, 1938), p. 106.
IZ^Ibid., p. 327.
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may be an ideal that is alloyed with some false values,
nevertheless "it is also the ideal of our religion"— the
kingdom of heaven on earth.1^8 The clergy must recognize the
purpose of the Church as a great national institution for
the promotion of goodness and devote themselves actively to
work for this ideal of the good society, a civilization
designed to foster not only the moralisation of the masses but
also their humanization— the cultivation of their complete
humanity. This is the present, as it is the historic, role
of the religious institution, the Church.
And by opening itself to the glow of the old and true 
ideal of the Christian Gospel, by fidelity to reason, 
by placing the stress of its religion on goodness, by 
cultivating grace and peace, it will inspire attachment, 
to which the attachment which it inspires now, deep 
though that is, will be as nothing; it will last, be 
sure, as long as this nation.129
Once the significance of its function is generally recognized,
there will be no more talk of disestablishment.
The Use of the Bible 
Much of Arnold's critical writing about religion 
centers on the proper and improper use of the Bible as a source 
of inspiration for the moral life. He is much upset by the 
failure of the Puritan denominations to acknowledge and read 
the Bible as literature. True, it is religious literature, 
but it is nonetheless literature. Therefore, it is to be read
, p. 328.
129lbid., p. 343.
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with due regard for its literary nature; that is, it is not 
to be read as a legal contract between God and the human race, 
nor is it to be taken as a scientific document. Thus, for 
example, at one point in St. Paul and Protestantism, he states 
that his purpose is actually "the true criticism of a great 
and misunderstood author."130 And the subtitle of Literature 
and Dogma, his most famous book on religion, is An Essay 
Towards a Better Apprehension of the Bible
The main reason why the Bible is misunderstood, Arnold 
stresses, is that people tend to interpret in a material sense 
what should be apprehended in a spiritual sense. That is, 
they fail to recognize the peculiar quality of the Bible as 
literature— its use of the metaphorical mode of communication. 
Instead, what is meant figuratively and poetically is taken 
literally and prosaically. Arnold distinguishes between two 
characteristics of the Apostle Paul's use of language that are 
characteristic of most Biblical language. On the one hand, 
Paul Orientalizes— he spiritualizes the material, using the 
figurative mode. On the other hand, he Judaises, using 
scripture (the Old Testament) as a source of absolute truth, 
whose assertions are to be accepted unquestioningly as 
historically, scientifically, and logically sound; thus Paul 
himself tends to take the Old Testament literally.
130&rnold, St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 63.
131lbid., p. 26.
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When Paul Orientalises^, the fault is not with him when 
he is misunderstood, but with the prosaic and-unintelli­
gent Western readers who have not enough tact for style 
to comprehend his mode of expression. But he also 
Judaises; and here his liability to being misunderstood 
by us Western people is undoubtedly due to a defect in 
the critical habit of himself and his r a c e . 131
Arnold makes clear that Paul himself, immersed in the 
mythic orientation of his age with its supernaturalistic 
ideology, was disposed to understand the Old Testament liter­
ally and that, consequently, his view of Jesus was influenced 
accordingly. He accepted the resurrection of Jesus in a 
material sense. But, Arnold insists, he also perceived its 
symbolic significance, and this it was that he emphasized in 
his Epistles as an inward source of inspiration for the moral 
life of righteousness. He did not preach that faith in the 
supernatural reality of the resurrection automatically 
"saved" an individual. Rather, his primary concern was 
righteous conduct for its own sake; righteousness in itself, 
here and now, he regarded as supremely desirable. And the 
teachings about the life and death of Jesus he valued for 
their instrumentality in fostering the realization of this 
desirable effect. A recognition and contemplation of the 
moral significance of Jesus and an imaginative identification 
with him could function— on the naturalistic level of 
psychological experience— as an emotional inspiration to 
righteous behavior.
^^^Ibid., p. 26.
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Ultimately, what Arnold recommends to modern man as 
the proper approach to the Bible is that of demythologizing. 
This approach has been popularized in the twentieth century by 
the German theologian Rudolf Bultmann and his followers, in 
whose hands it has assumed the propertions of a hermeneutic 
movement— a particular school of Biblical interpretation. The 
demythologizers more or less frankly accept the naturalistic 
assumptions of the contemporary secular world, although some 
of them assume the existence of an ultimate transcendental 
dimension of being. And they acknowledge that the Bible is 
the product of a culture whose assumptions were supernaturalis­
tic, being based on a mythic orientation and ideology. Never­
theless, the demythologizers believe that the Biblical writers 
often had profound intuitions and insights into the human con­
ditions. Although couched in the mythic mode of expression, 
their views are not to be rejected as superstitious and false. 
They should rather be regarded as valid truths expressed in 
symbolic forms. The problem of interpretation, then, is to 
demythologize— to translate the truth from its mythological 
and supernaturalistic context into psychological and natura­
listic terms. For basic experiential insights into the human 
condition remain true, even though the ancient cosmology that 
shaped the form of their expression may itself become outmodêd.
Eugene L. Williamson, Jr. has analyzed the relation 
between the Biblical criticism of Thomas and Matthew Arnold. 
Although concluding that the son was far more radical than
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his liberal father, he cites six points of similarity in
their Biblical criticism;
(1) rejection of the idea of plenary Biblical inspira­
tion; (2) emphasis on the ethical rather than the 
metaphysical significance of the Bible; (3) validation 
of religious doctrines by the teachings of Jesus; (4j 
reference to experience . . .  as demonstration of the 
efficacy of Christian teachings; (5) distrust of 
anthropomorphic conceptions of God's nature; and 
(6) considered employment of humanistic learning in 
Biblical interpretation.132
Doubtless the elder Arnold would have been shocked at the 
lengths to which his son was to carry these principles. 
Developing the implications of these principles to their 
logical conclusion, he was to arrive at a mode of interpreta­
tion that anticipated the contemporary movement of 
demythologizers.
The demythologizing approach of Arnold, with its 
interpretive consequences, is fully and clearly exemplified 
in his treatment, for instance, of the concept of God in the 
Old Testament. Arnold's effort to define "God" was based on 
the assumption that the concept, although generated in a 
supernaturalistic culture, had a valid naturalistic meaning 
for modern man. He "demythologized" the image of God in the 
Old Testament so that a contemporary Victorian could read 
the Bible with a sense of its relevance. This was Arnold's 
intention, at least, whether or not it was his achievement.
13 2Eugene L. Williamson, Jr., "Significant Points of 
Comparison Between the Biblical Criticism of Thomas and 
Matthew Arnold," PMLA, LXXVI (December, 1961), p. 540.
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Likewise, his handling of the doctrine of the crucifixion 
and resurrection of Christ in the New Testament is another 
instance of demythologizing: he translated the doctrine
from its mythological and supernaturalistic context into 
psychological and naturalistic terms, investing the doctrine 
with symbolic significance rather than literal or historic 
actuality.
Futther, Arnold's position in the famous ColensQ con­
troversy of his time may be simply stated in terms of his 
demythologizing hermeneutics. The Bishop of Colenso had 
published a book on the Pentateuch in which he pointed out 
much of its obviously mythological character. Religious 
liberals applauded him, but conservative colleagues condemned 
him. Arnold wrote several articles in which he dealt directly 
or indirectly with the controversy, including "The Bishop and 
the Pilosopher," "Spinoza and the Bible," and "Dr. Stanley's 
Lectures on the Jewish Church," all originally published in 
periodicals during 186 2 and 1863. Judging Colenso's work as 
an essay in higher criticism, Arnold condemned it as puerile 
in comparison with continental scholarship. Judging it as 
a work for the religious edification of laymen, he found it 
"unedifying." In ôther words, the essence of Arnold's criticism 
is that the Bishop "demythologized" the Pentateuch, but he 
failed to translate and interpret the valid naturalistic 
significance that existed within the supernaturalistic forms 
of expression. He failed to emphasize the "natural truth of
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religion" despite its being couched in mythological terms. 
Spinoza, on the other hand, is represented as an early 
exemplar of the correct approach to Biblical criticism and 
interpretation; and Dr. Stanley is upheld as a modern 
exemplar.
In the process of teaching his countrymen the proper 
use of the Bible, besides the general approach of demythologiz­
ing, Arnold recommended a specific and practical use of the 
Bible as a regular aid to meditation. This use of the Bible 
he dwells upon in his "Preface" to Last Essays on Church and 
Religion.
The figure and sayings of Jesus, embodying and repre­
senting men's moral experience to them, serving them 
as a perpetual reminder of it, by a fixed form of words 
and observances holding their attention to it, and thus 
attaching them, have attracted to themselves, by the 
very force of time, and use, and association, a mass of 
additional attachment, and a host of sentiments the 
most tender and p r o f o u n d . 1^3
For Arnold, the Bible was neither a book of religion nor a
book of morality; instead, it was a book of religious
morality— that is, of morality touched with emotion— and
•so was capable of inspiring men to righteous conduct. He
believed that for the English, nurtured in the Christian
tradition of western civilization, the Bible was the natural
source of a Aoble morality that is both experientially valid
and emotionally inspiring. Since the emotions are the springs
^Arnold, "Preface," Last Essays On Church and 
Religion, p. 173.
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of action, they must be involved in the contemplation of 
ethical principles in order to influence conduct. As Robert 
Shafer described Arnold's position in Christianity and 
Naturalism;
The importance of the Bible is that it states the moral 
law clearly, in passionate language, and in concrete, 
literary form, through symbol and myth, so that it 
brings its contributions of truth to us in a humanized 
shape which comes home to us and stimulates in us the 
intense conviction necessary to rouse us to a c t i o n . 134
Arnold himself exemplified the use of the Bible for
this purpose in his own practice. The Note-Books of Matthew
Arnold (edited by Lowry, Young, and Dunn) are studded with
verses and passages from the Bible that he wrote down in
order to meditate upon them daily. Such daily meditation
was a life-long habit with him. In the year before his death,
he wrote elsewhere:
The most important and fruitful utterances of Jesus are 
not things which can be drawn up as a table of stiff 
and stark external commands, but the things which have 
most soul in them; because these can best sink down into 
our soul, work there, set up an influence, form habits 
of conduct, and prepare for the future.135
13^Robert Shafer, "Matthew Arnold," Christianity 
and Naturalism (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1 9 2 6 ) ,  
p .  1 8 5 .
ll^Matthew Arnold, "Count Leo Tolstoi," Essays 
in Criticism, Second Series (New York; The Macmillan 
Company, 1 9 0 5 ) , p. 2 9 7 .  The essay entitled "Count Leo 
Tolstoi," was originally published in the Fortnightly Review 
during December of 1 8 8 7 .
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The Function of Literature
It may seem strange, at first, to examine Arnold's 
conception of the function of literature in the course of 
discussing his social criticism of the religious institution. 
But it is not so strange when we remember, for instance, that 
in 1880 Arnold wrote that "most of what now passes with us 
for religion . . . will be replaced by poetry.
In understanding Arnold's high conception of the 
potential function of poetry, it is perhaps best to start 
with his essay entitled "Maurice de Guerin," published 
in Essays in Criticism, First Series (1865). There he wrote of 
the "interpretative power" of poetry, anticipating his later 
definition of poetry as a "criticism of life." This "inter­
pretative power" of poetry he describes as "the power of so 
dealing with things as to awake in us a wonderfully full, 
new and intimate sense of them, and of our relations with 
them."137 Poetry exercises its interpretive power on two 
objects— man and nature; he refers to poetry both as "the 
interpretress of the natural world" and as "the interpretress 
of the moral world.
^^^Matthew Arnold, "The Study of Poetry," Essays in 
Criticism, Second Series (New York; The Macmillan Company, 
1905), p. 3.
1 3 7^^'Super, III, 13.
^^^Ibid., p. 30.
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Poetry interprets, by expressing with magical felicity 
the physiognomy and movement of the outward world, and 
it interprets by. expressing, with inspired conviction, 
the ideas and laws of the inward world of man's moral 
and spiritual nature. In other words, poetry is inter­
pretative both by having natural magic in it, and by 
having moral profundity.
In this early essay in literary criticism, Arnold asserts
that the greatest poets achieve a balance of both "natural
magic" and "moral profundity," pointing to Aeschylus and
Shakespeare as examples.
Arnold's later definition of poetry as a "criticism 
of life" must be understood in the light of his earlier des­
cription of it as the interpreter of the essential human 
significance of the natural and the moral dimensions of 
experience. It should also be remembered that Arnold's 
phrase is more a statement of what poetry does than of what 
it — a definition of its function, not of its nature.
Further, as H. W. Garrod noted in his volume entitled Poetry 
and the Criticism of Life, we should consider that when Arnold 
so described poetry, he merely "gave paradoxical finish, and 
a too sharp expression, to what for five and twenty centuries 
had passed for a truism with poets and men of letters.
And, finally, let us not forget that Arnold qualified his 
definition of the function of poetry as a "criticism of life"
^^^Ibid., p. 33.
W. Garrod, "Poetry and the Criticism of Life" 
Poetry and the Criticism of Life (Cambridge : Harvard
University Press, 1931), p. 10.
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by immediately adding "under the conditions fixed for such a 
criticism by the laws of poetic truth and poetic beauty.
As John Holloway has insisted, his conception of nature and 
function of poetry is by no means so simple as we are prone 
to assume.
As Arnold grew older, he came to place more emphasis 
on the "high and excellent seriousness" of moral profundity 
in poetry and to subordinate natural magic to it.1^3 in the 
end, his notion of the most significant poetry seems to be 
closely related to his definition of religion as "morality 
touched with emotion." And here we are enables! to see how he 
could suppose that poetry might someday replace traditional 
religion, for his treatment of the Bible in his own naturalis­
tic and humanistic religious morality was a use of the Bible 
as the very greatest literature, as the most morally profound 
poetry. And other poetry of moral profoundity differs from 
the Bible not in kind but in degree. Even secular poetry, 
insofar as it is "morality touched with emotion," may fulfill 
the religious function of serving as a source of inspiration 
for righteousness. Someday, he perhaps envisioned, there may 
exist a body of such poetry, rivalling even the Bible as an
141^rnold, "The Study of Poetry," Essays in Criticism, 
Second Series, p. 5.
^42john Holloway, "Matthew Arnold and the Modern 
Dilemma," Essays in Criticism, I (January, 1951), 1-16.
l^^ibid., p. 33.
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an emotional inspiration toward religious morality for modern 
man. Such a body of poetry would no doubt be that literature 
of "imaginative reason" which he wrote about at the end of 
"pagan and Medieval Religious Sentiment" as the great need of 
the modern age. It would saitsfy the naturalistic orientation 
of the modern intellect as well as the emotional and moral 
needs of the human heart and imagination.
In concluding this section on Arnold's social criticism 
of the religious institution in Victorian England, we should 
note a special feature of the times that served to intensify 
his devotion to the cause of religion. It is treated in 
Chater X of Literature and Dogma— "Our 'Masses' and the Bible." 
There Arnold describes what he regards as a situation of crisis. 
"This is what everyone sees to constitute the special moral 
feature of our times ; the masses are losing the Bible and its 
religion."
From the great inspirer of more than three-fourths of 
human life the masses of our society seem now to be 
cutting themselves off. This promises, certainly, if 
it does not already constitute, a very unsettled condi­
tion of things. And the cause of it lies in the Bible 
being made to depend on a story, or set of asserted facts, 
which it is impossible to verify; and which hard-headed 
people, therefore, treat as either an imposture, or a 
fairy-tale that discredits all which is found in connection 
with it.144
In his religious writings, then, Arnold sought to avert a 
social crisis— the condition of moral chaos in society. Along 
with most Victorians, he regarded religion as the great moral
14^4^rnold, Literature and Dogma,, pp. 282483.
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stay of society. As Walter E. Houghton observed in The
Victorian Frame of Mind, the spread of atheism was a source
of anxiety to many Victorians:
The decline of Christianity and the prospect of atheism 
had social implications which now seem curious (though 
they may have more bearing on our contemporary situation 
that we suppose). It was then assumed, in spite of 
rationalist denials, that any collapse of faith would 
destroy the sanctions of morality; and morality gone, 
society would disintegrate.145
Seeing that supernaturalism must go, Arnold strove to 
restablish the Christian religion-upon a naturalistic founda­
tion, He stressed its natural moral truth and emphasized the 
earnest use of the Bible to reinforce morality through its 
psychological effect. And he insisted upon the establishment 
of the Church as a national institution of immense social 
significance. All this he did because he believed that 
religion was ultimately a profoundly civilizing and humanizing 
cultural influence. The function of religion, he believed, 
was to foster the moralization part of the whole process of 
humanization; and conduct, he said, was three-fourths of life. 
This he set as the end of religion; and as the means to this 
end, he recommended the public use of the Church and the pri­
vate use of the Bible to cultivate and enrich the moral dimen­
sion of human experience. This was Arnold's ultimate, general
^'^^Walter E. Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, 
1830-1870 (New Haven: Published for Wellesley College by
Yale University Press, 1957), p. 58.
204
and positive goal in dealing with religion. But his religious 
criticism was perhaps immediately precipitated and intensified 
by a zeal to avert the social chaos of moral license among 
the masses, who were losing the Bible, its religion, and conse­
quently their own morality. As Asa Briggs stated in The Age 
of Improvement, 1783-1867,. "The Religious Census of 1851 
demonstrated what Christians had long feared, that a large 
proportion of the population of England were neither Church 
people nor of any other religion.
In concluding this chapter of Arnold's "Image of 
Society," we may recount the chief points of his project as 
a social critic in Victorian England. As a humanist, his 
concern is centered in man. His goal is the humanization of 
man, the achievement of human excellence by the cultivation 
of man's "powers": his capacities for beauty, knowledge,
conduct, and social life— or, in other words, for ideas, 
manners, morals, and the arts. Such humanization is man's 
happiness. Civilization, then, is the organization of social 
institutions in order to provide a cultural environment that 
fosters the development of man's true humanity and that 
affords the resources for the exercise and expression of his 
human powers. A vision of this ideal society Arnold held as 
a criterion by which to evaluate the actual society of 
Victorian England. This criterion he consistently applied in
l^^Asa Briggs, The Age of Improvement, 1783-1867 
(New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1959), p. 465.
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all of his cultural criticism. Politics, education, religion, 
and even literature— all were evaluated in terms of this 
standard: the ideal society is that which fosters or affords
the opportunity for the development of ideal man. We build 
our cities and our cities build our youth. Alterations or 
transformations in the structures and functions of social 
institutions were recommended as the means to the end of better 
achieving the humanized man in a civilized society. This 
vision of an ideal society Arnold desired to actualize as the 
image of the real society.
CHAPTER IV
THE IMAGE OF MAN 
Arnold's conception of human nature is implied or 
assumed in most of his critical writings. Hence the foregoing 
discussions of his images of God, of nature, and of society 
have necessarily involved, at least indirectly, some considera­
tion of his image of man. Thus the background has been estab­
lished for a fuller and more explicit exposition of his concept 
of human nature. On the one hand, it is evident by now that 
the background upon which his image of man must be projected is 
naturalistic. And, on the other hand, it is by now also evident 
that the image itself is essentially humanistic.
In Chapter II, "The Images of God and of Nature," we 
examined Arnold's concept of nature in his early poems and 
his concept of God in his later essays; and our examination 
indicated that the two concepts were practically identical.
Thus God, in the generàl sense of "the stream of tendency by 
which all things fulfill the law of their being," is but a 
version of the Spinozist conception of the cosmic process in 
nature— the process whereby natural structures execute their 
natural functions. And God, in the specific sense of "the 
Eternal, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness," is
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but an aspect of nature as experienced from the perspective of 
the moral viewpoint. So God is nature. There is no supernat­
ural or transcendental dimension of being. "God," d-s an 
Arnoldian concept, is based upon naturalistic assumptions. It 
follows, then, that man is a creature of nature— unique and 
anomalous, indeed, but natural. We have observed how Arnold 
was even willing to grant the supposition of evolutionists that 
most of man's behavior patterns are ultimately traceable to 
his natural instincts for self-preservation and for reproduc­
tion. Also, the poem "In Utrumque Paratus," especially in its 
original ending, suggests an acceptance of evolutionary theory. 
Arnold's image of man, therefore, is thoroughly grounded in 
naturalistic assumptions.
And in Chapter III, "The Image of Society," our examina­
tion of Arnold's standard for evaluating social institutions 
indicated that his orientation was clearly based upon tradi­
tional humanistic assumptions. Society, with its cultural 
environment of social institutions, exists for the sake of man, 
not man for the sake of society. Man's aim is to achieve the 
ideal of excellence or perfection in the humanist sense of a 
general, internal, and harmonious development of his peculiarly 
human "powers." The ideal society is that which fosters the 
cultivation of ideal men. However, aside from a general notion 
of the ideal man as one who is cultivated in ideas, manners, 
and the arts, the precise content of Arnold's humanistic 
conception of the good man has not been explicitly explicated
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at length and in detail. To do so is the purpose of this 
chapter.
The Image of Man in Poetic arid in Secular Contexts
Although there is a fundamental consistency, I think, 
in the image of man that Arnold projected in all of his com­
positions, one may discern at least three distinct stages in 
its progressive development. First, in the poetry of the 
young man, there are the early intimations of his concept of 
human nature— intimations whose implications the older man
was to develop more fully in the later prose. Second, in the
prose essays devoted to secular matters in the 1860's, his 
image of man is projected at a more advanced stage in its
development. And, third, in the subsequent succession of the
essays devoted to religious subjects, Arnold set forth his 
concept of human nature in its final and most comprehensive 
form.
The Poetic Image: Man As He Is
In Chapter I, "Introduction," we suggested that at 
some time during his school years, either suddenly and 
dramatically or gradually and casually, young Matt Arnold 
shed his faith in the supernaturalistic assumptions of 
orthodox Christianity. Then in Chapter II, "The Images of 
God and of Nature," specifically in the section entitled 
"The Image of Nature in the Poems," we traced the efforts of 
the young poet to recreate for himself a naturalistic
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cosmology in his early poetry. This effort we examined at 
some length in the poem entitled "Empedocles on Etna." Of 
course, at the same time that young Arnold lost faith in the 
supernaturalistic cosmology of Christianity, he also ceased 
to accept the traditional image of man as the child of God, 
his Father in Heaven. Therefore, he was simultaneously 
searching in his early poetry both for a new image of nature 
and for a new image of man. Thus "Empedocles on Etna" reflects 
the effort to recreate an acceptable concept of man as well 
as the effort to recreate an acceptable concept of nature. 
Empedocles, who in several ways closely resembles Arnold, is 
trying to find and to assert himself— or, in Hindu terms, his 
"Self." Indeed, the search for the self is also the theme of 
a number of the "other poems" that appeared with the title 
poem in the volume entitled Empedocles on Etna and Other Poems 
(1852), including especially "Self-Dependence" and "The 
Buriedd Life."
In an age of intellectual contention, Empedocles became 
estranged from his real self, neglecting the true needs of his 
whole being. The over-expression of his intellectual life, with 
a consequent suppression of his emotional life, caused him to 
become an unintegrated personality, a fragmented human being.
The inhibition of his emotional and imaginative needs resulted 
in his inability to experience joy— the sign of wholeness. 
Identifying his own desire as that of every man, Empedocles 
says that we all wish to "be true/ To our own only true, deep- 
buried selves,/ Being one with which we are one with the whole
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world" (11,371-73). The loss of integrity or wholeness in 
the person inevitably and simultaneously causes the loss of 
a sense of community in his relation to society and the loss 
of a sense of unity in his relation to nature or God.
A variation on the theme of the search for the self is
expressed in the poem entitled "Self-Dependence." The poem
begins with this quatrain;
Weary of myself, and sick of asking 
What I am, and what I ought to be.
At this vessel's, prow I stand, which bears me 
Forwards, forwards, o'er the starlit sea.
Figuratively, of course, the vessel is the "ship of self,"
whose captain in this case is uncertain or undecided as to his
course and destination through the "sea of life." In the
course of the poem, the speaker hears two voices. One is from
the "star-sown vault of heaven." This voice from nature
suggests to him, so he imagines, that the serenity of the stars
is attributable to their self-sufficiency, to their being true
to their natures without reference to the remainder of
creation: they do not "pine with noting/ All the fever of
some differing soul." The second voice, from within his own
heart,expresses a like counsel: "'Resolve to be thyself: and
know, that he/ Who finds himself, loses his misery*'" Nature
has afforded images in which the speaker of the poem reads his
problem and its solution.
When one "finds" himself, as the speaker realizes in 
the poem, one experiences an access of self-knowledge. And
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to know the self, in this sense, is to know one's, own heart.
It involves a knowledge of the true needs of one's whole 
being. Happiness is to be achieved, if at all, not by ful­
filling the needs of another person or the goals that society 
proclaims as admirable, the speaker senses, but by satisfying 
the needs of one's own self. And to ^  one-self involves, 
first, a process of introspection to discover the nature of 
the real self and, second, an uninhibited expression of the 
whole being. This would be the solution, but the problem is 
not solved within the context of the poem. Yet the speaker 
achieves insight into his situation and at least resolves to 
be himself, realizing that if he can but "find" himself, then 
he shall lose his misery.
Paradoxically, a man ought to be what indeed he is; but 
the difficulty is really to know and truly to be the self.
This difficulty is dealt with in another poem, "The Buried 
Life". The poem is cast in the form of a dramatic monologue. 
However, although it is a "monologue," it is actually not very 
"dramatic." The situation is static. The speaker, a man, has 
been frustrated in his effort to communicate— intimately and 
authentically— with his beloved: each self assumes a mask,
concealing its actual identity from the other self. This 
situation serves as the occasion to stimulate certain reflec­
tions in the man— reflections which, though presumably spoken 
aloud in the presence of the beloved, seem to be addressed 
primarily to himself. After the scene is set and the situation
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revealed in the first twenty-nine lines of the poem, the speaker 
tells a fable to account for the difficulty of intimate commun­
ion and authentic action.
Fate, which foresaw 
How frivolous a baby man would be.
By what distractions he would be possess'd.
How he would pour himself in every strife.
And well-nigh change his own identity;
That it might keep from his capricious play 
His genuine self, and force him to obey.
Even in his own despite, his being's law.
Bade through the deep recesses of our breast 
The unregarded River of our life 
Pursue with indiscernible flow its way;
And that we should not see
The buried stream, and seem to be
Eddying about in blind uncertainty,
TThough driving on with it eternally.
Ultimately, so the fable suggests, the difficulty of communica­
tion in inter-personal relationships is attributable to the 
difficulty of intra-personal communication. Man is isolated 
from society because he is alienated from himself. It is 
almost impossible to reveal the real self to others because it 
is hidden even from the consciousness of the person himself.
Yet in certain respects this fabulous account is 
curiously inconsistent with the remainder of the poem. For 
the fable suggests that man actually conducts himself in 
accordance with his true nature, although unaware that he is 
doing so. He acts truly; but he does not reveal himself truly 
to others, simply because he does not know himself truly. How­
ever, elsewhere in the poem, the speaker definitely asserts 
that the actions of men usually do not reflect their true 
selves; "long we try in vain to speak and act/ Our hidden self.
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and what we say and do/ Is eloquent, is well— but "tis not 
true." And the reason given for this failure to communicate 
intimately and authentically is not self-ignorance but social 
inhibition: men do not reveal their real selves "for fear
that if reveal'd/ They would bÿ other men be met/ With 
blank indifference, or with blame reprov'dl* The conditions 
for interpersonal communion, then, must be the opposite of 
those in the noisy and indifferent world: alone, hand in
hand and face to face with a beloved one, the person may 
unveil himself. Strangely, it is under such circunstances—  
in the intimate and authentic revelation of himself to 
another— that the individual stands revealed to himself as 
well; "he knows/ The Hills where his life rose,/ And the 
sea where it goes."
The early intimations of Arnold's image of man, as 
revealed in these poems from Empedocles on Etna and Other 
Poems, insist on the dualistic nature of man, with his several 
"selves," Man has a "true" self, which consists of the real 
needs of his whole being; but this true self he conceals from 
society. The opposite of the true self is, of course, a 
"false" self. The false self is a fragmented or unintegrated 
version of the person's positive potentiality; it is merely 
a misrepresentation of the actual nature of the true self that 
is presented to the public. The true self is concealed and the 
false self is revealed either because the person himself is 
unconscious of the real needs of his whole being or because,
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even if conscious of his true self, he is unable to realize 
himself: he cannot actualize his potential. One reason why
he is unable to do so is the intellectual contention or 
"mental strife" of the age, as emphasized in "Empedocles on 
Etna" and again later in "The Scholar-gipsy." The image of 
man that Arnold projects in his poetry is that of a creature 
alienated from himself and, consequently isolated from the 
world, with no sense of community in his relation to society ■
and with no sense of unity in his relation to nature or God.
This, then, is Arnold's poetic image of man as he is— the false 
self that he reveals. But ideally man ought to be what 
potentially he is— the true self that he conceals.
As suggested earlier, "The Scholar Gipsy" (1853) 
expresses Arnold's commitment to the ideal that the title 
character symbolizes— the unified self, the integrated person­
ality, the way of wholeness. And the pastoral elegy entitled 
"Thyrsis" (1866) can be read, on the one hand, as a lament for
the fragmentation of one whose wholeness was lost in the
intellectual contention of the times (Arthur Hugh Clough) and, 
on the other hand, as the reaffirmation of Arnold's commitment 
to the quest for the ideal of human perfection, of what man 
ought to be. Finally, with the publication of Culture and 
Anarchy in 1869, it is clear that, at least from Arnold's point 
of view, the "spark from heaven" had fallen.
215
The Secular Vision: Man As He Ought To Be
Culture and Anarchy is, as its subtitle indicates. An 
Essay in Social and Political Criticism. The author, as a 
social critic, discusses a problem in Victorian society and 
then recommends a solution. The problem that he discusses 
is the threat of "anarchy," and the solution that he recommends 
is the pursuit of "culture."
Now, the cause of the problem of anarchy, according to 
Arnold, is that the general practice of his countrymen is to 
follow the bent of their "ordinary selves." Each man asserts 
his ordinary self. And the bent of the ordinary self is, on 
the one hand, "ordinary" and, on the other hand, "selfish."
The ordinary self is disposed to accept its inclinations with­
out questioning their worth and to put them into effect with 
energetic activity. The disposition of the ordinary self is 
thus to do what it desires without evaluating the worthiness 
of its goals. It acts, so to speak, without stopping to think, 
without critical reflection. The consequence is anarchy, or 
a kind of chaos, both in the life of the individual and in 
the society as a whole.
This disposition to uncritical activity in his country­
men Arnold attributes to the effect of their religious inherit­
ance, which he refers to as "Hebraism." The essential 
characteristic of Hebraism is "strictness of conscience," and 
its primary emphasis is upon conduct, behavior, action. At 
its best, the effect of Hebraism is to urge the individual to
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conduct himself in accordance with what he knows is right and 
good. However, the Hebraism of Arnold's countrymen is 
perverted, he argues, because it is not checked or balanced 
by what he refers to as "Hellenism." The essential character­
istic of Hellenism is "spontaneity of consciousness," and its 
primary emphasis is upon "sweetness and light," or "beauty and 
intelligence." Hebraism without Hellenism is truncated; it is 
reduced to energetic activity without an adequate awareness of 
good ends and right means. With its insistence upon spontane­
ity of consciousness, or intelligence and knowledge, Hellenism 
is the indispensable complement to the strictness of con­
science in Hebraism. Either alone is incomplete. Yet the 
English are currently deficient in Hellenism, Arnold announces, 
and the bent to enact the will of one's ordinary self threatens 
to ensue in personal and social anarchy.
The solution to the problem, so he recommends, is 
"culture." And culture is nearly, but not quite, identical 
with Hellenism. In itself, Hellenism is simply that spontaneity 
of consciousness which delights in beauty and intelligence 
for their own sake. But when Hellenism is united with Hebraism—  
when the demand of the conscience that one conduct himself in 
accordance with what he senses as right is united with the 
effort of consciousness to learn what is good— then the 
resulting union is "culture." Thus culture is spontaneity 
of consciousness devoted to the quest for a knowledge of goods 
ends and right means. It is the exercise of reason upon human
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activity, individual and social. The use of culture is intended 
to reduce the errors of anarchy by discovering generally accept­
able ideas of the true, the good, and the beautiful— in short, 
of perfection. And in order to do so effectively, it must be 
disinterested— concerned to discover not who is right but what 
is right.
Such "culture" is the essential instrument of the 
social critic, and Arnold tried to wield it in his criticism 
of society. But he also recommended that every man should use 
it. The solution to the problem of anarchy, he believed, was 
a wide-spread and general practice of culture by individuals; 
for social anarchy is ultimately the consequence of individual 
anarchy. And the anarchy of individualism, as we have seen, 
consists in everyone's asserting his ordinary self. Yet the 
self does not ordinarily pursue perfection; rather, it pursues 
its own narrowly interested activities.
But what happens when one endeavors to be disinterested 
and to exercise reason in directing his life? The effect, so 
Arnold insists, is to take him out of his ordinary self. He 
begins to criticize the ends to which the self is ordinarily 
devoted; he begins to perceive that they are not truly good 
and beautiful, that they do not constitute an adequate ideal 
of perfection. Arnold assumes that if his countrymen,indivi­
dually and collectively, will Sea: exercise their reason in this 
manner, then they will surely arrive at uniform notions on 
important matters, or at least they will be much more likely
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to do so than if they all follow their interested passions.
The impulses of interested passions are various and lead to 
anarchy. But reason'— if it is right reason— is authorita­
tively unifying. Relative to human nature, there are circum­
stances in the world that are bad and good and, among the 
good, the better and the best. Passion judges not; it accepts 
its impulse as a motive to action. But reason can discern, 
evaluate, and choose the right and the good.
After exercising his right reason upon the idea of 
human perfection, the individual will discover a more adequate 
conception of the ideal of the good man. Thus Hellenism or 
culture or right reason will refine and purify his knowledge 
of worthy ends. Then Hebraism, with its conscientious impetus 
to enact what it knows is best, will move the individual to 
realize his new vision of the ideal man: he will strive to
transform himself, to actualize insofar as possible his 
potential to become the ideal. In so striving, he will trans­
form his ordinary self and actualize the potential of his best 
self. The best self of the individual is the state nearest to 
perfection that he can achieve. It is the actualization of 
his potentiality to achieve an internal,general, and harmonious 
development of his human powers.
What precisely are the "powers" that constitute "the 
beauty and worth of human nature"? As we have had occasion to 
indicate before, the content of Arnold's concept of human 
perfection, of the fully humanized man, is succinctly summarized
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in the "Preface" to Mixed Essays (1879): "They are the power
of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of 
beauty, the power of social life and m a n n e r s . T h e s e  are the 
specific parts involved in a general whole that includes both 
Hebraism and Hellenism. Hebraism is to be identified with the 
cultivation of conduct, which is three-fourths of life; and 
Hellenism, the other one-fourth of life, is to be identified 
with the cultivation of social life, of beauty, and of intelli­
gence. That this is an adequate conception of human perfec­
tion, that it is an ideal image of the good man, the disinter­
ested exercise of right reason, so Arnold assumed, must 
readily concur. It is to this conclusion that culture— or 
Hellenism tempered with the moral motive of Hebraism— leads 
us. And Hebraism— tempered with the guiding wisdom of 
Hellenism— will then lead the individual to cultivate the 
development of his best self, rather than his ordinary self, 
by the active endeavor to realize this ideal in his own 
personality. It is to be noted that the spirit of culture, 
the intellectual quest for the best self, is itself incarnated 
in the ideal image of the good man; for the ideal man is one 
who cultivates his "power of intellect and knowledge." Right 
reason, which originated the concept of human perfection, is 
itself a power within the ideal that it envisions.
Finally, one of the correctives for social anarchy 
that Arnold recommends, it should be noted, is that the State
^Arnold, Mixed Essays, p. x.
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be so constituted as to represent the "best self of the 
nation." In the nation of England, as a republic with a 
monarchial figurehead, the political organization of the State 
consisted in its legislative representatives and administrative 
executives, the ministers of the crown. Arnold's recommenda­
tion amounts to a demand that voters elect (or that the crown 
appoint) only those from among them who are wise and good, 
those who have evidently realized their best selves to a cer­
tain extent, who exhibit indications of disinterested right 
reason in matters of state. It is in this manner that anarchy 
in high places may be lessened: by investing the state with
the best of their best selves— the philosopher-^statesmen.
In the "Conclusion" of Culture and Anarchy, Arnold
cites Socrates as a concrete image of the abstract ideal of
the Hellenized good man:
Socrates has drunk his hemlock and is dead; but in 
his own breast does not every man carry about with 
him a possible Socrates, in that power of a disinter­
ested play of consciousness upon his stock notions 
and habits, of which this wise and admirable man gave 
all through his lifetime the great example, and was 
the secret of his incomparable i n f l u e n c e ? ^
The Image of Man in Religious Context
On an otherwise blank page immediately preceding the 
"Introduction" to his book entitled Matthew Arnold, Hugh 
Kingsmill juxtaposed the last stanza from Arnold's poem 
"Dover Beach" (with its image of the world as a "darkling
^Super, V, 228-29.
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plain") and the sentence, "Jesus hits the plain natural truth 
that human life is a blessing and a benefit . . . from his 
essays on religion. The implicit significance of the juxtaposi­
tion is explicitly indicated in the "Introduction" itself:
"The theme of this book is the collapse of a poet into a 
prophet."3 The purpose of the juxaposition was to emphasize 
the contrast between the early poetic Arnold and the later 
prosaic Arnold. It also suggests an inconsistency in the 
visions of the earlier and later Arnolds.
The change in Arnold's communicative mode from poetry 
to prose is a salient fact in his career; but to characterize 
the change as a "collapse" is to misapprehend the complexity 
of Arnold's life as a man of letters. For as Arnold's imagina­
tive vision broadened and deepened, as he began to perceive 
tentative answers to the great questions of his age, and as 
his personal and social purposes became more settled and clear 
to him, he naturally adopted the communicative mode that seemed 
most effective for his needs. He himself thought that he 
had done some of his best writing in his religious essays; and 
once he even expressed the hope that he would be most remem­
bered for them. As to the suggested inconsistency between the 
early secular poet and the later religious essayist, the real 
significance of Kingsmill's juxtapoâfcfcion is that, in Arnold's 
vision, human life a "darkling plain" unless one practices 
at least the equivalent of a religious morality.
o
Hugh Kingsmill, "Introduction," Matthew Arnold 
(London: Henrietta Street, 1931), p. xii.
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Nearly all of Arnold's later prose works are concerned, 
directly or i n d i r e c t l y , ..with an image of man as he ought to be. 
They are concerned with fostering the actualization of a 
humanistic vision of the ideal man. And the good man is, as 
Arnold conceived him, one who cultivates his capacities for 
intelligence, beauty, social life, and conduct. Thus Arnold's 
various writings are devoted to cultivating the development 
of these powers in his countrymen. But the most considerable 
of these powers, that which perhaps constitutes even so much 
as three-fourths of life, is the power of conduct. Therefore, 
it is natural that, holding morality in such high estimation, 
he should have written much to enhance this power for conduct 
in his countrymen.
Actually Arnold's four books on religion are more 
properly essays in morality; however, they are concerned not 
with a simple secular ethics but with a truly religious 
morality. In devoting so much of his writing to the matter 
of conduct, he developed a more complete and complex understand­
ing of this dimension of human nature than of any other in his 
image of man. Yet this stage in the development of his compre­
hensive conception of human nature is also distinguished by 
the persistence of his doctrine of the two selves in man. His 
treatment of the moral dimension of human experience may best 
be understood by examing what he himself emphasized as the 
most important contributions of the Christian religion to the 
conduct of men— the "method of Jesus" and the "secret of Jesus."
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The Method of Jesus
In Literature and Dogma, Arnold acknowledged the 
influence of Bishop Butler's approach in his own religious 
thought: "From Butler, and from his treatment of nature in
connection with religion, the idea of following out that 
treatment frankly and fully . . . came to us . . . .
William Blackburn has studied the nature of Butler's influence 
on Arnold. What Arnold admired in the Bishop, Blackburn 
concludes, was not his knowledge of human nature and religion 
but the soundness of his approach to the understanding of such 
matters. For Butler's approach was essentially naturalistic, 
and this accorded well with Arnold's consistent emphasis on 
the "natural truth of Christianity" and its experiential 
validity in human life. But in carrying out his naturalistic 
approach. Bishop Butler had arrived at an almost mechanistic 
conception of man. Even in his early poetry, Arnold had 
repudiated the rationalistic faculty psychology of the Bishop 
in his sonnet entitled "Written in Butler's Sermons." And 
much later in the essay entitled "Bishop Butler and the 
Zeit-Geist," published in Last Essays on Church and Religion, 
Arnold asserted that the spirit of the times had rejected 
Butler's view of human nature but accepted his naturalistic 
assumptions. Bishop Butler's enduring value, he insists,
^Arnold, Literature and Dogma, p. iv.
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abides in his experiential approach to religion, in his 
treating it thus with intellectual seriousness.^
This insistence on an experiential perspective in 
ethical matters Arnold also admired in St. Paul. All morality, 
Arnold believed, has its origin in our experience of two 
selves— the moral self and the immoral or amoral self. In 
a passage from the "Preface" of Last Essays on Church and 
Religion, he describes this experience of the two selves in 
human nature.
It will generally be admitted . . . that all experience 
as to conduct brings us at last to the fact of two selves, 
or instincts, or forces,— name them how we will, and 
however we may suppose them to have arisen,— contending 
for the mastery in man: one, a movement of first impulse
and more involuntary, leading us to gratify any inclina­
tion that may solicit us, and called generally a move­
ment of man's ordinary or passing self, of sense, 
appetite, desire; the other, a movement of reflection 
and more voluntary, leading us to submit inclination to 
some rule, and called generally a movement of man's higher 
or enduring self, of reason, spirit, will. The thing is 
described in different words by different nations and 
men relating their experience of it, but as to the thing 
itself they all, or all the most serious and important 
among them, a g r e e . 6
Of course, in our post-Freudian world, we describe this
experience in terms of the conflict between the and the
superego— the primitive biological drives of the person as
opposed to his culturally conditioned "conscience," with its
social inhibitions and prohibitions concerning the good and
the bad, the right and the wrong.
^William Blackburn, "Bishop Butler and the Design of 
Literature and Dogma," Modern Language Quarterly, IX (June, 
1948^, 199-207.
^Arnold, "Preface," ILast Essays on Church and Religion,
p. 166
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But this identification of the "selves" as Arnold 
conceived them is not so easy and simple as it seems. In 
general, the doctrine of the two. selves here set forth in 
a religious context corresponds to the dualism of the "ordin­
ary self" and the "best self" explained in Culture and 
Anarchy. However, the concept of the "best self" has been 
extended and enlarged to that of the "higher self." In 
Culture and Anarchy, the "best self" was associated with 
Hellenism, the element of right reason. In the "Preface" to 
Last Essays on Church and Religion, the "higher self" seems 
closely associated with the conscience, the element of 
Hebraism. Yet, even in Culture and Anarchy, the best self 
functioned somewhat as a conscience, opposing the passionate 
impulses of the ordinary self. And, on the other hand, the 
higher self is represented as much more than a limited set 
of inhibitions and prohibitions: it functions as "a movement
of reflection and . . . reason . . . ."^ It is clear, then, 
that the "higher self" cannot be strictly identified with the 
superego. Nor can the "best self" be strictly identified with 
the ego of Freudian psychology— the reality-oriented rational 
consciousness. Rather, both the best self and the higher self 
are obviously closely related. In the terms of modern depth 
psychology, they refer to a psychological process that involves 
both the superego and the ego; and in Arnold's terms, this
^Ibid., p. 166.
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psychic process represents a synthesis of Hebraism and 
Hellenism: in other words, it is "culture" at work in another
context. The "higher’’self" is the "cultured self," using both 
its power of intelligence and its power of conduct— "spon­
taneity of consciousness" and "strictness of conscience."
Our understanding of Arnold's concept of the higher 
self may perhaps be enhanced by recalling our discussion of 
"Empedocles on Etna," In discussing the poem, we had occasion 
to refer to the Hindu doctrine of the Self, as opposed to the 
self, with which Arnold was acquainted from his reading of the 
Bhagavad Gita. Indian religious philosophy distinguishes bet­
ween the lower self, or jiva, which is attached to an 
individual body, and the higher Self, or Atman, which seeks to 
unite with Brahman, the universal spirit.^ This is not to 
suggest that Arnold adopted the Hindu conceptions, for the 
dualism was available to him through his own Christian tradi­
tion in the Pauline distinction between the "flesh" and the 
"spirit," warring against each other in human nature. Rather, 
Arnold probably found in the Indian doctrine an additional 
confirmation of the universal moral experience of the two 
selves within man.
Of course, there are not really two selves inside man. 
The term "self," used in this- sense, is to be u%#@g@tood not 
literally but figuratively. Experientially, it is ae there
^Troy Wilson Organ, The Self in Indian Philosophy 
(London: Mouton and Company, 1964), p. 46.
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were two persons within the one body— a holy spirit and an 
evil spirit— each seeking dominion. Perhaps the words of 
St. Paul, which Arnold quoted on more than one occasion, des­
cribe the experience of conflict between the flesh and the 
spirit in a manner that is more readily apprehensible to our 
occidental modes of perception; "For I delight in the law 
of God after the inward man: But I see another law in my
members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing 
me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members" 
(Romans 7:22-23). The conflict is here represented as one 
between the "law" of the mind and the "law" of the members—  
the body as conceived apart from the mind. In other words, 
the conflict, even as experienced through the linguistic forms 
of primitive Christian culture, is between the insistent 
pressure of the physiological drives in the biological organism 
and a restrictive influence recognized as having its source 
and origin in the "mind." However, for Paul, who was both 
Hebraized and Hellenized, the mind was the rational soul, the 
Greek psyche, which participated in the nature of the universal 
logos, the spirit of God. But, for the humanistically 
oriented Arnold, the mind— as the source of the best or 
higher self— is an organic and self-sufficient process. Never­
theless, the experiential effect is much the same. One is 
conscious of a conflict between, on the one hand, the impulses 
of the flesh, the passions, the id, or the lower self and, on 
the other hand, the evaluative response of the spirit, the 
reason, the ego-superego, or the higher self.
228
One of the great effect of Jesus' teachings, Arnold 
declared in Literature and Dogma, was to restore emphasis on 
this source of moral wisdom within and to recommend a pro­
cedure for drawing upon it— the method of Jesus:
Christ's "method" directed the disciple's eye inward, and 
set his consciousness to work; and the first thing his 
consciousness told him was, that he had two selves pull­
ing different ways. Till we attend, till the method is 
set at work, it seems as if "the wishes of the flesh 
and of the current thoughts" were to be followed as a 
matter of course; as if an impulse to do a thing must 
mean that we should do it. But when we attend, we find 
that an impulse to do a thing is really in itself no 
reason at all why we should do it; because impulses 
proceed from two sources, quite different, and of quite 
different degrees of authority . . . .  And the moment we 
seriously attend to conscience,to the suggestions which 
concern practice and conduct, we can see plainly enough 
from which source a suggestion comes, and that the 
suggestions from one source are to overrule those from 
the other.9
The purpose of the "method" is to enable the person to learn, 
in a particular situation, what would be the right and good 
course of conduct to pursue. The method amounts to a process 
of stopping and thinking before acting. It is a process of 
meditation in which one consults both his rational "conscious­
ness" and his moral "conscience"— the Hellenistic and 
Hebraistic elements in his personality. It is the habit of 
counting to ten, as it were, before the pitch of passion 
quite overwhelms one— of having second thoughts and reflecting 
on what is best for the whole man as a member of the social 
community, not immediately implementing the irrational impulse
^Arnold, Literature and Dogma, p. 182-83.
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of an unintegrated physiological drive in a burst of anger, 
fear, or lust. This method, it should now be clear, is perhaps 
as much that of Matthew Arnold as of Jesus Christ.
Arnold was also wise not to identify the higher self
strictly with the "conscience," in the narrow sense of what
we now know as the superego. Rather, his concept of the
higher self also comprehends the rational "consciousness"
of the ego. In this respect, his ideas are in accord with
those of the modern depth-psychologist, Erich Fromm. In his
book entitled Man For Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology
of Ethics, Fromm distinguished between what he designates as
the "authoritarian conscience" and the "humanistic conscience."
"The authoritarian conscience is the voice of an internalized
external authority, the parents, the state, or whoever the
authorities in a culture happen to be.
The most important point . . .  is the fact that the 
prescriptions of authoritarian conscience are not 
determined by one's own value judgment but exclusively 
by the fact that its commands and tabus are pronounced 
by authorities. If these norms happen to be good, 
conscience will guide man's action in the direction 
of the good . . . .If they are bad, they are just as 
much a part of conscience.il
Arnold, like Fromm, was aware that conscience is culturally
conditioned. In a passage defending the wisdom of the
Protestants in breaking with the authoritarian structure of
l^Erich Fromm, Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the
Psychology of Ethics (Premier edition; Greenwich, Connecticut: 
Fawcett Publications Inc., 1965), p. 148.
l^Jbid., p. 149.
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of Roman Catholicism,- he wrote: "The true force of Protes­
tantism was its signal to return to the individual conscience,—  
to the method of Jesus. But a man's conscience does not 
necessarily tell him right on all points all at once . . . .
The demands of the superego can be as irrational as the 
impulses of the id. Therefore, the rational consciousness 
must supplement the conscience: the «ego must complement, and
even correct, the superego. And this is precisely the point 
that Fromm makes in his discussion of the "humanistic con­
science." For the humanistic conscience is not the "voice of 
an internalized external authority" but the "voice of our 
true selves which summons us back to ourselves, to live pro­
ductively, to develop fully and harmoniously— that is, ^
1 O
become what we potentially are." Here the "humanistic 
conscience" seems to be operating much as the "right reason" 
of the best self in Culture and Anarchy, enunciating an inward, 
general, and harmonious ideal of perfection for the ordinary 
self to actualize. Arnold's doctrine of the best or higher 
self, like Fromm's conception of the humanistic conscience, 
unites the motive of goodness with the guidance of wisdom. And 
goodness and wisdom (with beauty) are, of course, the sweetness 
and light of culture.
l^Arnold, "Preface," God and the Bible, p. xxviii.
^^Fromm, Man For Himself, p. 163.
231
The Secret of Jesus
Thus after putting him by his method in the way to 
find what doing righteousness was, by his secret Jesus 
put the disciple in the way of doing it. For the break­
ing the sway of what is commonly called one's self, 
ceasing our concern with it and leaving it to perish, 
is not, Jesus said, being thwarted or crossed, but
living.14
The "method of Jesus," as Arnold understood it, enables one 
to learn what is the true, beautiful, and good thing to do.
This process of consulting the "humanistic conscience" is 
superior to other ethical systems, in Arnold's view, because 
it emphasized the spirit of wisdom and goodness rather than 
the letter of the law. In any situation, the use of the method 
is designed to afford one access to his best understanding 
of the good end and of the right means. In its way, 
the method of conscience is a version of "situation ethics,"
But it is in no sense an éndorsement of moral relativity, for 
it is based on principles that, if not absolute, are at least 
imperative; and the application of its principles to specific 
situations is governed by rules that, if not dogmatic, are 
nevertheless general— not to be broken, unless, in an excep­
tional circumstance, the principles could be better served by 
other means. It is interesting in this regard to note a 
statement by Arnold in his essay entitled "Count Leo Tolstoi," 
included in Essays in Criticism, Second Series. Commenting 
on Tolstoi's reduction of Christ's sermon on the mount to five
l^Arnold, Literature and Dogma, p. 184.
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absolute commandments, he offers a critical reservation;
"Christianity cannot be packed into any set of commandments."^^
Rather, it is a source or temper, he says, not a system.
And the reason mainly lies in the character of the 
Founder of Christianity and in the nature of his 
utterances. Not less important than the teachings given 
by Jesus is the temper of their giver, his temper of 
sweetness and reasonableness, of epieikeia.
But knowing what is best, hard as it may be to learn,
is yet only half, and that the easier half, of exercising
one's power o£ conduct aright. There still remains the matter
of bringing oneself to act in accordance with what one knows.
And the great superiority of a religion over an ethical system,
and of the Christian religion over other religions, is in the
aid that it affords to the moral life. The function of
religion, we remember, is to motivate morality by affording
emotional inspiration. The use of the Bible, as religious
poetry, is one means of attaching emotional associations to
matters of conduct. But the greatest aid to the moral life
is, so Arnold believed, the emotional motivation afforded by
the "secret of Jesus," which complements the "method of Jesus,"
In St. Paul and Protestantism, Arnold declares that
the secret of Jesus (although he had not so labeled it then)
was the essential doctrine of Paul, his central teaching:
This is Paul's conception of Christ's sacrifice. His 
figures of ransom, redemption, propitiation, blood,
^^Arnold, "Count Leo Tolstoi," Essays of Criticism,
Second Series, p. 295.
IGlbid., p. 296.
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offering, all subordinate themselves to his central idea 
of identification with Christ through dying with him, and 
are strictly subservient to it.l7
The italicized phrase refers to the "secret of Jésus" that
modern man may also use. Arnold describes the secret at
greater length in another passage;
If any man be in Christ, said Paul— that is, if any man 
identifies himself with Christ by attachment so that he 
enters irfcbo his feelings and lives with his life,— he is 
a new creature; he can do, and does,what Christ did.
First, he suffers with him. Christ throughout his life 
and in his death presented his body a living sacrifice 
to God; every self-willed impulse blindly trying to 
assert itself without respect of the universal order, 
he dies t o . 18
As Arnold interprets Paul, Jesus' secret was, in effect, to 
associate the two selves— the lower and the higher— with two 
ways of life: the way of "death" or spiritual atrophy and
the way of "life" abundant. In committing himself to the way 
of life and to the higher self as "the real law of his being," 
Jesus symbolically put to death his lower self and, in every 
situation of moral decision, reaffirmed the sacrifice.19 In 
the conflict between the flesh (which leads to "death") and 
the spirit (which leads to "life"), we must identify with 
Jesus and commit ourselves to the side of the higher self and 
of life. "The motions of sin in ourselves we succeed in 
mortifying [putting to death], not by saying to ourselves that
l^Arnold, St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 95.
IBlbid., p. 64.
l^Arnold, Literature and Dogma, p. 185.
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they are sinful, but by sympathy with Christ in his mortifica­
tion of t h e m .  "20 of course, at this point we. are very close 
either to Medieval asceticism or to Victorian prudery— the 
denial of the flesh. As a man of his time, Arnold was prudish 
in his way, denouncing the excesses of French "lubricity" and 
praising the virtue of purity, although he enlarged the con­
cept to include the whole of conduct, not the sexual drive 
alone. But he was not ascetic, for more than once he criticized 
the practices of the Medieval ascetics as perversions of 
Christian morality. Ultimately he was concerned to control the 
expression of the physiological drives, not to extinguish them 
entirely. The lower self is not literally but figuratively 
put- -to death: it is to be subordinated to the discipline of
the higher self. This is but to say that the ego and the 
superego must direct the expression of the id with goodness and 
wisdom for the sake of the whole person as a member of the 
social community.
It is interesting to consider Arnold's doctrine of 
identification with Christ in the light of modern depth 
psychology. Indeed, the word "identification" is now used as 
a technical term to designate a particular psychological 
process, and its present use is quite close to the sense in 
which Arnold used the word. It refers to the psychological 
process whereby one person so admires another individual that
2®Arnold, St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 67.
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he tends to assume his attitudes and traits: the person
begins to imitate and to act as if he were the individual and 
thus, in the process, to condition his character accordingly.
To the person, the individual with whom identification is 
made represents the sum of desirable manhood. In psychological 
terms, he is referred to as the "guiding fiction" or the 
"ego-ideal."
One psychologist, Ernest M. Ligon, has discussed the 
use and effect of psychological identification with Jesus in 
the formation of character. In his book. Dr. Ligon presumes 
neither to question nor to affirm the ultimate validity of 
Christian doctrines; rather, he is primarily interested in 
their effect on the personality when an individual assumes 
that they are true and commits himself seriously to the task' ' 
of living in accordance with them. As a psychologist 
interested in the conditioning of character, he asserts: "It
is not intellectual assent to a code of ethics that constitutes 
character education. It is the transformation of the emotional 
attitudes so that the natural reaction of the individual is 
in conformity with the code of e t h i c s . "^1 And the most effective 
means of conditioning traits and attitudes is, he thinks, the 
psychological process of identification. But the choice of 
the "ego-ideal" must be carefully made, for the ideal with
^^Ernest M. Ligon, The Psychology of Christian 
Personality (Macmillan Paperbacks edition; New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 344.
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which the ego-consciousness chooses to identify may not be an
adequate example of good character. From the perspective of
psychology, the ego-ideal should be a maturely integrated
personality, an example of psychological wholeness. And, in
Dr. Ligon's estimation, the ethical character of Jesus is an
excellent ego-ideal to use in conditioning the character of
children. To integrate the personality around the social
values that Jesus taught will surely result in the healthy
self-control and the happy interpersonal relationships of a
mature character. Not only must the ego-ideal be carefully
chosen; the desirable ego-ideal must be presented effectively:
If we are to bring up children to identify themselves 
with Jesus . . . w e  must cause them to admire and love 
him. To make him the personification of a set of very 
disagreeable rules of conduct will leave them perfectly 
indifferent, and Jesus will become for them like the 
model boy next door whom they despise but do not
emulate.22
Dr. Ligon is less optimistic about transforming the 
character of adults, for the transformation of adults involves 
not a simple process of conditioning but a more complex pro­
cess of reconditioning. Nevertheless, if the personality of 
adults is to be transformed or even altered, their adoption 
of an ego-ideal will be the best means of fostering the change. 
Thus "adults are also changed by the process of identifica-:- .i 
t i o n . " 2 3  To this extent, then, the soundness of Arnold's
^^Ibid., p. 363.
23Ibid., p. 367.
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insight in fixing upon the "secret of Jesus" as central in 
the religious morality of Christianity is corroborated by a 
modern depth psychologist.
In concluding Culture and Anarchy, Arnold pointed to
the figure of Socrates as an ideal of the "best self" in
action. In St. Paul and Protestantism, he pointed to the
figure of Jesus as the ideal image of the "higher self."
Socrates inspired boundless friendship and esteem; but 
the inspiration of reason and cGonscience is the one 
inspiration which comes from him and which impels us to 
live righteously as he did. A penetrating enthusiasm 
of love, sympathy, pity, adoration, reinforcing the 
inspiration of reason and duty does not belong to 
Socrates. W i t h  Jesus i t  is d i f f e r e n t . 24
The difference between the two is that Socrates represents a
rational secular ethics and that Jesus represents a religious
morality— that is, morality touched with emotion— which may
afford greater inspiration and motivation for ethical conduct.
In a way, what Arnold recommended was, on the one hand, the
use of the Socratic "method" in a dialogue between the selves
within one in order to learn what is best and, on the other
hand, the use of the process of psychological identification
with Jesus in order to motivate one to do what he has learned
is best.
The ideal image of the good man that emerges from 
Arnold's critical writings is complex. Human nature is 
represented as involving two "selves"— a positive self and a
^^Arnold, St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 66.
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and a negative self. When man chooses to heed the intima­
tions of his positive self, then he is led to actualize his 
human potential— his powers of intelligence, beauty, social 
life, and conduct. But if he elects not to oppose his 
negative self, then he will remain a mere fragment, never 
realizing the complete humanity of his positive self— "the 
real law of his being."
Arnold’s conception of human nature, his ideal image 
of the good man, has occasionally been criticized as too 
eudaemonistic and ego-centic, which is another way of charg­
ing that he held a humanistic rather than a supernaturalistic 
ideal of human perfection. The orthodox objection to the 
humanistic position consists in a rejection of the humanist's 
faith in human nature, of his assumption that man has either
the power to envision an adequate ideal of perfection or the
25resources within himse&f to actualize it.
Arnold's reply to this criticism would probably be 
that his ideal is not self-centered, but "Self-centered.
Never did he suggest that man should affirm and fulfill his 
ordinary or lower self. Rather, even against his will, for 
the sake of his own integrity and for the sake of unity in 
the human community, man is called to a way of life that 
requires him to discipline himself. It is true that although
^^This objection of orthodox Christianity to tradi­
tional humanism is given expression, for example, by A. Dwight 
Culler in The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Newman's
Educational Ideal (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1955), 
pp. 234-8.
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it conflicts with the impulses of his lower self, the call 
to this vision of a different way of life also come from 
within man rather than from a supernatural dimension of being 
beyond human knowledge and, to that extent, is an affirmation 
of man's self— but of his higher Self. And, as a naturalist, 
Arnold would no doubt comment that, after all, even the 
traditional orthodox religious visions of the human ideal 
have the same source as that of the humanist ideal— the crea­
tive imagination in men of genius.
As to the difficulty of living up to the ideal, Arnold 
had no illusions. Unlike secular rational humanists, he did 
not assume that reason alone could control passion. As a more 
eclectic humanist, hé was himself drawn to use and to recom­
mend the ritual practice of religious meditation and 
psychological identification as aids to sustain the moral 
life. Evolved over a long period after much trial and error, 
the techniques of the religious life were, he recognized, 
grounded ultimately in sound psychological principles. They 
had "natural truth" in them, although orthodox Christianity 
gave them supernaturalistic explanations. To Arnold, they 
were effective techniques for drawing upon otherwise untapped 
resources of human nature in the psychic depths. And so he 
used some of the same religious techniques in pursuit of 
his humanist ideal as orthodox Christians used in striving 
to live the Christian life.
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As an eclectic humanist, Arnold assimilated much of 
the Christian ideal of moral perfection within the larger con­
text of his ideal of human wholeness— intellectual, esthetic, 
and social, as well as moral. Besides the Christian virtue 
of goodness, his image of man as he ought to be also included 
the more Hellenistic virtues of truth and beauty.
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
The thesis announced in the "Introduction" to this 
dissertation is that the works of Matthew Arnold express and 
create an imaginative vision of the human condition, natura­
listic humanism, which assumed certain religio-mythic functions, 
Arnold was led to create his religio-mythic imaginative 
vision in order to resolve for himself the great questions of 
human existence— those concerning the nature, purpose, and 
relations of God, of nature, of society, and of man. His 
works express a vision that proposes a modern resolution for 
the anxiety implicit in the human condition: our conscious
involvement in the mortal situation of peculiar creatures in 
a strange universe. After this initial enunciation of the 
thesis, most of the "Introduction" was devoted, first, to a 
discussion of Arnold's awareness that the original basis of 
the traditional Victorian cultural ideology, supernaturalistic 
Christianity, was inevitably disintegrating and, second, to a 
discussion of his conscious intention to foster the accept­
ance of naturalistic humanism as the new basis for the cul­
tural ideology and to use its resources to fulfill the 
religio-mythic needs previously satisfied by a religious 
mythology.
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The three chapters that constitute the body of the 
dissertation, then, were devoted to a topical analysis of 
Arnold's concepts of God, nature, society, and man, designed 
to reveal the naturalistic assumptions and humanistic princi­
ples that pervade, determine, and inform them. Now, having 
examined at length and in detail the conceptual content in 
the focal images of Arnold's imaginative vision, we are in a 
position to elaborate on the religio-mythic effect of his 
naturalistic humanism.
The statement that Arnold's imaginative vision has a 
religious functbn is not so surprising, of course, when we 
recall the circumstances of its origin. It was originally 
created to fill the vacuum of a disintegrating religious 
faith. Arnold's imaginative vision of naturalistic humanism 
is greatly different from the religious mythology of supernat- 
uralistic Christianity, yet both may be apprehended as 
ministering to certain religious needs. Only one has tradi­
tionally been cast in the mode of myth proper, yet both share 
the religio-mythic function: to resolve the anxiety implicit
in the human condition (our conscious involvement in the mortal 
situation of peculiar creatures in a strange universe); to 
answer the great questions of human existence by providing 
satisfactory images of God, nature, society, and man; and to 
supply the sanctions for social institutions and for a cultural 
life-style.
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The purpose of this concluding chapter, then, is to 
elucidate the sense in which Matthew Arnold's naturalistic 
humanism qualifies as a religious vision; to illuminate 
further how even in the nineteenth century his imaginative 
vision assumed certain of the religio-mythic functions 
previously fulfilled by the religious mythology o£-supernatura- 
listic Christianity; to indicate to what extent Arnold anti­
cipated and perhaps even partly inspired the contemporary 
movement of naturalistic humanism; and to suggest the continu­
ing relevance and significance of Arnold's imaginative vision 
insofar as it is related to a small but impressive group of 
modern religious thinkers. In order to accomplish these 
aims, it is necessary, first, to discuss as briefly as possible 
the complex nature and function of religion and, second, to 
examine at greater length the religious position in the 
contemporary movement of naturalistic humanism (especially 
as it is articulated in certain writings of John Herman 
Randall, Jr.), relating and comparing it then to Arnold's 
imaginative vision.
The Nature and Function ef Supernatural Religion
The institution of religion, like all social institu­
tions, has experienced many changes, both in its nature and 
in its function, during the course of its development from 
primitive societies to sophisticated civilizations. Yet it 
has also retained a certain persistence of purpose and 
consistency of effect.
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Most anthropologists and social scientists agree that
religion had its roots in primitive man's, practice of magic.
Primitive religion evolved from early magical practices. But
there is a distinct difference between magic and religion.
According to one view, the practice of magic is associated
with animatism, a primitive structure of belief that is to be
distinguished from the later development of animism. The
structure of beliefs in animatism is the natural consequence
of normal imaginative processes operating in the primitive
mind. As Clyde Kluckhohn suggests.
The mere recurrence of certain motifs in varied areas 
separated geographically and historically tells us 
something about the human psyche. It suggests that 
the interaction of a certain kind of biological apparatus 
in a certain kind of physical world with some inevitables 
of the human condition (the helplessness of infants, two 
parents of different sex, etc.) bring about some regu­
larities in the formation of imaginative productions, 
of powerful images.1
The relative uniformity of the human psyche and of the
environmental and organic conditions for human life have
almost inevitably and universally resulted in early animatis-
tic beliefs, with slight cultural variations, as man evolved
his hyper-consciousness and consequently emerged from his
animal ancestry. The imaginative effect of animatism, as a
primitive belief, is to invest the world of nature with a
source of supernatural but impersonal power. The existence
of this supernatural power, which anthropologists now call
^Clyde Kluckhohn, "Recurrent Themes in Myths and 
Mythmaking," Daedalus, LXXX (Spring, 1959), 270-71.
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mana, explained for primitive man the motive and process of 
extraordinary phenomena. All such manifestations of power 
in nature— the force of the wind, the motion of water, the 
animation of creatures, the great strength of certain men—  
were ascribed to concentrations of this supernatural but 
impersonal power. Thus mana was regarded as the cause of 
these effects.2
Against the background of this animatistic world-view, 
the emergence of magical practices may be understood; for the 
techniques of magic were evolved as a means whereby primitive 
man could relate himself to his animatistic universe and 
exert (so he believed) a certain measure of human control 
over the expression of the mysterious power of mana. The aim 
of magic, of course, was to use the power of mana for the 
benefit of the individual or society by exercising influence 
over nature and against enemies. In accordance with the 
psychology of the primitive mind, the basis of magic was the 
holophrastic principle that the part represents the whole and
2Convenient summaries of anthropological conclusions 
about primitive magic and religion are presented by Ralph L. 
Beals and Harry Hoijer in "Religion," An Introduction to 
Anthropology (second edition; New York: Macmillan Co., 1959),
pp. 527-563, and by Samuel Koenig in "Religious Institutions," 
Sociology: An Introduction to the Science of Society
(New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1957), pp. 107-128.
One of the most comprehensive and authoritative treatments 
is that by George B. Vetter in Magic and Religion: Their
Psychological Nature, Origin, and Function (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1958), to which this entire discussion 
is indebted.
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and the sympathetic principle that like produces like. Ritual 
procedures— verbal formulas and action sequences— were used 
practically to implement and specifically to apply these 
general principles of magic. Thus, for example, the name of 
a person (or a hair from his head) was regarded as in some 
sense representing his essence, so that the manipulation of 
the name by words (or of the hair by actions) resulted in a 
corresponding effect upon the person— friend or enemy. To the 
primitive mind, magical practices were simply the use of cer­
tain mechanical means intended to achieve certain "natural" 
effects as their inevitable end. If the ritual procedure 
were precise, both in word and in act, then the expected 
consequence was assumed to be almost automatic: mana would
deliver. Magic was thus a means of coercing the expression 
and manifestations of mana for human purposes. The intricacy 
of magical practices, which had to be precisely performed in 
order to secure results, fostered the development of the social 
role of magician, a specialist in such matters. The failure 
of a magical procedure could be easily rationalized, and such 
rationalizations were readily accepted. However, because of 
the psycho-somatic unity of human nature, the magician 
(shaman, witch-doctor, or medicine-man) often achieved a high 
degree of success. Easily inducing a receptive faith, antici­
pation, and suggestibility in the primitive minds of his 
patients and customers by his impressive ritual procedures,
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the magician could often generate desired effects in their 
bodies, much as a modern hypnotist may do.^
Religious Mythology
The step from magic to religion was made with the 
advance from animatism to animism, which represents another 
stage in the mental history of mankind. Animism differs 
from animatism in that the concept of the supernatural is 
literally transmogrified. The supernatural dimension of 
existence is conceived not in terms of a mysterious impersonal 
force, mana, but in terms of certain mysterious personal 
powers— spirits. The psychological process which results in 
the personification of natural phenomena is that of anthropo­
morphic projection: the interpretation of the natural in
terms of the human. At a certain stage in the mental history
of mankind, apparently, the most plausible explanation of 
the world was that it is animated by superhuman persons with 
supernatural powers. Animism is tenacious. It is perhaps 
the most "natural" way for the human imagination to apprehend 
its universe and to account for its operation. Animistic
beliefs have determined the world-views of the masses from
prehistoric primitivism to twentieth-century Fundamentalism. 
Animism began to disintegrate only after the general cultiva­
tion of the analytical processes of the rational intellect
3gee Dr. Bernard C. Gindes, "Mechanisms of Hypnosis," 
New Concepts of Hypnosis (Hollywood, California: Wilshire Book
Comapny, 1964), pp. 59-79.
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in the modern period started to challenge the analogical pro­
cesses of the intuitive imagination.
The mysterious spirits in animistic beliefs vary
greatly. They range from vague beings scarcely differentiated
from the impersonal mana of animatism through the highly
personalized gods and goddesses of polytheistic mythologies
to the mysterious "great spirit" of the higher monotheisms
and (closing the circle) the almost impersonal "world-soul"
of pantheism, doubtless the ultimate in animism. But, in
nearly every case, the apprehension of the universe as
"peopled" with spirits resulted in the emergence of a
different procedure for interacting with the spirits in
order to influence them.
The belief in impersonal power fthe mana of animatisi^ 
calls for a procedure . . . which does not involve the 
establishment of rapport with anyone. The individual 
seeks to effect the desired end by following a mechani­
cal course of action, ®uch as touching certain objects, 
pronouncing formulas, or even merely possessing the 
object endowed with power . . . .  The belief in personal 
power, however, requires a procedure identical with the 
one used to establish rapport between two persons, or 
rather, between a man and his superior. Hence the use 
of devices such as love, reverence, and humility, but 
also, under certain conditions, command, sacrifice, 
and abstention or taboo.4
The aim of magic, grounded in the animatistic world-view, was
to coerce and control the use of the impersonal power of mana;
but the aim of religion, grounded in an animistic world-view,
is to persuade and influence a personal spirit (or superhuman
^Koenig, "Religious Institutions," Sociology,
pp. 118-19.
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person) to exercise its supernatural power for the benefit of 
the society or individual. Even as the effective practice of 
magic usually required a trained magician, so religion has 
its specialist, the priest— one on good terms with the gods 
and highly trained in the rhetorical techniques of divine 
persuasion.
Since primitive man believed that the personal spirits 
or gods were responsible as causative agents for all natural 
phenomena, he strove to placate the appropriate gods and to 
persuade them to assure the success of his endeavors, especially 
in thofle involving a large element of chance or great danger. 
Anthropologists have classified three clusters of experiences 
in which primitive men habitually sought supernatural resources 
of aid: "(1) the physiological facts of birth, puberty,
disease, and death; (2) the contacts of man with the world 
around him and with the forces of nature; and (3) the indivi­
dual's clash with his fellow men."^ Anthropologists also 
distinguish between "two kinds of religious leaders in primi­
tive societies— those (e.g., healers) who perform the rites 
of passage and help individuals in their personal crises, 
and those (e.g., rain-makers) who conduct the rites of inten­
sification and intervene on behalf of the whole group.
Thus the specialization of the spirits— gods of the sea, of
^Ibid., p. 111.
GIbid., p. 119.
250
the earth/ of the sky, and of the underworld and gods for all 
the affairs of mankind— required a corresponding specializa­
tion of priests.
The history of animism—  the belief that natural 
phenomena are animated by supernatural spirits— is almost 
coextensive with the history of religion. Although the 
development has not been absolutely uniform, animism has 
generally evolved in most cultures through several successive 
phases: from a belief in multitudinous vague spirit beings
through the gods and goddesses of the polytheistic mythologies 
to the later monotheisms and pantheisms. The evolution from 
the polytheistic phase to the monotheistic phase of animism 
represents a process of consolidation: the various functions
of the many gods are ascribed to one comprehensive God~~ 
the "great spirit." Usually the transition from polytheism 
to monotheism is initially characterized by the emergence of 
a "greater" god from among the "lesser" gods of the pantheon. 
Thus the God of the Hebrews, Jahweh, enucniated as the first 
of his ten commandments, "Thou shalt have no other gods 
before me" (Exoduc 20:3), and so squelched the recognition 
and worship of alien gods until He Himself was established as 
the one true God of Israel. And the latter stages of 
polytheistic mythology in Greece were marked by the growth 
in stature and significance of Zeus, the Father of gods and 
of men.
Religious Morality
Concurrent with the monotheistic process of divine 
consolidation, there is usually an increasing, emphasis oâ 
ethics. The conceptual development of monotheism tends to 
become increasingly dominated by a process of moralisation.
The primary concern of the God becomes the social conduct of 
His worshippers. Indeed, the successoof human ventures, 
as determined by God, is finally conceived to be relative 
to the ethical goodness of the individual or society, to 
their executing the moral commandments of God. Success is 
determined not by the effective practice of divine flattery 
and bribery (prayer and sacrifice) but by the earnest practice 
of "godly" behavior— righteousness rather than burnt offer­
ings. This evolutionary process is clearly discernible in 
the developing characterization of Jahweh as apprehended by 
the prophets through the course of the Old Testament, and 
there are traces of it in the gradual transformation of Zeus 
by the Greeks of the classical period from the capricious 
and lustful god in the ancient myths to the God of moral law 
and order.
Although the emphasis on morality emerged as the primary 
concern of God in the advanced monotheistic religious, anthro­
pologists generally agree that morality is only a foster 
child of religion, that moral rules originally emerged from 
the trial and error of interpersonal interactions within the 
social organization, and that religion only adopted and
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sanctioned the moral code later, after it was already created.
"Ethics is believed to be the product of social evolution."
Ethical values . . . are arrived at by man in the course 
of living, but they may be, and often are, appropriated 
by and incorporated into religion, giving the illusion 
of having been created by religion. Obviously religion 
plays an important part in promoting ethical values. In 
incorporating these values, religion strengthens and 
returns them . . .  to the people, often in a refined and 
crystallized form.7
It is clear, then, that the general development of religion 
proper (as distinguished from early quasi-religious magical 
practices) may be divided into two fairly distinct stages— a 
primitive stage and a "civilized" stage. The civilized stage 
emerged when ethical demands rather than material welfare 
began to be emphasized as the primary concern of religion 
in the advanced monotheistic phase of animism. The singular 
insistence of advanced monotheisms upon the significance of 
ethical conduct has resulted in their being designated as 
the "higher religions." This civilized stage of religion has 
been predominant for nearly three thousand years and continues 
as the predominant form offreligion in the present.
However, the evolution of religion from its roots in magical 
practices through a primitive stage to the civilized stage has 
not been a steady process of inevitable progress. Even in the 
higher monotheisms of the civilized stage of religion, one may 
still discern vestiges of magical beliefs and practices. For
^Koenig, "Religious Institutions," Sociology, p. 121.
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example, the concept of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament 
(the "power of God" invested in man) is apparently a modified 
version of the animatistic belief in mana, to be manipulated 
by quasi-magical techniques. Although the Holy Spirit was 
eventually elevated in orthodox dogma to the status of the 
third "person" in the trinity, it seems to be a vaguely 
impersonal power in much of the New Testament. Among the 
early Christians, dramatically sudden "possession" by the 
Holy Spirit, manifested through speaking in tongues, was 
apparently regarded as the necessary sign of true disciple- 
ship. And the ritual procedures through which possession by 
the Holy Spirit was accomplished closely resemble magical 
methods for manipulating mana. The ritual procedures were 
the verbal formula of praying over the convert ("Receive ye 
the Holy Spirit") and the action sequence of the laying on 
of hands. Evidently, the supernatural power was transferred 
to another through the hands, much as the closing of a circuit 
enables an electrical current to conduct its power to another 
object. (The analogy of electricity is often used to illus­
trate the concentrated power of mana.)
Yet in Christianity, as a higher religion, the use of this 
supernatural power was dedicated to ethical purposes, such 
as healing. Again, on the basis of recent knowledge about 
the dynamics of psychosomatic interaction and its amazing 
effects, modern psychology and medicine readily accept the 
reliatality of most accounts of "miraculous" healing in the
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New. Testament (with, a certain allowance for hyperbolic 
accretions in the early oral tradition). The early Christians 
did not use this amazing power for immoral or selfish ends.
In the eighth chapter of the Acts of the &postles, where Simon 
the Sorcerer (or magician) offered to buy the power of the 
Holy Spirit from the disciples, Peter refused his offer, 
denouncing it as sacrilegious. Thus, although vestigial 
remnants from its magic roots and from its primitive stage 
continue to characterize religion even in its civilized stage, 
these are subordinated to the superior ethical purpose, which 
is primary and pervasive.
Conversely, it is interesting to consider, according to one 
of the foremost authorities, the basic function of mythology 
as the psychological sanction for morality even in the primi­
tive stage of religion. In concluding The Masks of God; 
Primitive Mythology, Joseph Campbell uses three terms from 
classical Indian philosophy to designate "the ends for which 
men strive in the world": kama, "love and pleasure"; artha,
"power and success"; and dharma, "lawful order and moral 
viture."^ Identifying kama and artha (pleasure and power) as 
the basic "erotic and aggressive" character of man's biological 
nature, Campbell states that the development of dharma (social 
responsibility) is necessary to control this biological nature 
and to effect the socialization of the individual.
^Joseph Campbell, "Conclusion: The Functioning of Myth,"
The Masks of God; Primitive Mythology (New York: The Viking
Press, 1959), p. 464.
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Dharma, the sense of duty, the knowledge of one's duty 
and the will to abide by it, is not innate, but the aim 
instilled in the young by education . . . . The unsocialized 
thought and feeling of the very young child are egocentric 
but not socially dangerous. When the primary urges of the 
adolescent remain unsocialized, however, they become 
inevitably a threat to the harmony of the group. The 
paramount function of all myth and religion, therefore, 
has always been, and surely must continue to be, to engage 
the individual, both emotionally and intellectually, in 
the local organization . . . .  The infantile ego . is. is 
dissolved for recombination in a ritual and actual 
experience of death and ressurrection: death of the
infantile ego and resurrection of the socially desirable 
adult.9
In order to achieve a sufficiently authoritative sanction, the 
moral code is imposed as the will of an ultimate source. 
According to the level of culture in the society, this ultimate 
source and sanction may be conceived as "the will and magic 
of the 'ancestors,' the will of an omnipotent all-father, the 
mathematics of the universe, the natural order of an ideal 
humanity, or an abstract, immutable imperative seated in the 
moral nature of every man who is properly a man."
It is clear, then, that the moral!zation of man has 
always been, as it continues to be, the great effect of reli­
gion, perhaps even as much so in its primitive state (at 
least among the members within the local tribe) as in its 
civilized stage. The ethical transformation of human life is 
the essential function of traditional religion. However, 
after this background of information about what the complex
^Ibid., pp. 466-67. 
lOlbid., p. 467.
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nature and function of supernatural religion has been, we are 
prepared to proceed to a discussion about what, from the 
contemporary perspective of naturalistic humanism, the nature 
and function of modern religion should be, as adumbrated by 
Matthew Arnold and elaborated by John Herman Randall, Jr.
The Religious Vision of Naturalistic Humanism
Because of the changing nature and function of reli­
gion during the course of its long history, it is difficult 
to define. The attempt at definition often issues in state­
ments that are either too vaguely general or too exclusively 
specific. One definition that hovers in the general yet 
points to the specific is suggested by this statement: "Most
authorities maintain that religion includes a belief in super­
natural or mysterious powers, that this belief is associated 
with feelings of awe, fear, and reverence, and that it ex­
presses itself in overt activities designed to deal with those 
p o w e r s . I n  the light of the previous discussion, it is 
clear that the existence of a religion involves the presence 
of at least three elements: (1) an assumed cosmology; (2) a
personal goal or a class of social goals, based on certain 
human needs and their supposed relation to the assumed cos­
mology; and (3) a set of techniques and activities intended to 
interact with the assumed cosmology or to condition the person 
so as to achieve the goal and to fulfill the needs.
^^Koenig, "Religious Institutions," Sociology, p. 108.
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A religion assumes a cosmology. Historically, the 
cosmology in a culture has not been the exclusive creation 
and possession of its religion. Rather, it has tended to be 
a common heritage of the entire culture. Thus the cosmology 
as such has been not specifically religious but generally 
cultural. Hence the social institution of religion, as a 
cultural mechanism for human adaptation, originally emerged 
to mediate between the needs of man and the strange forces 
of the mysterious universe as conceived in terms of the 
generally accepted cultural cosmology. As a social institu­
tion, then, religion is adapted to enhance human existence.
The peculiar nature of human needs and their supposed rela­
tion to the peculiar nature of the assumed cosmology, as 
variously envisioned in different cultures, have determined 
the peculiar nature and function of the religious institution. 
In this sense, religion is a cultural response to the 
challenge of the supernaturalistic cosmology (an extra dimen­
sion of reality), as apprehended in terms of the cultural 
ideology.
Historically, the cosmologies to which the religious 
institution has had to adapt itself, in striving to enhance 
human life by fulfilling certain human needs, have generally 
been derived from some phase of animism— polytheistic, 
monotheistic, or pantheistic. In a universe supposed to be 
animated by personal spirits, as in the primitive polytheistic
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phase, the goal of primitive religion is to persuade the 
spirits or gods to satisfy the desires of the society, to 
grant it success in its various affairs— economic, domestic, 
military, and personal, as well as moral— through abasement, 
adoration, offerings, prayers, and sacrifices. In a universe 
supposed to be created and controlled by a single "great 
spirit," as in the monotheistic phase, the main goal of 
civilized religion is to attain the state of religious 
beatitude or spiritual blessedness (both here and, in 
accordance with the cosmology, hereafter) through exercising 
various techniques of moral discipline so as to satisfy the 
ethical demands imposed by God as the condition for such 
fulfillment.
The religious institution has consistently adapted 
itself to the assumed cultural cosmology and interceded with 
the gods on behalf of mankind. Until the modern period, all 
popular cosmologies have been supernaturalistic. But in the 
nineteenth century, for the first time in the history of 
culture, a non-supernaturalistic cosmology began gradually 
to be widely establishedcand eventually to be generally 
accepted, at least among the intelligentsia. The emerging 
cosmology was naturalistic in its assumptions. Now, the 
essence of naturalism is to regard the cosmos not as "Thou)* 
but as "It." Almost in the middle of the Victorian age, the 
assumed cosmology of traditional supernaturalistic religion 
became intellectually untenable. The impact of the Enlightenment
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began to be more generally felt, and the findings of nineteenth- 
century scientists and thinkers (especially in geology, 
biology, and astronomy) began irresistibly to discredit the 
literal acceptance of the biblical account. For those who 
narrowly identified religion only with belief in the supernatura­
listic listic cosmology, the acceptance of the new cosmology 
threatened to undermine the foundation of religion. Further, 
the goal of religion— "spiritual" fulfillment— seemed to 
have no basis; for if there were no spiritual dimension in the 
universe, how could there be a spiritual dimension in man? And 
the traditional techniques of religion, incapable of inter­
acting with an impersonal universe, were consequently regarded 
as futile. God, free will, and the human soul— all seemed 
incredible. For many of those who thought and for some of 
those who accepted their thinking, the theoretical foundations 
on which the practice of religion was based seemed to be 
irreparably shattered. The emerging cultural ideology, with 
its novel comcepts of man, society, and nature, seemed to 
dissolve and to exclude the traditional nature and function 
of religion.
The contention in this dissertation is that the poems 
and essays of Matthew Arnold, as a Victorian man of letters, 
expressed and created an imaginative vision— that of natura­
listic humanism— intended to supersede the religious mythology 
of supernaturalistic Christianity which had been the original 
basis of the traditional Victorian cultural ideology. In many
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respects, the position implicit in Arnold's, imaginative vision 
of the human condition (with its answers to the great ques­
tions of human existence) anticipated and perhaps even partly 
inspired the religious attitude of contemporary naturalistic 
humanism, especially as it is articulated in the writings of 
John Herman Randall, Jr.
In 1957 the Institute for Religious and Social Studies 
published a volume entitled Patterns of Faith in America Today 
in its "Religion and Civilization Series." The volume consisted 
of scholarly expositions by eminent men of their respective 
religious faiths, including "Classical Protestantism,"
"Liberal Protestantism," "Roman Catholicism," and "Judaism."
The volume also included "Naturalistic Humanism" as a religious 
faith, and the man chosen to represent and to explain the 
movement was Randall.Ahticipating objections to the inclu­
sion of naturalistic humanism as a religious faith along with 
the established religious traditions in America, the editor of 
Patterns of Faith, F. Ernest Johnson, defended his decision in 
the "Introduction":
Without doubt, many readers will cavil at the inclusion 
of "naturalistic humanism" in an admittedly limited and 
selective treatment of religious systems. Why go so far
^^In a volume similar to Patterns of Faith in America 
Today but international in scope— Religions and the Promise of 
the Twentieth Century, ed. Guy S. Metraux and Francois Crouze 
(Mentor edition; New York: The New American Library, 1965)—
the president of the British Humanist Association, H. J. 
Blackham, was selected to represent and to explain the 
religious position of "Modern Humanism."
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off the reservation? The answer is to be found in the 
actual situation that we are sefeking to portray and 
interpret. Nothing is to be gained for religion by 
refusing to recognize that in our day some of the most 
authentic expressions of religious feeling and aspira­
tion come from men and women who have great difficulty 
with the forms and symbols of traditional religion.13
And in explaining the selection of Randall to repre­
sent this religious faith, the editor wrote, "Indeed,
Dr. Randall, our chosen interpreter of naturalistic humanism, 
is the author of one of the most perceptive and reverent 
interpretations of the role of religion in human life of 
which I have any knowledge."1^ The interpretive account to 
which the editor referred is Part IV, "The Meaning of Religion 
for Man," in Preface to Philosophy (1946). Randall, who is 
perhaps most generally well known as the author of The Making 
of the Modern Mind (1926), has also written of religion with 
a unique combination of sympathy and scholarship in Religion 
and the Modern World (co-authored with his father in 1929) , 
in his discussion of Santayana and Dewey under the heading 
"The Naturalistic-Humanistic Philosophy of Religion" in 
Philosophy; An Introduction (1942), and in The Role of Know­
ledge In Western Religion (1958).
In order to elucidate, to demonstrate, and to sub­
stantiate the religious function of Matthew Arnold's
13p. Ernest Johnson, "Introduction," Patterns of Faith 
in America Today (New York: The Institute for Religious and
Social Studies, 1957), pp. 3-4.
l^ibid., p. 4.
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imaginative vision, we shall analyze the religious attitude 
of contemporary naturalistic humanism in terms of the three 
stipulated elements in religion (its cosmology, its goal, 
and its techniques) and then relate this religious attitude 
to the position of Arnold. Like the editor of Patterns of 
Faith, we shall regard the religious views of Randall (set 
forth in his several writings on religion) as the typical 
and normative expression of the religious attitude of contem­
porary naturalistic humanism, although frequently supplementing 
his view by references to other naturalists and humanists.
Organic Naturalism
In our analysis of naturalistic humanism, the first 
element to be examined is the concept of "naturalism." In 
terms of the elements involved in religion, as stipulated by 
our definition, "naturalism" is the assumed cosmology to which 
"humanism," insofar as it constitutes a religious attitude or 
position, must accommodate itself. Indeed, as Randall asserts 
in his essay on "Naturalistic Humanism" in Patterns of Faith,
"A 'humanism' that confines itself narrowly to man's activities 
and the human scene alone, without taking into account the 
broader context of the great universe with its challenges and 
its resources, it both philosophically and religiously truncated 
and inadequate."15
15john Herman Randall, Jr., "Naturalistic Humanism," 
Patterns of Faith in America Today (New York; The Institute 
for Religious and Social Studies, 1957), p. 164.
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In Religion and the Modern World, Randall indicated 
the naturalistic cosmology to which conteiriporary religion 
must adapt itself by quoting a scientist's descriptive 
account ;
We have to conceive of a universe incredibly vast, with 
thousands upon thousands of suns accompanied by their 
satellites, each moving swiftly on its course with the 
utmost uniformity and precision, each isolated and 
apparently independent, yet all parts of a harmonious 
whole, kept in their places by the mutual influence of 
on# upon the other. And in this complex of complexes 
all matter is undergoing constant change. Slowly but 
surely there is continuous transformation, evolution.
All that we know as inorganic matter, all that we know 
as life, has been built up from simple elementary sub­
stance and passes again to simple elementary substance.
Thus has the earth, a minute attendant of one of the 
younger and less important stars, come into being.
Thus has man and all other types of life evolved. He is 
an infinitesimal part of the great scheme, like all the 
rest; governed by natural law, like all the r e s t . 16
Is the universe, so conceived, to be regarded as inimical to
religious and human values? Indeed, during the course of the
New Humanism movement in America during the second and third
decades of this century, there was a conflict between the
"humanists" and the "naturalists." For instance, in a critical
survey of the movement. The Challenge of Humanism; An Essay
in Comparative Criticism (1936), Louis J. A. Mercier entitled
his concluding chapter with the query "Naturalism or Humanism?"
And in Humanism as a Way of Life (1930), J. George Frederick
explained "humanism" as the middle way between "supernaturalism"
and what he referred to as "naturism" and described as
pessimistic, cynical, and even nihilistic.
l^Quoted in Religion and the Modern World by John Herman 
Randall, Jr. (New York: Frederic A. Stokes Company, 1929),
pp. 176-77. The "scientist" who is quoted was not identified.
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What the New Humanists were reacting against, of
course, was not so much the conception of a naturalistic
cosmology as the school of "literary naturalism," based on
a particular version of naturalism— that of mechanistic
materialism. The cosmology of mechanistic materialism is
indeed inimical to religious and human values. It denies
the very possibility of their existence or realization. As
Sterling Lamprecht wrote in an article on "Naturalism and
Religion": "Again, and particularly in the last few decades,
antireligious forms of naturalism were framed in terms of
a contrast between the aspirations of men, which were said
to be as futile as they were noble, and the ways of nature,
which were said to be as destructive as they were indifferent."
These forms gave rise to "a widely entertained supposition
that naturalism is committed to the idea of 'an alien world'
in which ideals are sure to be crushed by'Ithe trampling
march of unconscious power.'" However, such notions are "no
more an integral part of a sound naturalism than are militant
17agnosticism and agressive atheism."
In "The Nature of Naturalism," included in the same 
volume with Lamprecht's article, Randall distinguished clearly 
between the unsound and the sound naturalisms:
Indeed, the popular meaning which "naturalism" still bears, 
and which it retains in antinaturalistic circles, has been
^^Sterling P. Lamprecht, "Naturalism and Religion," 
Naturalism and the Human Spirit, ed. Yervant H. Krikorian 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), p. 28.
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derived from the scientific materialism of the nine­
teenth century— a body of ideas founded on a reductive 
analysis of all processes to the motion of masses, on 
the mechanistic dogmas of nineteenth-century physics, 
and on the materialistic metaphysics . . . .  That 
reductive analysis, those dogmas, and that materialism 
have very largely disappeared from the store of 
scientific ideas today . . . .18
Whatever the label, however, the major facts stand out: 
the "new" or "contemporary" naturalism . . . stands in 
fundamental opposition not only to all forms of super- 
naturalism, but also to all types of the reductionist 
thinking which up to this generation often arrogated 
to itself the adjective "naturalistic" . . . .  The 
richness and variety of natural phenomena and human 
experience cannot be explained away and "reduced" to 
something else.19
Certain of the religious implications in this new 
cosmology have been articulated by James K. Feibleman in a 
recent article entitled "A Religion for Materialism." In 
beginning his discussion, Feibleman makes it clear that the 
"Materialism" in his title refers to "the new materialism" 
which is identical with what Randall calls "contemporary 
naturalism." Thus he distinguishes the sophisticated modern 
materialism from the rather naive materialism that Karl Marx 
used as the metaphysical basis of Communism. The nineteenth- 
century dualism of matter and motion has been superseded by 
a twentieth-century monism in which mass and energy are 
regarded as only interchangeable forms of a single ultimate
l^Randall, "The Nature of Naturalism," Naturalism 
and the Human Spirit, p. 360.
l^ibid., p. 361.
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constituent of existence that cannot finally be identified 
either as a "particle" or as a "wave." "The simplest forms 
of matter [the atonQ has been found to be enormously c o m p l e x . "^0 
As the fundamental constituent in nature, the enor­
mously complex atom is the building block of all being.
Above the atoms and constructed of them are the chemical 
elements and compounds; and above the compounds and 
constructed of them are the organic cells; above the 
cells and constructed of them are the organisms; and 
finally above the organisms are the societies and cultures. 
This series is now known as the integrative levels, 
which are after all nothing more than disclosures of 
the complex structures inherent in matter.21
The inherent tendency of the various types of atoms to enter
into increasingly complex and relatively stable structural
relationships, with the capacity to perpetuate and even to
reproduce their organizational patterns, eventually ensued
in the evolutionary emergence of novel modes of existence,
each with its own uniquely peculiar qualities— from the atomic
to the galactic and from the organic to the psychic. Thus
the religious implication of contemporary naturalism is that
"the. spiritual aspirations of man can be considered among
the properties of matter just as much as man himself because
all organisms and their behavior, including man and all his
22works, are natural developments of materials."
20james K. Feibleman, "A Religion for Materialism," 
Religious Studies, II (April, 1967), 214.
21lbid., p. 215.
22%bid., p. 214.
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The capacity of the ultimate constituents in nature 
to evolve the 'integrative levels* and to create autonomous 
organizations (or holistic structures)— as much so in physics, 
for instance, as in biology— suggests the name of "organic 
naturalism" as an analogously appropriate designation for 
the contemporary metaphysics or cosmology, thus distinguish­
ing it clearly from the "mechanistic materialism" of the 
nineteenth century. Especially the element of determinism 
implied in the term "mechanistic" has made the older material­
ism seem incompatible with the individual's freedom to commit 
himself to the cultivation of human and religious values. 
However, the concept of free will in relation to "organic 
naturalism" (as opposed to mechanistic materialism) is 
clarified in this statement by John Herman Randall, Jr.
To be very brief, I judge a naturalist today would say 
that the old question, "Is the 'will' of man free?" is 
no longer meaningful. It is indeed essential to hold 
that "man" is in a humanly significant sense not wholly 
"unfree" or "enslaved." But "man" is free only in so 
far as what used to be called "reason" and has now been 
reconstructed into "intelligence" is free to discover 
truth— especially truth about what is good. In the 
measure that intelligence is "free" . . . man can hope 
to determine his "will" by knowledge rather than
ignorance.23
That is, insofar as the psychic consciousness of ends and 
means is cultivated, the individual person may function as 
a self-determining organism, not as an organization of atoms 
entirely determined by the mechanical operation of its 
external environment.
^^Randall, "Naturalistic Humanism," Patterns of Faith,
p. 174.
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The cosmology of organic naturalism, then, is not
inimical to the values of man. On the contrary, nature itself
is the source and promoter of these values (insofar as they
are not "false" values), which must consequently be regarded
as in some sense natural. Our attitude toward the universe
must be conditioned by the consideration that, as Randall
observed, the world Sseems uniformly to have provoked men to
practice some form of religion. In seeking to understand and
appraise that world, we can hardly afford to neglect the fact
that it leads or drives men to religion . . . ."24
The aims and ideals which religions proclaim and teach 
are not merely human hopes and imaginings. They are 
discoveries about the nature of the world in which man 
lives. They are not the inventions of a being alone 
in an alien and hostile universe. They are rooted in 
the nature of things and in the conditions which 
determine human life.25
Since man himself a natural process, a peculiar organism
with psychic consciousness, the values that he envisions as
the consequence of interaction with his environment are the
creation of nature itself: in man, nature has come to
consciousness, with the potential to envision and to determine
its own becoming within the conditions of being.
What is the religious attitude of the naturalistic 
humanist toward the universe, the cosmic process of nature?
^^Randall, "The Meaning of Religion for Man," Preface 
To Philosophy, ed. William P. Tolley (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1946), pp. 297-98.
25Ibid., p. 348,
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On the one hand, he may be. moved to a sense of awe or
reverence, as Randall has indicated in explaining Santayana's
concept of "piety."
Piety is ho longer directed toward a supernatural being 
but to the vast universe in which we are bred and in 
which we develop. Such a piety is justified by the 
fact that nature gives rise in us to those interests 
responsible for our aspiring to goals or ideals. Ideals 
always express natural impulses or interests. . . . Piety 
is the attitude that looks to the source of our existence 
and our ideals.26
On the other hand, the naturalistic humanist must 
ultimately hold an attitude of agnostic wonder. After defin­
ing "agnosticism" as the "renunciation of both affirmations 
and denials about what lies outside the reach of human 
thought," H. J. Blackham asserts: "Nevertheless, in all
rigour, agnosticism is the only defensible position, and it 
does not advance anybody one step on the road to atheism nor 
one step on the road to t h e i s m . T o  observe that nature in 
some sense stimulates the emergence of moral values is one 
thing; to insist that nature itself is the creation of a "God" 
whose being can be apprehended is another matter altogether.
Yet, in "A Religion for Materialism," Feibleman sug­
gests, "It is not inconsistent with materialism to suppose 
that there is a reason why there is matter, and nothing is 
hurt if we use an old name for the reason and call it God,
26Randall, "The Naturalistic-Humanistic Philosophy of 
Religion," Philosophy; An Introduction (New York: Barnes 
and Noble, Inc., 1942), p. 285.
J. Blackham, "Humanism: The Subject of the
Objections," Objections to Humanism (London: Constable and
Co., Ltd., 1953), p. 14.
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provided of course that our speculations in that direction
end t h e r e . "28 And the noted naturalist, Loren Eisely, after
defining miracle as "an event transcending the known laws of
nature," declared that "nature itself is one vast miracle
2 9transcending the reality of night and nothingness."
Moreover, in recommending a religious attitude toward the
universe for modern man, Eustace Chesser wrote;
Ths basic experience is that we are involved in a 
cosmic process, which extends from the infinite 
abysses of space to an infinitesimal electron 
spinning in one of our blood cells. No new informa­
tion is given about this mighty process of unceasing 
change whether it is labeled Nature, Tao, Brahman, or 
God. The important thing is not the words we use, 
but what we feel. Since we are a conscious part of 
the universe we know it from the inside. When the 
mind becomes intuitively aware of its oneness with 
the Whole it finds p e a c e . 30
Thus the final religious attitude of naturalistic humanism
toward what Spinoza always referred to as "Nature or God"
is that of a reverent, perhaps even almost mystical,
agnosticism.
It is evident that the images of God and of nature 
in the imaginative vision of Matthew Arnold, as explained 
in Chapter II, are closely related to the concept of 
"organic naturalism"— the assumed cosmology to which the 
contemporary religious attitude of naturalistic humanism 
has adapted itself. In general, Arnold's affirmation of
^Bpeibleman, p. 221.
^^Loren Eisely, The Firmament of Time (New York: 
Athenum Published, 1960), p. 171.
^^Eustace Chesser, Life Is For The Living (London; 
George G. Harrap and Co., Ltd., 1962), p. 206.
271
human values set him apart from the radically reductive 
mechanistic materialists of his own day, while his definition 
of God in terms of Spinoza's pantheistic naturalism (or 
naturalistic pantheism) set him apart from the transcendental 
teleology of the supernaturalists. More particularly, his 
distinction between nature as it exists generally in the 
universe and nature as it exists specifically in the constitu­
tion of man (who must live in accordance with the moral law 
of his own being) closely resembles the concept of "integra­
tive levels" of atomic organization in contemporary organic 
naturalism. In addition, his assertion that "God"— an aspect 
of nature as experienced from the perspective of the moral 
viewpoint— "makes for righteousness" is quite similar to 
Randall's interpretation of nature as the matrix of human 
and religious values. And, finally, Arnold's agnosticism 
(his refusal to make statements beyond experiential verifica­
tion about the essential and ultimate being of God) is an 
attitude which marks his position as clearly consonant with 
that of contemporary naturalistic humanists.
Eclectic Humanism 
In accordance with our stipulated definition, the 
second essential element involved in a religion (after its 
assumed cosmology) is a personal goal or class of social 
goals. In naturalistic and humanistic definitions of 
religion, emphasizing the positive function of the higher 
monotheisms in their civilized stage of development, the
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traditional goal— the moralization of man— has been elevated
as the supreme element. Thus Lamprecht states, "The religious
life is . . .  a life in which multiple interests and diverse
values are brought into effective and organic unity through
central allegiance to some integrating ideal." After
observing that this definition is "one which both historically
and philosophically seems legitimate," he insists that "at
its best the religious life is a kind of fulfillment of life's
31most urgent moral needs."
The concept of religion developed by Randall in 
Religion and the Modern World (from the perspective of natura­
listic humanism) centers on the redefinition of "spirituality" 
and of "divinity." The concept of spirituality, as it must 
be conceived in contemporary terms, Randall indicates by 
quoting a statement of Santayana:
A man is spiritual when he lives in the presence of the 
ideal, and whether he eat or drink does so far the sake 
of a true and ultimate good. He is spiritual when he 
envisages his goal so frankly that his whole material 
life becomes a transparent and transitive vehicle, an 
instrument which scarcely arrests attention but allows 
the spirit to use it economically and with perfect 
detachment and freedom. This spiritual mastery is, of 
course, no slashing and forced synthesis of things into 
a system; it is rather an inward aim and fixity in 
affection that knows what to take and what to leave in 
a world over which it diffuses something of its own
peace.32
^^Lamprecht, pp. 20—21.
^^Quoted by Randall in Religion in the Modern World, 
pp. 191-92.
273
"Spirituality, therefore, is a quality of the life that has 
organized its ends about some ultimate principle," so Randall 
suggests, "and acts always with that supreme end in view."
The concept of divinity, as it must be redefined in
contemporary terms, Randall indicates by quoting another modern
philosopher, Bertrand Russell.
If life is to be fully human, it must serve some end 
which seems in some sense outside human life, some end 
which is impersonal and above mankind, such as God or 
truth or beauty. Those who best promote life do not 
have life for their purpose. They aim rather at what 
seems like a gradual incarnation, a bringing into our 
human existence of something eternal, something that 
appears to imagination to live in a heaven remote from 
strife and failure and the devouring jaws of Time.
Contact with this eternal world— even if it be only a 
world of our imagining-— brings a strength and a funda^ 
mental peace which cannot be wholly destroyed by the 
struggles and apparent failures of our temporal life . .
. .By contact with what is eternal, by devoting ourselves 
to bringing something of the Divine into this troubled 
world, we can make bur own lives creative . . . .3^
The "Divine" is a transcendent ideal— the kingdom of heaven—  
that exists in an eternal dimension envisioned by the imagina­
tion. In the religious tradition of western civilization, 
Christianity, the Divine in this sense has been personified 
and projected into the cosmos as "God." Or rather, it would 
seem, the originally envisioned ethical ideal was gradually 
attached to the greatest nature deity and eventually refined, 
purified, and elevated to the highest eminence in the hier­
archy of concerns under the dominion of the "great spirit."
33lbid., p. 193.
34ibid., pp. 242-43.
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The effect of divinity (the "call" or appeal of God) is to 
create spirituality in man— supreme devotion to an ultimate 
ideal.
In "The Naturalistic-Humanistic Philosophy of 
Religion," Randall quoted the philosopher John Dewey"-s 
definition of religious faith as "the unification of the self 
through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination 
presents to us and to which the human will responds as worthy 
of controlling our desires and c h o i c e s . "35 The distinctive 
characteristic of this definition is the insistence that 
religion is not a matter of fact but a matter of value.
Religious faith is not belief in certain dogmas, like that 
of a mythological cosmology, as factually valid. Rather, it 
is concerned with the spirit, not the letter. The essence 
of religion is faith in the supreme value of a transcendent 
ideal— an imaginative vision of the ultimate good— to which 
one dedicates his life. Thus religion is never to be iden­
tified with the literal acceptance of any cosmology, "for 
the religious life may be lived under all the differing 
pictures which philosophy may present of the world.
The Good Man. The German theologian Rudolf Bultmann
has asserted that humanism and the Christian religion
stand together in their faith in the possibility of 
objective knowledge of truth, in their faith in the validity
35Randall, Philosophy; An introduction, p. 29Q.
36Randall, Religion and the Modern World, p. 178.
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of moral norms, and in th-eir faith, in the idea of a law 
determined by justice. Thus they stand together in their 
faith in an invisible spiritual world beyond the visible 
world and in the conviction that man by his very nature 
belongs to this spiritual w o r l d . 37
From the perspective of a Christian theologian, then, 
humanism is recognized as having these points in common with 
a traditional religious faith. But how does humanism differ 
from Christianity and from all other traditional religions?
This is a matter beyond the scope of Bultmann's article, which 
was devoted to the delineation of similarities. However, in 
terms of our approach in this study, the religious vision of 
humanism is to be distinguished from that of traditional 
religions by the specific content in its particular concept 
of the ultimate good— the nature of its ideal goal. From 
the humanist's viewpoint, the ideal of traditional religions 
has been the "moralization" of man; but the ideal of natura­
listic humanism is the "humanization" of man, a more inclusive 
goal. The ethical ideal of "the good man," as envisioned by 
an eclectic humanism, involves an insistence upon human 
wholeness.
Of course, the goal of human fulfillment is not uniquely 
the possession of humanism, for even traditional religions 
promise such fulfillment, the realization of what is of true 
worth in life, as at least the indirect effect of devotion 
to the ultimate good, which is God. Yet the religious vision
^^Rudolf Bultmann, "Humanism and Christianity," The 
Journal of Religion, XXXII (.April, 1952), 81.
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of humanism differs from that of traditional religions in 
that, first, its goal of human wholeness is primary and in that, 
second, the content of its concept of "wholeness" differs 
rather significantly from the more exclusively moral ideal 
of traditional religions. What, then, is the distinctively 
humanistic ideal of the good man, the fully humanized person? 
Human wholeness has been the historic ideal of humanism, 
although the specific content of the concept has gradually 
changed as man's knowledge of human nature has advanced. As 
conceived in terms of contemporary naturalistic humanism, 
the good man is one who has actualized his peculiarly human 
potentialities: physical and psychical, personal and social.
The value of the flesh has been affirmed by humanists
since the ancient Greeks extolled the classical ideal of mind
and body held in dynamic balance. H. J. Blackham has
reaffirmed it:
This body with which the human spirit is formed, which 
transcends itself in the work of its hands and in the 
utterance of its mouth, is the ancestral home, and at 
all times separation from it is the alienation of exile, 
and the return to it is the restoration of selfhood, 
breed, tradition, the recovery of health and love.3°
Although the humanist heartily affirms the earthy 
flesh, he also insists on the affirmation of the human spirit. 
Man is not merely a body or "soma," for he also has a mind 
or "psyche." And, as we now understand, the two are
33h . j . Blackham, The Human Tradition CLondon:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1953), p. 144.
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inextricably interrelated; man is a psychosomatic unity—  
an organism whose physiological functions and psychological 
processes are reciprocally interdependent. The process of 
"mind" is the function of the "brain." Yet other animals also 
have the enlarged nodule of nerve tissue calèed the brain.
The peculiarity of man is that of all the animals, he alone 
has developed cortical consciousness. The growth of the 
cortex or "gray-matter" in the higher center of the human 
brain, the cerebrum, resulted in the emergence of a high 
degree of intelligence. As Ernst Cassirer explained in An 
Essay on Man and as Susanne K. Langer explained in Philosophy 
in a New Key, the human mind eventually evolved the unique 
capacity for "symbolic transformation" of experience. Other 
animals can respond to "signals," but man is the only creature 
who creates and recognizes "symbols." The ideological crea­
tions and technological inventions of human culture are the 
end-products of various modes of symbolic transformation.
The great survival value of cortical consciousness is 
that it enabled man to respond more flexibly to his environ­
ment (than other animals bound by instinct) and even enabled 
him to create his own cultural environment. But the evolu­
tion of hyper-consciousness had another consequence: the
emergence of human self-consciousness. Although other animals 
are aware of their environment, man is aware of himself as 
well. : He is the self-conscious creature who senses the 
separation of "self" from all the "other," the remainder of
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nature. As Erich Fromm has explained in Man For Himself, 
the emergence of the capacity for self-consciousness in man
39had the effect of creating certain "existential dichotomies." 
Alienated from the world (in the sense of nature, society, 
and even aspects of himself), man now has a psychological 
need to express his powers and to relate himself to society 
and to nature in self-satisfying ways. In Fromm's view, man 
fulfills his psychological needs (as distinguished from his 
physiological drives) by relating himself to the world, 
mentally and emotionally, through "productive love" and 
"productive reason."^0
Similarly, Herbert J. Muller has described the source
of man's phycdical uniqueness.
Ripeness means a complete realization of potentialities, 
and the distinctive potentialities of man lie in his 
nervous system, more particularly in the cerebral cortex. 
Hence that is valuable, generally, which heightens, extends, 
and refines consciousness, and thereby increases the 
significance of experience; the traditional humanistic 
ideal of maximum consciousness, a full, harmonious develop­
ment of human faculties, is a moral expression of the 
biological fact of growth. Hence that is bad which 
cramps, blunts, distorts . . . .  In this view one can :
make out clearly the source of value in science, art, 
religion, philosophy, and all the interests and activities 
we call civilized. One can also make out the source of 
their abuse: the excesses that make for narrowness, dis­
harmony , incompleteness.^^
The humanist tradition has consistently emphasized 
that man should pursue "the true, the good, and the beautiful."
40lbid., pp. 102-113.
^^Herbert J. Muller, "The Naturalistic Basis of Values," 
Science and Criticism: The Humanistic Tradition in Contemporary
Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), p. 29.
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These are values that fulfill the psychological needs of corti­
cal consciousness. The full expression of psychic processes—  
sensuous, emotional, imaginative, and intellectual— -ensues in 
the creation and appreciation of beauty, wisdom, and love. 
Other animals have a body, but only man has a spirit that can 
experience these values. To cultivate them is to actualize 
uniquely peculiar human potentialities. For this reason, at 
various times even in the history of humanism, the value of 
the body has been de-emphasized as insignificant. But the 
general attitude of the humanist tradition has advocated the 
classical ideal of balance, a harmonious relationship between 
soma and psyche with mutual fulfillment, although based on 
the controlled subordination of the physical to the physical 
in the hierarchy of human values.
But man is. even more than soma and psyche. A modern 
holistic approach requires that we conceive of him as a 
"psycho-socio-biological" e n t i t y . ^2 The ideal of human whole­
ness insists upon the cultivation of social values as well 
as of personal values. The "humanization" of man demands 
not only his "personalization" but also his "socialization." 
The humanistic conception of the good man has traditionally 
emphasized that man must experience a sense of community and 
of responsibility in his relationship with society.
^^Douglas W. Orr, M.P., Professional Counseling on 
Human Behavior: Its Principles and Practices (New York ;
Franklin Watts, Inc., 1965), p. xi.
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To experience a sense of cbmmnnity in relation to 
society, individually or collectively, is essential to the 
human wholeness both of oneself and of others, so modern 
psychology asserts. Without love, in the sense of satisfying 
interpersonal relationships, man is nothing. He feels so, 
and he acts so. The loneliness of personal isolation is 
crippling to the humanization of the person. The need for 
social interaction, sympathetic communication, and intimate 
affection is undoubtedly the strongest of psychological needs, 
the one that man neglects with greatest peril; for to do so 
may even jeopardize his very sanity. The violent man is the 
socially alienated man. Whether it is the love that we get 
or the love that we give which saves us, love is in any case 
necessary for salvation. One of the most essential elements 
in the universe of human experience is love.
In addition to the psychological need for satisfying 
interpersonal relationships with other individuals, man also 
has the need to fulfill himself as a unit in the communal 
organization as a whole. He needs to identify himself as 
a member of the social group and feel himself accepted as an 
integrated unit, contributing to the health of the communal 
body. The condition for this process of socialization is 
his assumption of a sense of social responsibility. The 
person must fulfill his "duties"--the essential requirements, 
as culturally prescribed, of his various social roles; as 
son, brother, friend, student, lover, husband, father, worker.
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and citizen of the body politic. The relation of coMmunity
is granted to him who assumes his social responsibility.
Again, this "social contract" is needful both for the person
and for the society.
Yet in the hierarchy of human values, "there must be
an ultimate conviction," so Randall asserts, "by which lesser
goods are judged. And elsewhere he affirms, "The great
religions have offered men a transcendent or 'spiritual'
ideal that goes beyond their finite ends, and raises them
above the mere search for material goods, for social goods,
44even for others." Moreover, in explaining the effect of
such an ideal on the person, he writes:
The highest peace and the deepest satisfaction come to 
men only when their lives are centered, not in what is 
best in their own attainment, but in that beyond all 
possible attainment which is better than their best.
No one ever becomes aware of his deeper spiritual 
possibilities, no one ever awakens to the nature of 
his true self, until he has found some transcendent 
ideal to which he dedicates the best he has to give.45
Further, Randall identifies the "core of the Hebrew-Christian
moral tradition" as a "faith in the sacredness of the spiritual
nature of every man," and he suggests that modern religion,
although based on naturalistic and humanistic assumptions,
must assimilate this core as its integrative focus.
^^Randall, Religion and the Modern World, p. 227.
44Randall, Preface to Philosophy, p. 367.
45Randall, Religion and the Modern World, p. 206.
46
Ibid., p. 227.
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Finally, by "faith in humanity," he asks, do we not signify 
our conviction "that in every man there lies the possibility 
of developing higher capacities, the moral and spiritual 
qualities of character?
Now, the "spiritual nature" of man, as conceived by 
contemporary naturalistic humanism, is the human capacity 
to organize the ends and means of life in accordance with 
an ultimate principle. As Randall quotes Santayana, "To be 
spiritual is to live in view of the i d e a l . "^8 yet the trans­
cendent ideal of naturalistic humanism, its imaginative vision 
of the ultimate good, is that of human wholeness. Is there 
a paradox here? On the one hand, religious humanism seems 
to assert that man must dedicate his life to an ideal that 
transcends the self, tliat he must live in the service of a 
cause greater than his immediate aims. On the other hand, 
religious humanism seems also to assert that the ultimate 
goal of life is individual fulfillment. Does humanism thus 
merely affirm that the highest value to which a man can 
devote his life is simply that of fulfilling his own desires? 
Does it affirm only that the organizing principle of life—  
the "spiritualizing" idea to which one should dedicate his 
supreme allegiance— is simply the cultivation and satisfac­
tion of himself?
47%bid., p. 237.
48guoted by Randall in Philosophy: An Introduction,
p. 286.
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. The resolution of this paradox is indicated by
Rudolf Bultmann in his article on "Humanism and Christianity."
"It is . . .  a complete misunderstanding," he writes, "to
think that the ideas of freedom and autonomy deliver man from
every transcendent norm, giving free course to his subjective,
arbitrary will." For "humanistic faith," he explains, is
not "faith in man as an empirically definable phenomenon."
Bather humanistic faith is faith in the idea of man 
which stands as a norm above his empirical life, pre­
scribing his duty and thereby bestowing upon him 
dignity and nobility. Humanism is faith in the spirit 
of which man partakes, the spirit by whose power man 
creates the world of the true, the good, and the 
beautiful . . . .
The goal of humanism is not the affirmation of what
man but the aspiration to realize a transcendent ideal of
what man ought to become. Dedication to an ideal of the 
"Self" is certainly not dedication to the self. The concept 
of "Self," as a human potentiality, is an unactualized ideal; 
but the self is already realized, and devotion to it is merely 
the perpetuation of the extant, the maintenance of the 
status quo. To respond to the impulses of the non-humanized 
self is merely "animality"; but to live in quest of an ideal, 
even of the Self, demands "spirituality."
At the very heart of the humanist ideal of the good
man, the concept of what man ought to become, is the insistence
that the individual must endeavor to contribute to the
^^Bultmann, "Humanism and Christianity," The Journal 
of Religion, pp. 80-81.
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wholeness of other persons. And the greatest contribution 
one can make to the wholeness of others is that toward the 
fulfillment of their greatest need: not merely to provide
them with material goods (although these must be shared) but 
to awaken them "spiritually,", to introduce them to a self- 
transcending ideal. "If we take the word 'God' as the symbol 
of man's supreme allegiance. . . then faith in God may mean 
faith in the possibility of sharing ever more fully this 
vision of the highest p e r f e c t i o n . "50 Again, "Faith in 
divinity is the hope that men may see more clearly the ideal 
possibilities of human life, and, seeing, reweave the tangled 
fabric of their l i v e s . " 5 1  Even in humanism, there exists the 
paradox of "Self"— fulfillment achieved through self- 
renunciation. The "good" humanist is engaged in the process 
of spending his life for the ideal of wholeness; and, if 
necessity requires, he may even feel impelled to sacrifice 
his life for the sake of love, as some have done in order to 
uphold for all or to extend to one the ultimate good.
Thus humanism is not the satisfaction of self but the
cultivation of "Self," the quest to actualize an ideal. As 
such, it has the power to "spiritualize" the person who dedicates 
himself to the realization of that ideal in himself and in 
others. He is required to order his life by the light of an
5^Randall, Religion and the Modern World, p. 247.
Sllbid., p. 248.
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"idea," not to live in th.e darkness of an ego-centric 
animality of immediate impulse. , Yet the idea to which he 
dedicates his life is one that envisions human wholeness—  
physical and psychical, personal and social— as its goal, 
so that even the physiological drives of the biological 
organism, although subordinated and controlled in an integrated 
pattern of personality, are also to be satisfied in due order.
The Good Society. The humanist ideal includes the
concept of "the good society" as well as that of "the good
man." Although individual humanists may indicate that only a
particular social order constitutes the good society, the
tradition of humanism as a whole has not achieved specific
agreement except upon certain general principles. The
fundamental humanist assumption about the structure and
function of institutions in the good society was
stated well in the "Humanist Manifesto" of 1933;
Religious humanism maintains that all associations and 
institutions exist for the fulfillment of human life.
The intelligent evaluation, transformation, control, 
and direction of such associations and institutions with 
a view to the enhancement of human life is the purpose 
and program of humanism.
As an individual humanist, Randall has advocated such social
goals as "democracy," "social justice,” and "a new world
order" in which "great cultural ends shall at length replace
in the life of nations the old ends of domination and greed
and w a r . "52 The implementation of such goals, in accordance
SZRandall, Religion and the Modern World, pp. 238-41.
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with the principle that society, exists for the sake of man 
(not man for the sake of society), is the ultimate task of 
humanism as it strives to actualize an ideal vision of the 
good society.
The Good Life. As a way of life, humanism has been 
criticized as inadequate. The critic of humanism may even 
concédé that the humanist ideal of the good life~one devoted 
to the humanization of man— is indeed good but insist that 
there is a better or even a best. This is a perennial criti­
cism of humanism by traditional religions. But the humanist 
answer is that, far from upholding an àùadequate ideal, the 
vision of humanism is more nearly complete and perfect than 
that of traditional religion. The inclusive goal of the 
humanization of man includes and transcends the more exclusive 
goal of the moralization of man. As Lewis Mumford has 
stated: "The good life is not only good for one's conscience;
it is good for art, good for knowledge, good for health, good 
for fellowship."53Humanism has always remained eclectically 
open to assimilate worthy values from all sources, as it has 
often done. However, every proposed ideal must be compatible 
with the assumptions of a naturalistic cosmology in order to 
be acceptable to the humanist who values his intellectual 
integrity. Again, as Mumford has written:
Lewis Mumford, "Toward an Organic Humanism," The 
Critique of Humanism; A Symposium, ed. C. Hartley Grattan 
(New York: Brewer and Warren, Inc., 1930), p. 349.
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Just as the tormented abstentious of an Alexandrian hermit 
may be further away from true chastity than the physical 
union of a happy marriage, so every ideal end which 
ignores the nature of the universe and of man's constitu­
tion tends . . .  to be both meretricious and ineffectual, 
since i t  is divorced from the means of r e a l i z a t i o n . 5 4
Besides those who criticize humanism as inadequate 
because its ideal of the good life is too "low," there are 
those who critize it on the ground that its ideal is too "high" 
for the common man. The ideal of contemporary naturalistic 
humanism is indeed high. In a chapter entitled "The Compromise 
of Liberal Religion" in Religion and the Modern World, Randall 
castigates the "social gospel" to which nineteenth and early 
twentieth century intellectual and ethical compromises led.
The "social gospel," insofar as it advocated only the dis­
tribution of material goods and the satisfaction of physical 
needs in human animals, did not offer men an inspiring and 
ennobling ideal to arouse their spiritual capacities.
Similarly, in Humanism As A Way Of Life, J. George Frederick 
discussed the "spiritual awakening" of Man:
the "miracle" of lifting the individual out of pure 
instinct and animal self to a certain selflessness, a 
contact with forces greater than the petty, pedestrian, 
fleshly concentration on the lower man. No human being 
is a complete, individual human being until that spiritual 
awakening has occurred.55
This is too much to ask of the common man, so one line of
criticism runs. It is unrealistic to expect the masses ever
^^Ibid., p. 349.
55J. George Frederick, Humanism As a Way of Life,
(New York: The Business Course, 1930), p. 199.
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to respond to such values, which can be accepted and practiced 
by only a small elite.
In replying to this criticism, H. J. Blackham remarks;
Surely, all that has been said shows how sophisticated a 
position humanism is, suitable only for intellectuals, 
unintelligible and unattainable to simple people? Not 
aàtall. bn the contrary, the simplest people will for 
themselves think that we don/t know and can't know about 
ultimate things, that ethics are much the most important 
and certain part of the great religions and say much the 
same in all of them, that if you don't know the differ­
ence between right and wrong the parson can't tell you, 
that we should respect other people's convictions and way 
of life, that the Bible should be judged by common sense 
and moral sense, that it is reasonable to co-operate in 
a society which is regulated to serve the interests of all 
and not merely of a few or of some, that this is the only 
life we are sure of and we better make the most of it.56
Further, in response to charges of exclusiveness, the 
humanist replies that his ideal, that of human wholeness, is 
to be understood as inevitably transcendent in essence. It 
is an ideal vision of excellence, even of perfection, in man 
and in society that can never be realized. It is assumed 
and expected that, of course, every man can achieve only a 
measure of excellence, a degree of perfection. The goal of 
humanism is not for every man to become the complete and 
perfect incarnation of the ultimate good; rather, the goal is 
that every man should actualize his own vital potentialities 
insofar as he is able— that he become his own true Self, not 
that of another. The range of achievement will correspond 
to the variety of men.
56
Blackham, "Humanism: The Subject of the Objections,"
Objections to Humanism, pp. 22-23.
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The third great criticism of the humanist ideal of 
the good life is that, even if true and even if good, it is 
nonetheless pointless. The imminent prospect of inevitable 
and utter annihilation is intolerable: before the fact and
face of death, all human endeavor is futile, and the only- 
authentic response to the moflal condition of human life is 
utter despair. Without more or better, life is meaningless.
In discussing this attitude, Randall notes, "It is important 
to be clear that the question of the "meaning" of life is 
not primarily a question about facts, about what exists, but 
rather about what is Worth while, about what it is all for, 
about what is g o o d . T h e  humanist position asserts that 
although no supernatural source imposes a cosmic significance 
upon human life, there is nonetheless potential, value in 
being. The pattern of life, from birth to death, may indeed 
be sensed by the individual as worthwhile for its own sake.
It is better to have lived and then to die, most men will judge, 
than never to have lived at all. And those who want eternal 
life, after all, only want more life.
That Matthew Arnold's imaginative vision was essentially 
humanistic and eclectic is evident. The close correspondence 
between the values in his vision of human "perfection:" —  
intelligence and knowledge, social life and manners, beauty,
^^Randall, Preface to Philosophy, p. 357.
^^See H. J. Blackham*s defense against "The Pointless­
ness of It All" in Objections to Humanism.
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and conduct— and Lewis Mumford's concept of "the good life"
Cgood for conscience, art, knowledge, health, and fellowship) 
is obvious. The affirmation of the New Humanists that social 
institutions exist to enhance human life, to foster the 
humanization of man, was the principle that Arnold used in 
his criticism of Victorian culture as he strove to point the 
way toward "the good society," the state of true civilization. 
His reiterated criticism of civilization in Victorian England 
was that it is "impaired by a defective type of religion, a 
narrow range of intellect and knowledge, a stunted sense of 
beauty, a low standard of m a n n e r s . "59 As Walter J. Hippie, Jr. 
states, "Victorian England, as Arnold saw it, was characterized 
by vulgarity, hideousness, ignorance, violence— the defects of 
the four powers of social life and manners, beauty, intellect, 
and c o n d u c t . I n  short, Arnold's aim in all his endeavors 
was to encourage his countrymen to achieve the goal of eclectic 
humanism— human wholeness; the good man living the good life 
and working for the good society. The humanist ideal of "human 
wholeness," then, is virtually identical with Arnold's own 
concept of "the good man," his vision of "human perfection."
In making man the measure of all things and in measuring man 
himself by an ideal standard of completeness and perfection, 
Arnold is definitely related to the general tradition of
S^Arnold, "A Word More About America," Five Uncollected 
Essays of Matthew Arnold, p . 6.
GOwalter J. Hippie, Jr., "Matthew Arnold, Dialectician," 
University of Toronto Quarterly, XXXII (October, 1962), 8.
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humanism and is certainly a significant ancestor of contemporary 
naturalistic humanism. Thus, for instance, in Objections to 
Humanism, editor H. J. Blackham quoted Arnold twice in his 
introduction and once in his conclusion. And, again. Sterling 
P. Lamprecht remarked on the resemblance of Santayana's treat­
ment of religion to that of Arnold in his article on 
"Naturalism and Religion."
Spiritual Discipline
According to our stipulated definition, the third 
essential element of religion (after its cosmology and its 
goal) is a set of techniques and activities intended to inter­
act with the cosmology or to condition the person so as to 
achieve the goal. Because the assumed cosmology of contempor­
ary humanism is naturalistic, it is no longer tenable to 
suppose that religious techniques can persuade or influence 
the spirits of the air to break the laws of nature in order 
to favor one's own enterprise beyond that of one's neighbor. 
Consequently, contemporary religious techniques must rather 
concentrate on conditioning the person so that he may achieve 
the goal— the actualization of his vital human potentialities.
In "The Naturalistic-Humanistic Philosophy of 
Religion," Randall invoked John Dewey's distinction between 
having a "religion" and being "religious. The "religious" 
individual is one who holds a certain attitude toward human
G^Randall, Philosophy: An Introduction, p. 275.
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experience, but a "religion" involves an organized institution.
Ac
According to this distinction, humanism has traditionally been 
more "religious" and less, a "religion." It has not been a 
religion because it has largely lacked the spiritual techni­
ques and organized activities of the traditional religions. 
However, contemporary naturalistic humanists are beginning, 
like Matthew Arnold, to exhibit an increasing appreciation 
for the value of these practices. The two religious practices, 
or spiritual disciplines,that have been most effective for 
conditioning the character of the individual in traditional 
religions are various forms of meditation and of communion.
Meditation. As Kingsley Martin has written; "Prayer 
may be the concentration of the mind upon purposes which are 
more likely to be fulfilled if clearly formulated and delib­
erately repeated. The West has forgotten the value of 
meditation."G2 The pragmatic experience of religious tradi­
tions, based upon centuries of trial and error, has consistently 
recommended the practice of meditation as an aid to the 
spiritual life and to psychic health. Now, modern depth- 
psychology is learning why meditation is a useful practice 
and how it can be made even more effective.
It is a phenomenon of man's mental life that he tends 
to experience certain of his psychic processes— id, ego, self- 
image, and superego— almost as if they were separate and
^^Kingsley Martin, "Is Humanism Utopian?" Objections 
to Humanism, pp. 99-100.
293
distinct persons within him. The motivations to behavior 
originating from the several psychic sources may be apprehended 
as inner "selves" whose still small "voices" urge man to act 
or to refrain from action. After noting that psychologists 
have long described "personality as a cast of characters," 
Jerome Bruner remarked: "It is far from clear why our dis­
cordant impulses are bound and structured in a set of 
identities— why one pattern of impulse is the self-pitying
little man in us, another the nurturing protector, another the
^ 3
voice of moral indignation." And Wayne E. Oates explains 
"demon possession" as the alienation within the disintegrated 
personality of an isolated pattern of impulses which assume 
an individuated character and control the behavior of the 
"demon-possessed" person.^4 The psycho-dynamics of spiritual 
mediums, through whom the dead are supposed to speak^ has been 
described in similar terms by Ira P r o g o f f . 6 5  Thus, in both 
normal and abnormal mental experience, man tends to interact 
with personified versions of his psychic processes. However, 
normally, the several psychic processes are integrated and 
usually resolve their conflicts by accepting the decision of
Jerome S. Bruner, "Myth and Identity," Daedalus,
LXXX (Spring, 1959), 352.
G^wayne E. Oates, "The Religious Dimensions of the 
Destruction of Personality," The Religious Dimensions of 
Personality (New York; Association Press, 1957) pp. 197-218.
G^ira Progoff,The image of An Oracle: A Report on
Research into the Mediumship of Eileen J. Garret (New York: 
Garrett Publications, 1964).
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the ego; but in the abnormal personality, one or more psychic 
process may be alienated from the others, beyond the control 
of the ego.
The thesis of Bruner's article on "Myth and Identity" 
is that "personality imitates myth in as deep a sense as myth 
is an externali2ation of the vicissitudes of personality."66 
Such a mythological figure as, for instance, the medieval con­
ception of Satan— who closely resembles a crimson satyr with 
Neptune's phallic trident— is obviously a personified projec­
tion of the especially of the libido or sexual drive.
Opposed to this "evil spirit" who tempts man to sin, there is 
the "holy spirit" (a personified projection of the superego in 
this simplified dualism) who urges man to acts of goodness.
This projection or externalisation of psychic processes is 
natural and useful to the mythically oriented imagination 
because of "the human preference to copy with events that are 
outside rather than those that are i n s i d e . T h e  specific 
characteristics of the mythic projection, as externally imagined 
or (in hallucinations) even experienced, are largely determined 
by the mythic world-view of the culture in which the person 
li#es.- This is the approach applied by S. V. McCasland, for 
instance, in The Pioneer of Our Faith; A New Life of Jesus 
(1964). After the mythic world-view of primitive and medieval
^^Bruner, p. 352.
6^Bruner, p. 349.
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Christianity started to break up with, the advance of the 
modern period, men eventually began to apprehend and to 
interact with their psychic processes as internal rather than 
external phenomena, yet the practice of personification con­
tinued. Within the personality, now, we may sense the exist­
ence and activity of several "selves," unless we have learned 
to experience them otherwise.
The various "voices" within may accuse, advise, demand, 
or plead; and the several Vselves" for whom they seem to speak 
are the wishes of the id, the prohibitions and admonitions of 
the superego, the suggestions of the self-image, and the 
reflections of the ego. The wishes of the id express the 
urgent biological drives of the physiological organism; the 
pronouncements of the superego are the ariculation of "duties" 
as assimilated from authority figures or of convictions as 
learned from one's own deeply felt experience and reflection; 
the suggestions of the self-image are, on the one hand, the 
repeated judgments on the inferiority, adequacy, or superiority 
of one's personality as learned from constant interaction with 
others and, on the other hand, either the confirmation or the 
correction of these judgments as occasioned by one's own 
experience; and the reflections of the ego may press the claims 
of unfulfilled psychological needs, arbitrate and resolve the 
conflicts of other impulses ("voices" or "selves"), and 
designate a certain action as essential to the health or 
happiness of the whole person in his environment.
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In a popular exposition, one of the foremost English 
depth^psychologists, Eustace Chesser, has described the 
dialogue among the various voices of our several selves in 
these terms ;
Gradually, you will become aware [during introspection] 
ofla kind of double consciousness. There are the thoughts 
that come unbidden, and there is the self which silently 
observes those thoughts, blotting them out as they arise. 
There are really two selves, each going about its own 
business. There is the restless ego, conjuring up scraps 
of memory and piecing together bits of material already 
in the mind; and there is the Self which watches this 
process and to some extent controls it.68
Chesser differentiates between these two selves— the "ego" 
and the "Self"— by referring to the former as the YOU [the 
lower or apparent self) and the latter as the ^ (the higher 
or real Self). Chesser's simplified dualism thus distinguishes 
between, on the one hand, the subjective impressions from 
irrational psychic processes— the wishes of the id, the pro­
nouncements of the superego, and the suggestions of the self- 
image— as experienced in arbitrary succession and, on the other 
hand, the objective articulation of cortical intelligence, 
which may exert more rational control for the sake of the 
whole and thus integrate the personality, if cultivated and 
exercised in self-determining reflection and decision. Chesser 
recommends a type of introspective meditation intended "to 
intensify consciousness of the 'I' so that it assumes control, 
and you think and act deliberately instead of automatically."
^^Eustace Chesser, Life Is For Living (London:
George G. Harrap and Co., 1962), p. 207.
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Although Chesser suggests the use of the personal 
pronoun "I" to designate the. psychic process of cortical 
Intelligence with which the Individual should Identify and 
which he should cultivate In order to achieve the best 
Integration of his personality, the choice of the grammatical 
person In which one experiences this and other psychic phenomena 
Is Immaterial. The person, gender, number, or even mood in 
which one addresses himself to his psychic processes In prayer 
and meditation does not alter their effect. Whether one 
Imagines that the access of Inspiration which he occasionally 
experiences has its origin In a source within himself or 
beyond himself (as good and bad spirits); whether one addresses 
it as "You," "1," or "He"; and whether one commands, questions, 
or supplicates it, are all matters that depend upon cultural 
and individual assumptions. What actually determines the 
effect is the content of the Imagery in the mind, as it 
envisions a certain goal, and the intention behind whatever 
words are addressed to whatever supposed source. If an effect 
Is physiologically or psychologically possible (and human 
potential is usually far beyond our image of normality), then 
a pattern of belief, expectation, and imagination can actualize 
it. Such is the conclusion of Dr. Bernard C. Cindes, one of 
the foremost American authorities on the psycho-dynamics of 
hypnosis and related psychic p h e n o m e n a . 69
69gee Bernard C. Cindes, New Concepts of Hypnosis 
(New York; Julian Press, Inc.), 1951.
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But one must test the spirits or voices to determine
whether they are good or bad. As one writer has observed,
The Freudian Super Ego, made up as it is of the prohibi­
tions, threatenings and thunderings of all the morbid 
and misguided authorities we have ever met . . . becomes 
our conscience . . . .  Such a morbid conscience is nega­
tive and destructive of life, and itself has to be 
destroyed before its possessor can possibly be whole.
On the other hand a true conscience presses forward 
towards all things which we see to be good and true and 
beautiful; it brings peace of mind, a sense of well 
being and integration. A sin against this true con­
science is to see the light, and to choose the darkness,
"to love the darkness rather than the light."70
The pronouncements of the superego and the suggestions of the
self-image are culturally conditioned and imposed upon the
person. These may be either sound or unsound. Along with
the wishes of the id, they must be judged by the objective
intelligence of the reality-oriented ego, which should be
the court of last resort. The cortical consciousness of the
ego (which is identical with Eustace Chesser's "Self" and
with Matthew Arnold's "Best Self" or "Higher Self") may be
used as a psychic source of inspiration to guide man to
human wholeness.
Thus the critical power of the ego may transform a 
morbid, negative, and destructive superego into a positive 
and constructive ego-ideal, a healthy guiding fiction. As 
old traits and attitudes have been "learned" by us from others, 
so we may "teach" ourselves new traits and attitudes by
70e . N. Ducker, A Christian Therapy for a Neurotic 
World (First American Editron; New York: Taplxnger Publishing
Col, Inc.), pp. 40-41.
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regular meditation designed to confirm new insights and 
reinforce new qualities of character by intensive impression, 
association, and repetition. In this respect, the pragmatic 
effectiveness of formula prayers and set biblical texts, as 
encouraged by traditional religious organizations, has been 
demonstrated by modern psychology.
Communion. The second traditional religious activity
that contemporary naturalistic humanists recommend, like
Arnold, is that of actively supporting an established religious
organization. Randall is insistent on this point. His "The
Meaning of Religion for Man" is in large part a defense of
religion as an organized social institution, which should be
supported by the individual both for his own sake and for the
sake of society.
That some form of religion is indispensable to any society 
seems no longer an open question. It has been lon§ 
debated whether a society could get along without any 
religious organization of its life. Recent experience 
has made it clear that if a traditional religion disinte­
grates, men will not calmly proceed to live without any 
' religion at all. A new religion, or, if we prefer, a new 
substitute for religion, will spring up to fill the vacuum 
and to perform the historic functions of a religion. And 
this new "religion" will be much worse than the old one it 
supplants. For it will be onesided and fanatical. It 
will forget much of what has been learned through the 
bitter experience of generations because it will lack 
what the great historic religions have received, the 
criticism and clarification that have been born of cen­
turies of human experience. The new social faiths of 
Europe [Nazism and Communism] reveal their rawness and 
crudeness at every turn.72
^^See, for instance. Dr. William J1 Bryan, Hr., Religious 
Aspects Of Hypnosis (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas,
Published, 1962)., in which the state of true prayer is des­
cribed as a natural kind of hypnotic condition.
' '^^Randall, "The Meaning of Religion for Man," Preface to 
Philosophy, pp. 318-19.
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Identifying himself as a supporter of the Congregational 
Church and of the Wider Quaker Fellowship, Randall urges modern 
man not only to be "religious" but also to have a "religion," 
preferably a traditional r e l i g i o n . of course, the naturalis­
tic humanist cannot accept the language of traditional reli­
gion-— myth and ritual— in a literal sense. Rather, he must 
understand that the function of myth and ritual is not 
cognitive but affective ; it is concerned not with facts but 
with values— not the letter but the spirit. The function of 
religious language is to move the emotions and to motivate 
the will rather than to instruct the intellect about the 
nature of existence. This is the essential significance of 
myth and ritual, Randall asserts, even though the mass of men 
have always accepted them in a literal sense. "Religious 
language provides a set of symbols in terms of which men can 
express and share the experiences they feel deeply, and relate 
them to the 'things which are not seen.'"^^
In summarizing the cultural worth of traditional
religious institutions, Randall writes:
The three fundamental functions of religion . . . are 
first, celebration, the social observance, in appropriate 
form, of the values to which a group is devoted; secondly, 
consecration, the cooperative dedication to those values; 
and thirdly, clarification, the reflective criticism and 
appraisal of their significance and w o r t h . 75
7 3 Randall, "Naturalistic Humanism," Patterns of Faith,
p. 157.
74Randall, Preface to Philosophy, p. 323.
75ibid., p. 319.
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Thus the spiritual discipline of social coitimunion is 
commended by contemporary naturalistic humanism as well as 
that of personal meditation. Yet Matthew Arnold insisted in 
the nineteenth century that the retention of religion as a 
social institution was essential for the well-being of society 
in general and of its individual members, as we have seen in 
our discussion of his essays on the religious institution 
of Victorian England in Chapter III. Further, we have noted 
his recommendation of certain practices as valid spiritual 
disciplines for modern man; the use of the Bible (reinterpreted 
by Arnold for the Victorian reader) as a source of emotional 
inspiration for ethical conduct; the cultivation of the Best 
Self or Higher Self; identification with Jesus in dying to 
the lower self and living by the higher self; and private 
meditation (as exemplified in Arnold's own Notebooks). In 
these several ways, Arnold has anticipated the growing respect 
of contemporary naturalistic humanists for the usefulness and 
effectiveness of traditional religious techniques in condition­
ing the character of the person to achieve the goal of 
religion— the moralization and, ultimately, the humanization 
of man.
Through this discussion of the cosmology, goal, and 
discipline in the contemporary movement of naturalistic 
humanism and its comparative relation to Arnold's imaginative 
vision, we have been enabled to understand and to appreciate 
more clearly how Arnold's own naturalistic humanism may be
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apprehended as an imaginative vision with a religious, effect; 
how even in the nineteenth century his imaginative vision 
assumed certain of the religio—mythic functions previously 
fulfilled by the religious mythology of supernaturalistic 
Christianity; how Arnold anticipated and perhaps even partly 
inspired the contemporary movement of naturalistic humanism; 
and how his imaginative vision, insofar as it is related to a 
small but impressive group of modern religious thinkers, 
continues to bear a definite relevance and significance.
From the religious perspective of twentieth-century naturalis­
tic humanism, Arnold showed one way for modern religion to go. 
His imaginative vision, although naturalistic and humanistic, 
ministered to certain religio-mythic needs in man.
In ."From Secularism to Humanism: An Aspect of
Victorian Thought," John Gillard Watson writes, "By now, 
Victorian humanism can be seen to be not only a broadening out 
from, and away from eighteenth-century rationalism; it is also 
the foundation of twentieth-century humanism." And, again, 
"Whether we are religious or not, we owe a debt of gratitude 
to those great Victorian families— the Arnolds, the Huxleys, 
the Stephens, the Macaulays, the Trevelyans, and the like— who 
made a culture out of a dogmatic q u a r r e l . "^6 Especially is 
this so, as we have seen, in the case of Matthew Arnold: for,
to repeat the thesis stated in Chapter I, the essential unity
Gillard Watson, "From Secularism to Humanism:
An Aspect of Victorian Thought," Hibbert Journal, LX (January, 
1962), 140.
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both, in the variety of literary works and in th.e life of 
Matthew Arnold is to be apprehended in his dedication as a 
humanist to the humanization of his countrymen by a program 
of humanistic education, which he effected through his poems 
and his essays in criticism (literary, educational, religious, 
social, and political)— wherein he created an imaginative vision 
of the human condition in a naturalistic universe and advocated 
the actualization of an ideal of the good man and of the good 
society— so that his countrymen would be enabled to assume the 
social responsibilities and to pursue the personal opportun­
ities involved in the inevitable development of the modern 
world as an industrial and as a democratic civilization.
A Final Comment; The Vehicle of the Vision 
It has been emphasized in this study that the imagina­
tive vision of Matthew Arnold fulfilled certain religio-mythic 
functions. He originally created his vision to supersede what 
he regarded as an inadequate religio-mythic system. Indeed, he 
regarded it as inadequate precisely because it was mythical.
Yet he undertook to articulate a new vision of reality that, 
if accepted, would assume many of the religio-mythic functions 
previously fulfilled by the religious mythology of supernatura­
listic Christianity; to provide an explanation for natural 
phenomena, to supply sanctions for the social institutions and 
for the cultural life-style, and to resolve the anxiety 
implicit in the human condition— our conscious involvement in
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the mortal situation of peculiar creatures in a strange uni­
verse— by expressing images of God, nature, society, and man 
through which answers to the great questions of human existence 
are suggested.
Now, the traditional mode of religion is myth. The 
normal vehicle of myth (in I. A. Richards' sense of the term) 
is a narrative structure of metaphorical images; and the tenor 
of myth, as A. J. M. Sykes has indicated, is the cosmic or 
social "attitudes," "beliefs," and "values" that are assumed, 
implied, embodied, and affirmed in the narrative structure of 
metaphorical i m a g e s . T h e  religio-mythic effect of a system 
of religious mythology, then, is to communicate its tenor: 
to condition and reinforce cosmic or social attitudes, beliefs, 
and values by embodying them in an effectively pedagogical 
and propagandistic vehicle, which not only clarifies but also 
sanctions these attitudes, beliefs, and values as self-evidently 
validated within the context of the literally accepted 
narrative structure of metaphorical images. Sykes even suggests 
that the vehicle need not necessarily be literally accepted; 
for, even if it is accepted as only symbolically expressive, it 
may nonetheless effectively perform its function.
As we have seen, there is a fundamental consistency in 
Arnold's imaginative vision: it is pervasively unified by a
complex of basic naturalistic and humanistic concepts. This
^^A. J. M. Sykes, "Myth and Attitude Change," Human 
Relations: Studies Towards the integration of the Social
Sciences, XVIII (November, 1965), 324.
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complex of basic concepts (of God, nature, society, and man) 
may have evolved and developed, yet the evolution represented 
an organic development from earlier to later stages in their 
formulation and articulation. These concepts— with the 
cosmic and social attitudes, beliefs, and values that they 
assume, assert, and affirm— constitute the religio-mythic 
tenoE in Arnold's imaginative vision. And insofar as the 
tenor of his vision was successful in resolving the human 
condition by answering the great questions of human existence, 
his vision effectively fulfilled the religio-mythic function 
traditionally fulfilled by a system of religious mythology.
Thus Arnold's vision ministers to certain religio- 
mythic needs; but it is not cast in the traditional mode of 
religion. For the normal mode of religion is myth, whose 
vehicle is the metaphorical image, set in the dramatic context 
of poetic narrative. Yet, in Arnold's shift from supernatura­
lism to naturalism, from poetry to prose, and from narration 
to exposition, the mythic mode of religion is lost. Indeed, 
Arnold's "images" of God, nature, society, and man are not 
really concrete images at all. They are not even literal 
much less metaphorical images. Rather, they are abstract 
concepts.
Now, although abstract ideas (attitudes, beliefs, 
values) are also the tenor of mythvproper, its vehicle is 
concrete images. However, the abstract tenor of Arnold's 
imaginative vision was never effectively embodied in a concrete
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vehicle. Rather, instead of creating concrete images of 
supernatural realities, he expressed a complex of abstract 
concepts about naturalistic realities— the "Eternal,” the 
Zeit-Geist" or "modern Spirit" (the historical process),
"Culture," and the "Best Self."^^ And, instead of formulating 
a narrative structure, he composed expository and argumentative 
essays.
It is true that the comparison-and-contrast organiza­
tion in many of Arnold's essays (as suggested by Robert A.
79Donovan in "The Method of Arnold's Essays in Criticism" )
is organically accommodated to the dialetical structure of
his thought (as suggested by Walter J. Hippie, Jr. in "Matthew
Arnold, Dialectician"^^). It is also true that the texture
of his style is often admirably adapted to his rhetorical
purpose of persuasion (as suggested by John Campbell Major
filin "Matthew Arnold and Attic Prose Style" ). And granted,
*7 A' Interesting studies of Arnold's ideas of the histori­
cal process (which we examined in the "Introduction" to this 
dissertation) are Fraser Neiman's "The Zeitgeist of Matthew 
Arnold," PMLA, LXXII (December, 1957), 977-996, and N. N. Feltes' 
"Matthew Arnold and the Modern Spirit: A Reassessment,"
University of Toronto Quarterly, XXXII (October, 1962), 27-36. 
However, neither sufficiently grasps that Arnold's concept of 
the historical process, like his concept of God, is not in 
any sense a transcendental power but the effect of causes 
immanent in nature and in man.
^^Robert A. Donovan, "The Method of Arnold's Essays in 
Criticism," PMLA, LXXI (December, 1956), 922-931.
^^Walter J. Hippie, Jr., "Matthew Arnold, Dialectician," 
University of Toronto Quarterly, XXXII (October, 1962), 1-26.
Bljohn Campbell Major, "Matthew Arnold and Attic Prose 
Style," PMLA (December, 1944), 1086-1103.
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in Imaginative Reason; Tlie Poetry of Matthew Arnold, A. Dwight 
Culler has demonstrated the existence of recurrent images in 
the poems that may be arranged in a fairly coherent pattern 
that symbolically represents the cycle of human life. But 
the fact remains that no narrative, dramatic, or poetic struc­
ture of metaphorical imagery pervades— consistently, 
comprehensively, and insistently-— the entire canon of Arnold's 
works in which his imaginative vision is expressed and 
created. The tenor of his vision fulfilled certain functions 
of a religious mythology, at least for Arnold himself; but 
the vehicle of his vision is far removed from the traditional 
mythic mode of religion.
Arnold valued the Bible for its poetry, which he 
believed afforded an emotional inspiration to ethical conduct. 
And he believed that someday, perhaps, a poetry of "imagina­
tive reason" would fulfill its function even better. If the 
literary vehicle of his own imaginative vision had been a 
narrative, dramatic, or poetic structure of metaphorical 
images (effectively embodying his naturalistic and humanistic 
attitudes, beliefs, and values), then his own works would 
perhaps qualify as that poetry of the "imaginative reason," 
designed to appeal both to the "emotions and the Heart" and 
to the "senses and understanding" of the "modern spirit."
This is to say that if the mode of his religious vision had been 
more nearly mythic, then it would have fulfilled religio-mythic 
needs more effectively. But a man writes as he must and as 
he can.
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